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Plaint iff-appellant United Park City Mines Company ("United Park") appeals from
the judgment of the Third Judicial District Court dismissing United Park's Amended
Complaint against defendant-appellees Atlantic Richfield Company ("ARCO"), successor
to The Anaconda Company ("Anaconda"); ASARCO, INC. ("ASARCO"); Greater Park City
Company ("GPCC"), and its parent, Alpine Meadows of Tahoe, Inc. ("AMOT"); Royal
Street Land Company, Deer Valley Resort Company, Royal Street of Utah and Royal
Street Development Company, Inc. (collectively "Royal Street"); Morgan Guaranty Trust
Company of New York ("Morgan"), Fidelity Bank of Philadelphia ("Fidelity"), and their
wholly owned subsidiaries Greater Properties, Inc. ("GPI"), and Park Properties, Inc.
("PPI") (collectively "Morgan-Fidelity"); and intervenor-appellee Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
("Wells Fargo").
INTRODUCTION
In

1975, Anaconda

(now ARCO) and ASARCO, United

Park's

controlling

shareholders, caused United Park to enter into a number of interrelated contracts and
leases (the "1975 Resort Agreements"), which gave away for essentially nothing United
Park's major equity interest in GPCC, including the profitable Park City Ski Resort
operations and facilities, the planned development of the Deer Valley resort area, and
other valuable developable real property and water rights. Anaconda and ASARCO did
so, to the great detriment of United Park and its other shareholders, because they
decided in late 1974 that the ski resort and land development business was a distraction
from their paramount corporate interest — mining — and that United Park would "get out
of the resort business." They gave away United Park's major equity interest in these ski
resorts and their great potential, to concentrate on and to protect their discrete and
disproportionate interests in Park City Ventures, a joint venture conducting mining
operations on United Park's property.

Through these actions, Anaconda and ASARCO

breached their fiduciary duties as controlling shareholders to United Park and its other
1

shareholders.
Royal Street and Morgan-Fidelity also owed fiduciary duties to United Park as coshareholders with United Park in GPCC, a closely-held corporation, and breached those
duties by obtaining unfair advantage over United Park in the 1975 Resort Agreements.
GPCC and AMOT aided and abetted the fiduciary duty breaches by Anaconda, ASARCO,
Royal Street and Morgan-Fidelity to their financial advantage. Anaconda and ASARCO,
assisted by the other defendants, concealed material facts regarding the 1975 Resort
Agreements from United Park's outside shareholders.
In August 1985, for the first time in its history, United Park had a Board of
Directors and management independent of Anaconda and ASARCO. Prior to that time,
United Park's Board was controlled by Anaconda and ASARCO through employees, former
employees, attorneys, bankers, and persons who, due to business, contractual and
historical relationships with Anaconda and ASARCO and other conflicts of interest, would
not act independently for the best interests of United Park. After new management
arrived in August 1985, certain apparent violations of the Resort Agreements by GPCC
and Royal Street ultimately led new management to investigate the circumstances
surrounding the 1975 Resort Agreements. That investigation was difficult because many
critical documents were not in United Park's files and certain key witnesses, affiliated
with defendants, refused to talk to United Park management.
The district court erroneously held that United Park's fiduciary duty claims are
time-barred as a matter of law, because United Park discovered or should have discovered
the claims through outside shareholders and independent directors in 1975. The critical
fact issue in deciding whether United Park's fiduciary duty claims are time-barred is
whether, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, United Park's outside shareholders
could have discovered these claims prior to new management's arrival in August 1985.
The combination of control by Anaconda and ASARCO, the directors' involvement in the
2

wrongdoing and defendants' concealment of certain critical facts, made it not possible,
through reasonable diligence, for the claims to have been discovered or asserted earlier.
In all events, that issue and several others raised by defendants' motions to dismiss and
for summary judgment were issues of fact.

The district court committed clear error in

dismissing United Park's Amended Complaint as a matter of law. At a minimum, United
Park should have been permitted to complete necessary discovery.
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2 (3)(j) (1953, as
amended).
ISSUES FOR REVIEW
1.

Did the district-court err when it granted summary judgment in the face of

United Park's affidavit, filed pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 56(f), which demonstrated
United Park's need for additional discovery on the statute of limitations, breach of
fiduciary duty and breach of contract issues?
2.

Did the district court err in granting summary judgment dismissing United

Park's claims for breach of fiduciary duty in connection with the 1975 Resort Agreements,
as barred by the statute of limitations, when there are genuine issues of material fact
as to whether United Park discovered or in the exercise of reasonable diligence could
have discovered its fiduciary duty claims in 1975 or anytime prior to new management's
arrival in 1985?
3.

Did the district court err in granting summary judgment dismissing United

Park's claims for breach of fiduciary duty as barred by the Bangor Punta doctrine, even
though (1) Anaconda and ASARCO owned and sold only 31% of the United Park stock; (2)
only the Loeb Investors Company XL ("Loeb") purchased any stock from Anaconda or
ASARCO; (3) defendants' presented no evidence that United Park would receive a
windfall from a recovery from Anaconda or ASARCO; and (4) the Bangor Punta doctrine
3

has no application to claims against non-selling third parties?
4.

Did the district court err in granting summary judgment dismissing United

Park's breach of fiduciary duty claims against Anaconda and ASARCO based on the bald,
unsupported conclusion that ff[n]o genuine issues of material fact exist regarding [United
Park ! s] allegations against Anaconda and ASARCO," when United Park alleged and
presented evidence of the breaches of duty, and Anaconda and ASARCO did not even seek
summary judgment on this ground?
5.

Did the district court err in dismissing, pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6),

United Park's claims against AMOT and GPCC for aiding and abetting breaches of
fiduciary duty, when the tort of aiding and abetting fiduciary breaches is clearly
recognized and there are genuine issues of material fact as to whether these defendants
are liable for that tort?
6.

Did the district court err in granting defendants' motions to dismiss or for

summary judgment dismissing United Park's prayer for reformation of the Resort
Agreements?
7.

Did the district court err in granting defendants GPCC and Royal Street

summary judgment dismissing United Park's claims that GPCC and Royal Street breached
the Resort Agreements?
8.

Did the district court err in granting summary judgment dismissing United

Park's trespass claims against GPCC?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standard of review for the district court's refusal to permit United Park to
complete discovery is abuse of discretion. Where, as here, the non-moving party makes
a showing under Rule 56(f) that additional discovery is relevant to the issues on summary
judgment and that the request for more time to complete discovery is not dilatory, it is
an abuse of discretion for the court to deny the opportunity to complete discovery. Cox
4

v. Winters, 678 P.2d 311, 312-15 (Utah 1984); Strand v. Associated Students of Univ.
of Utah, 561 P.2d 191, 193-94 (Utah 1977).
The standard of review of the district court's grant of summary judgment under
Rule 56 is a de novo determination whether, after construing all facts and reasonable
inferences in the light most favorable to United Park, defendants, the moving parties,
demonstrated the absence of any genuine issue of material fact and their entitlement to
judgment as a matter of law. Since summary judgment is granted as a matter of law, this
Court gives no deference to the district court's legal conclusions. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c);
Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. State, 779 P. 2d 634, 636 (Utah 1989); Barber v. Farmers
Ins. Exchange, 751 P.2d 248, 251 (Utah App. 1988).
The standard of review for the district court's grant of a motion to dismiss under
Rule 12(b)(6) is the de novo determination as to whether, assuming the truth of United
Park's allegations, the Amended Complaint, as a matter of law, fails to state any valid
claim for which relief can be granted. Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); see Conley v. Gibson,
355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1357
at 600-04 (1969); see also Davis v. Payne & Day, Inc., 348 P.2d 337, 338 (Utah 1960).
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS
Sections 78-12-25(3) and 78-12-27, Utah Code Ann. (1953, as amended); Utah R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(6), and 56(c) & (f). 1
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Parties
Plaintiff-appellant United Park, a Delaware corporation maintaining its principal
place of business in Salt Lake City, Utah, is a public company with more than 5,000
shareholders.

United Park is the successor of mining companies which, since the

Pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 24(f), these provisions and the district court's Findings
of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Orders are reproduced in the Addendum.
5

nineteenth century, operated mines around Park City, Utah. Due to adverse market and
technological conditions, United Park has not actively mined its properties since 1982,
but these conditions are dynamic and may permit renewed mining activity in the future.
United Park continues to maintain its mill and mining properties. In 1963, United Park
began operating the Park City Ski Resort. In 1971, United Park entered into interrelated
contracts and leases conveying to GPCC the resort facilities, and certain water and real
property rights.
Defendant-appellee ARCO, a Delaware corporation, merged with Anaconda in 1977.
The now merged Anaconda/ARCO interests are referred to as "Anaconda." At all material
times, Anaconda was engaged in the mining business. From 1953 until 1985, Anaconda was
a controlling shareholder of United Park. Defendant-appellee ASARCO is a New Jersey
corporation also engaged in mining.

From 1953 until 1985, ASARCO was a controlling

shareholder of United Park.
Defendant-appellee GPCC is a Utah corporation which has operated the Park City
Ski Resort and engaged in land development since 1971. Between 1971 and 1975, GPCC
was a closely-held corporation owned by United Park, Royal Street, Morgan-Fidelity and
Unionamerica. As a result of the 1975 Resort Agreements, GPCC became a wholly-owned
subsidiary of defendant-appellee AMOT, a Delaware corporation.

Nicholas Badami

("Badami") is the President of AMOT and the Chairman of GPCC.
The defendants-appellees collectively referred to as "Royal Street" are several
related entities owned or controlled by Edgar Stern. Deer Valley Resort Company ("Deer
Valley") is a Utah limited partnership which operates the Deer Valley Ski Resort. Royal
Street of Utah ("RSU"), a Utah corporation, is the general partner of Deer Valley. Royal
Street Land Company ("Land"), a Utah corporation engaged in the ski resort and land
development businesses, which owns virtually all of the stock of RSU, has effective
control over RSU and, through RSU, control over Deer Valley. Royal Street Development
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Company, Inc. ("RSDC") is a California corporation and is the affiliate and alter ego of
Deer Valley, RSU and Land. RSDC was a shareholder of GPCC from 1971 to 1975 and
operated GPCC during that period under a Management Agreement.
Defendant-appellee Morgan is a New York corporation engaged in banking.
Defendant-appellee

Fidelity is a Pennsylvania corporation

engaged

in banking.

Defendants-appellees GPI and PPI are Delaware corporations wholly owned by Morgan
and Fidelity on behalf of certain commingled pension trusts of which Morgan and Fidelity
are Trustees. GPI and PPI were incorporated by Morgan and Fidelity in 1975 to receive
a percentage of ski lease income from revenue generated by GPCC at the Park City Ski
Resort and to own the ski resort base facility,

Morgan, Fidelity, GPI and PPI are

sometimes referred to collectively as "Morgan-Fidelity."
Intervenor-appellee Wells Fargo has loaned money to Royal Street and its loans
are secured by mortgages on certain real and personal property.
Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings
In May 1986 United Park filed its initial Complaint against GPCC and Royal Street
alleging fraud and contract breaches. United Park filed an Amended Complaint in June
1988.

The Amended Complaint added as defendants Anaconda, ASARCO, AMOT and

Morgan-Fidelity.
United Park's Amended Complaint (R. 2760-2848) contains Twelve Claims for
Relief. The First and Second Claims seek damages from Anaconda and ASARCO, United
Park's controlling shareholders, for breaches of their fiduciary duties of loyalty, fairness
and care in causing United Park to enter into the unfair 1975 Resort Agreements. The
Third Claim asserts that GPCC, AMOT, Royal Street and Morgan-Fidelity aided and
abetted Anaconda's and ASARCO's breaches of duty and seeks damages and equitable
remedies.

The Fourth Claim asserts that Royal Street and Morgan-Fidelity breached

fiduciary duties they owed to United Park as co-shareholders in GPCC, and that AMOT
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aided and abetted those breaches.

The Fifth and Sixth Claims allege contractual and

lease breaches by GPCC and Royal Street, The Seventh Claim alleges trespass by GPCC
on United Park's land.

The Eighth and Ninth Claims against GPCC and Royal Street,

respectively, seek to remedy underpayment of ski lift revenues owing to United Park.
The Tenth Claim alleges that GPCC violated its duty of good faith in its contractual
relations with United Park.

The Eleventh Claim, against Morgan-Fidelity, seeks a

declaration of Morgan-Fidelity's rights under the 1975 Resort Agreements. The Twelfth
Claim, against GPCC and Royal Street, seeks reformation of the Water Agreement to
permit United Park to use its 2850 gallons per minute reservation for all purposes.
Before any responsive pleadings to the Amended Complaint were filed and before
any significant discovery could be obtained from Anaconda and ASARCO, or completed
with the other parties, Anaconda and ASARCO filed motions to disqualify United Park's
counsel.

(R. 2920-36; 3119-90)

These disqualification motions, although ultimately

denied, (R. 3509-22; 3523-36) stayed discovery on the merits of United Park's claims
through November 1989. (R. 3640-51)
In December 1989, immediately after the stay was lifted, defendants filed motions
to dismiss or for summary judgment. (R. 3682-3874 (GPCC); 3875-78, 4384-4404 (MorganFidelity); 3879-3922 (ASARCO); 3923-4127 (ARCO); 4128-4383 (Royal Street); and 440534, 4505-07 (AMOT); 4449-4497 (Wells Fargo)) United Park filed a lengthy memorandum
(R. 4523-4728) together with six affidavits (R. 4729-4867) and several volumes of exhibits
(R. 4868-6777) which clearly demonstrated the existence of genuine issues of material
fact precluding summary judgment. One affidavit, submitted pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P.
56(f), demonstrated that significant and relevant discovery had not been completed.
(R. 4862-67) The district court heard argument on all pending motions on April 4, 1990.
On April 12, 1990, the court issued Memorandum Decisions granting defendants' motions
to dismiss and for summary judgment essentially in their entirety.
8

(R. 7651-97)

On May 15, 1990, over United Park's written objections (R. 7701-54), the district
court entered Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Orders, drafted by defendants.
(R. 7821-48; 7851-56)

The Orders dismissed United Park's Amended Complaint with

prejudice in its entirety as to all defendants except GPCC, and dismissed all claims with
prejudice as to GPCC except for one factually distinct claim, Id. By Order of May 30,
1990, the district court directed entry of final judgment against United Park pursuant to
Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b). (R. 7881-82)
The district court held, as a matter of law, that (1) United Park's claims
challenging the 1975 Resort Agreements were barred by the three-year statute of
limitations in Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-27 or the four-year limitation in § 78-12-25(3)
because United Park knew or should have known of its claims in 1975; (2) the claims
challenging the 1975 Resort Agreements were barred by the doctrine of Bangor Punta
Operations, Inc. v. Bangor & Aroostock R.R. Co., 417 U.S. 703 (1974) ("Bangor PuntaM);
(3) no genuine issues of fact existed as to United Park's claims against Anaconda and
ASARCO; (4) United Park had failed to state claims against GPCC or AMOT for aiding
and abetting breaches of fiduciary duty; (5) United Park's claim for reformation of the
Resort Agreements was barred due to United Park's acceptance of payments under the
Agreements or because of the Wells Fargo Estoppel Certificates; (6) GPCC's breach of
the Water Agreement had been cured by payment of the price owing under that agreement
and that United Park's other claims for breach were not breaches or had been cured or
waived; and (7) GPCC has not committed trespass through the construction of a ski lift
tower and maintenance building on United Park property.
The district court committed fundamental and sweeping error. In its haste to be
rid of United Park's Amended Complaint, the court denied United Park the right to
complete discovery, misapplied the standards governing summary judgment and motions to
dismiss, and resolved critical disputed factual issues and inferences in defendants' favor.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
The following statement of facts provides this Court with an understanding of the
Agreements at issue, the relationships among the parties, and the facts that support the
allegations in United Park's Amended Complaint-

To avoid repetition, the facts that

directly controvert the district court's findings are stated in detail in the Argument.
Anaconda's and ASARCO f s Control of United Park
When United Park was formed by consolidation in 1953, Anaconda and ASARCO
acquired a combined 24% equity interest.

By 1972, their interest in United Park had

increased to 32%. Anaconda and ASARCO generally voted their stock as one block and
were able to effectively control United Park from 1953 until the summer of 1985 when
they sold their shares to Loeb. Through 1982, Anaconda and ASARCO each elected two
of their employees to the seven-member United Park Board, thereby

effectively

controlling the Board.2 (R. 4818-20) All significant actions by United Park's Board were
either at the direction or with the consent of Anaconda and ASARCO.

Anaconda's

representative on United Park's Board and counsel for Royal Street have admitted that
Anaconda and ASARCO controlled United Park in 1975. (R. 7922 at 24; 7930 at 104)
United Park's three outside directors were usually individuals with prior or existing
business or professional relationships with Anaconda or ASARCO, such as retired
employees, attorneys, bankers and mining consultants. In 1975 the three outside directors
were Harold Steele, President of First Security Bank, Miles Romney, a mining consultant,

2

In 1981, Wheeler M. Sears, president of Cimarron Corp., joined United Park's Board.
In 1982, one of Anaconda's employees on the board, Clark Wilson, was replaced by Ivan
Yerger, also a representative of Cimarron Corp. Anaconda's other employee on the Board,
Herbert Weed, retired from Anaconda in 1982, but remained on United Park's Board as
an "independent" director. (R. 4113) Between 1982 and 1985, Cimarron pursued a merger
with United Park, which required the support and approval of Anaconda and ASARCO.
(R. 4770-75) Cimarron entered successive option agreements in 1981 and 1984 to
purchase Anaconda's shares in United Park.
(R. 4771-72, 4774-75)
Cimarron
representatives could take no action in conflict with the interests of Anaconda or
ASARCO, who continued in effective control of United Park through 1985.
10

and S. N. Cornwall, formerly a member of the law firm of VanCott, Bagley, Cornwall &
McCarthy ("the Vancott firm").
In 1985, Anaconda and ASARCO sold their entire interest in United Park,
approximately 1,681,549 shares, to Loeb for $3,978,034, or approximately $2.37 per share
(R. 4737). In 1975, United Park stock traded at or substantially below $2.37 per share
Id. Loeb is the only United Park shareholder to have purchased stock from Anaconda or
ASARCO.

United Park's other shareholders, representing approximately 68% of the

outstanding shares, did not purchase shares from any defendant.

(R. 4736-37; 6962)

Regardless of the outcome of this litigation, it is unlikely that United Park will be able
to pay a dividend in the foreseeable future (R. 4737).
The 1971 Resort Agreements and Creation of GPCC
Over the years, United Park acquired vast acreage and water rights in and around
Park City, including the Deer Valley area.

This property presented an excellent

opportunity for a major ski resort, which United Park began to develop in the early
1960 f s. The Park City Ski Resort, then known as the Treasure Mountain Resort, opened
in late 1963 with base and summit facilities, chair lifts and a gondola, and approximately
27 miles of ski runs. United Park also developed a nine-hole golf course adjacent to the
base facilities.

(R. 4737-38)

Resort operations grew each year, but additional

development was required to establish Park City as a destination resort and realize its
full profit potential. (R. 6305-07)
In 1970, Edgar Stern of Royal Street made a proposal to Anaconda and ASARCO
to expand and develop United Park's resort properties. Stern proposed a partnership in
which United Park would contribute the land and water, including its existing Park City
ski operations and resort properties. Royal Street would manage and develop the resort,
and would find a third partner to contribute capital.

(R. 7930 at 41-6; 7946 at 64-8)

Anaconda and ASARCO agreed to Stern's proposal. For tax reasons, the parties formed
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a closely-held corporation — GPCC — instead of a partnership, and agreed that United
Park would sell its resort operations, real property, and other property rights to GPCC.
(R. 7946 at 62-4)

In May 1970, United Park and GPCC entered an Option Agreement

(R. 6258-86), which provided that if GPCC obtained $4,500,000 from the contemplated
financial partner, the following agreements would be executed:
Land Purchase Agreement ("Land Agreement"). United Park would sell to GPCC
approximately

4,200 acres suitable for

commercial, condominium and

subdivision

development, together with the base resort facilities, golf course and other resort
improvements for $5,400,000 payable over time, (R. 4872-5016) These terms were very
favorable for GPCC. (R. 4740-41)
Ski Area Leases ("Ski Leases"). United Park would lease to GPCC 432 acres under
the Crescent Ridge Lease, 47 acres under the Deer Valley Lease, and 5,631 acres which
included the then-existing ski runs under the Resort Area Lease. (R. 5167-88, 5217-38,
5307-41)

Each Ski Lease had an initial 20-year term and one additional 20-year

extension.

United Park would receive only 1% of the first $100,000 of ski lift revenue

and one half of one percent (.5%) of the lift revenue over $100,000 for the first 20-year
term with a one-half of one percent increase during the extension. This 40-year term and
minimal rental was extremely favorable for GPCC even in contrast to public land leases,
which generally have lower rentals than private land leases. (R. 4740-41)
Water Rights Purchase Agreement ("Water Agreement"). United Park would sell
certain valuable water rights to GPCC for $500,000 over time, but title would not pass
until the other agreements were fully performed.

(R. 5087-5116) United Park reserved

the prior right to use 2850 gallons per minute from certain of the water rights for
"mining, milling and related purposes." (R. 5089)
The Land and Water Agreements and the Resort Area Lease each included a "crossdefault" provision which entitled United Park to declare a default on the other two
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agreements if GPCC defaulted under any one of them.

(R. 4899-4905; 5101; 5318-19)

The cross-default provisions were to protect United Park so that United Park could
reclaim a viable, operational ski resort if GPCC defaulted on any portion of the related
agreements. (R. 4804-05; 4743-44) In return for conveying its ski resort, land and water
rights to GPCC on such favorable terms, United Park received the right to participate
as a major equity owner in the growth and development of Park City as a destination ski
resort through an option to purchase up to 900,000 shares of GPCCfs common stock and
900,000 shares of preferred stock over three years. (R. 6303)
The 1971 Resort Agreements were approved by United Park shareholders, effective
January 1, 1971. In mid-1972, Royal Street obtained the contemplated financial partner,
Morgan-Fidelity, which together invested $4,000,000 in GPCC unsecured subordinated
notes.

In 1973, Morgan invested another $1,500,000 in GPCC unsecured subordinated

notes.

(R. 6397-98)

Between 1972 and 1974, United Park purchased 900,000 shares

(39%) of GPCC common stock and 900,000 shares (some two-thirds) of GPCC preferred
stock, paying a total price of $972,000.

(R. 5499)

Royal Street acquired 24% and

Morgan-Fidelity 20% of GPCC's common shares. (R. 6477)
Royal Street's Mismanagement of GPCC and GPCC's Default
In 1971, Royal Street began operating GPCC and developing the United Park
properties subject to the Land Agreement. Unionamerica, a California lending institution,
provided interim financing for the construction of condominiums and commercial business
properties.

(R. 6397-8; 6478A)

Between 1972 and 1974, Unionamerica made secured

loans to GPCC at three to six percent over the prime rate, and purchased a small number
of shares in GPCC.

(R. 7946 at 113-17)

The land development and resort expansion,

along with the growing success of the skiing operations, greatly enhanced the value of
the real property, both developed and undeveloped, that United Park had contributed to
GPCC. (R. 6392-93) Revenue from skiing continued to increase and generated significant
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profits, and the number of actual skier days rose dramatically as Park City became a
destination ski resort. (R. 6393) During the 1973-74 and 1974-75 ski seasons, the resort
earned profits of more than $1 million each year, and accounted for one-third of Utah's
ski market,

(R. 4754; 6390)

Throughout much of 1972, 1973 and 1974, however, Royal Street committed serious
management

errors,

including

over-expansion,

negligent

construction

practices,

construction cost overruns and continually unsound debt/equity ratios, which, when
combined with rising interest rates, generated substantial book losses for GPCC.
(R. 6390; 7954 at 26-7; 7921 at 130-32) Despite the successful expansion and profitability
of the ski resort operations, Royal Street's land development projects generated such
large losses and so impaired cash flow that by the summer of 1974 GPCC was
highly-leveraged and unable to service its growing debt, then in excess of $20 million.
(R. 6390; 7921 at 81-2; 7947 at 260-61; 7973, Ex. 21 at 827) In July 1974, Royal Street
requested and received from GPCC's common stockholders a $2 million loan, pro rated
in accordance with their stock ownership, until a long-term financial solution was found.
In early 1975, GPCC failed to make substantial payments due United Park under
the Land and Water Agreements. GPCC claimed that it was unable to make the payments,
but it continued to make payments on other land purchase contracts with third parties.
(R. 4748-49; 4782)

Due to GPCC's defaults, United Park was entitled under the

cross-default provisions to terminate all of the 1971 Resort Agreements, take possession
of the Park City resort facilities and all other unconveyed properties subject to the Land
Agreement (some 2,278 acres), all water rights subject to the Water Agreement, all real
property subject to the Resort Area Leases and have the Deer Valley and Crescent Ridge
Leases deemed non-exclusive. See supra at 12-13.
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Anaconda's and ASARCOys Breach of Duty
In 1970, Anaconda and ASARCO formed a joint venture, Park City Ventures, to
mine United Park's properties. As controlling shareholders, Anaconda and ASARCO caused
United Park to lease to Park City Ventures all of its mining property and equipment.
Under the lease, Anaconda and ASARCO were to receive two-thirds of the net mining
profits.

(R. 6291-93) Because of their holdings in Park City Ventures, Anaconda's and

ASARCOfs interests in United Park differed from the interests of United Park's other
shareholders.

(R. 7954 at 110; 7930 at 105, 112) With the Park City Ventures Mining

Lease and the 1971 Resort Agreements, United Park was transformed into a holding
company wholly dependent on Park City Ventures, operated by Anaconda and ASARCO,
and on GPCC, operated by Royal Street.

(R. 4744)

In late 1974, Anaconda and ASARCO decided to cause United Park to get out of
the ski resort and land development business. Clark Wilson, one of Anaconda's employees
on the United Park and GPCC Boards, admitted in deposition that in 1975 Anaconda and
ASARCO controlled United Park, and that it was their "policy" to "get out of the resort
business" because their first interest was mining. (R. 7930 at 104-5)

Wilson testified

that Anaconda was very anxious to protect the mineral property (R. 7932 at 475), and
believed that a threatened bankruptcy of GPCC could have a negative impact on the Park
City Ventures mining lease.

(R. 7932 at 474-76)

Anaconda's principal goal was to

protect the mining lease, and Wilson's first duty to Anaconda was to make sure that
United Park did not do anything during any restructuring of GPCC that would interfere
with the mining lease. (R. 7930 at 104-5, 112; 7932 at 473)

"[A]nything we thought we

could arrive at for the interests that Anaconda and ASARCO represented had to be
cleared in New York."

(R. 7932 at 411). Wilson also conceded that, with respect to

United Park's surface assets, the interests of Anaconda and ASARCO differed from the
interests of United Park's other shareholders. (R. 7930 at 112) Anaconda and ASARCO
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refused to allow United Park to preserve its equity in GPCC or its interest in the resort's
property and other assets, even though they knew that the value of the resort and the
real property that United Park had contributed to GPCC had increased greatly since 1971.
In a memorandum to the Anaconda files dated March 26, 1975, for example, Wilson wrote
that the "value of the properties is now much greater than in the [1971] UPC contract,
perhaps 10 times." (R. 6467)
Royal Street's and Morgan-Fidelity's Breach of Duty
During 1974 and early 1975, Royal Street, Morgan-Fidelity and Unionamerica held
discussions about restructuring GPCC to relieve its debts and realize its future growth
potential. Royal Street, Morgan-Fidelity and Unionamerica3 knew that United Park was
controlled by Anaconda and ASARCO, and that Anaconda and ASARCO had no interest in
preserving United Park's interests in the ski resort but were concerned solely with
protecting their mining interests. Gilbert Butler, Morgan-Fidelity's representative in the
restructuring of GPCC, testified in deposition that Anaconda and ASARCO "had zero
interest in the future of the ski area, zero," and were "very, very serious about trying
to protect their mining rights." (R. 7954 at 109-10) Butler testified that the focus of
the mining companies was almost exclusively on the mining and the protection of the
mining interests and what they had coming under the old 1971 agreements.

Id. The

mining companies did not attempt to obtain anything more than that (R. 7954 at 110-11),
because "they basically wanted to protect their mine and protect their principal."
(R. 7954 at 112) Consequently, Morgan "never really had any cause to negotiate very
much" with Anaconda and ASARCO. Id. Donald Prell, Unionamerica?s representative,
also testified in deposition that United Park "wanted to be sure that down the road they
collected these funds" they were owed on the 1971 agreements. "They didn't want to

3

Unionamerica, which went out of existence in 1983, is not a party to this action.
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wind up getting back" the resort properties because they "had the subsurface, the mines
that they wanted, obviously, to keep." (R. 7921 at 49)
Royal Street, Morgan-Fidelity, and Unionamerica thus knew that Anaconda and
ASARCO would agree to restructure GPCC on terms grossly unfair to United Park to
protect Park City Ventures.

(R. 7954 at 110, 148; 7930 at 104-5, 112)

Royal Street,

Morgan-Fidelity, and Unionamerica were each willing to restructure GPCC but only if
each received substantial equity, property, or participation in the growth of the resort.
By spring 1975, Royal Street, Morgan-Fidelity, and Unionamerica agreed to a division of
GPCC's assets that enabled each to obtain its objectives.
Unionamerica and Morgan-Fidelity had lost confidence in Royal S t r e e t ' s ability to
manage the ski resort. Unionamerica decided not to provide capital to restructure GPCC,
and to require satisfaction of its secured loans to GPCC and receive something for its
equity. (R. 7921 at 127; 7953 at 73-4) Morgan-Fidelity recognized that the successful
ski resort would be very profitable in the hands of competent management.

Therefore,

Morgan-Fidelity determined to convert their unsecured investment in GPCC to an
ownership interest in the ski resort facilities and the ski mountain leasehold, which would
provide them a large percentage of the ski lift revenue generated by new management.
Morgan-Fidelity also determined to have United Park extend the terms of the Ski Leases
on the same highly favorable rentals that United Park had given GPCC originally so that
Morgan-Fidelity could reap those large profits for as long as possible.

(R. 7954 at 49-

50, 55, 121) Morgan-Fidelity threatened a GPCC bankruptcy if United Park did not agree
to at least two 20-year extensions. (R. 6373; 7954 at 55, 144)
Royal Street wanted to develop all of the properties that United Park had
contributed to GPCC, and had plans to develop the Deer Valley properties as a new and
exclusive resort.

(R. 4790-91; 4859-60; 7946 at 93; 7921 at 34)

Like Anaconda and

ASARCO, Royal Street knew that the real property United Park had contributed to GPCC
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had increased greatly in value. In spring 1975, Royal Street prepared prospectuses for
GPCC stating the residual values of the United Park properties at $37.8 million, excluding
the Park City Resort base facilities, golf course, and water rights.

(R. 6529)

The

prospectuses valued United Park's Deer Valley properties alone at more than $15 million.
(R. 6521; 4751-52)

Royal Street insisted that it receive United Park's Deer Valley

properties, other properties near the resort facilities and Thaynes Canyon, and certain
water rights, as part of any restructuring.
Royal Street,

Morgan-Fidelity

(R. 7954 at 53; 7921 at 34)

and Unionamerica

rejected

alternatives

for

restructuring GPCC inconsistent with their objectives 4 and sought an experienced operator
to run the Park City Ski Resort.

In early 1975, Royal Street negotiated with Vail

Associates, the operator of the Vail Colorado ski resort, and Disney Properties of
California.

(R. 7921 at 110; 7954 at 51; 7940 at 33) Royal Street made clear that the

Deer Valley properties were unavailable because Royal Street intended to retain these
properties for itself.

(R. 7954 at 53; 7921 at 34)

Disney was not interested in this

limited investment without developable real estate (R. 7940 at 33-34), and Vail indicated
that for internal reasons it could not make a decision for several months.

4

(R. 7975,

In fall 1974, GPCC requested Salomon Brothers, Inc. ("Salomon"), a prominent New
York investment banking house, to analyze and recommend possible methods of
recapitalizing GPCC. Salomon developed a number of recapitalization plans in which each
of United Park's shareholders maintained its equity interest. The plans were designed
to enable GPCC to meet its future obligations, with an appropriate margin of safety,
assuming no additional capital investment by present security holders or outside investors.
(R. 6332-44)
The recapitalization plans also contemplated no changes in the
miscellaneous secured notes held by non-GPCC affiliated persons, the construction notes
held by Unionamerica or in the existing preferred stock. The plans described the United
Park notes due in 1987 as "the most senior security in [GPCC's] capital structure, having
a prior lien on substantially all the resort's properties and facilities," and proposed that
these notes would retain their senior, fully secured position. (R. 6335) Salomon stated
that it believed the plans were "fair and equitable to all present security holders on the
basis of their current position within [GPCC's] capital structure." (R. 6333) There is
evidence that certain members of the United Park Board, such as S.N. Cornwall, were not
informed of the Salomon recommendations.
(R. 4802; 4786-87)
Salomon's
recommendations were never implemented.
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Ex. 51) The Aspen Ski Resort owners notified United Park in April 1975 that Aspen would
be interested in purchasing the operations if GPCC could not meet its obligations to
United Park and United Park took back the ski area.

(R. 6599)

United Park's

management did not pursue this option. (R. 4750)
Royal Street and Morgan-Fidelity then negotiated with Nick Badami of AMOT,
presenting AMOT with a most favorable opportunity: for a modest investment it could
acquire a unique and profitable ski operation, together with valuable real estate, including
a golf course and other commercial property suitable for hotel sites and condominiums,
and one-half of United Park's water rights, all at the favorable 1971 prices. AMOT and
Badami knew the increased 1975 values of the land and the ski resort from the GPCC
prospectuses.

(R. 7946 at 131)

Gilbert Butler, Morgan-Fidelity's representative, who

favored Vail to acquire GPCC, said that Vail "walked away from the greatest corporate
opportunity in their history and Nick Badami was smart enough to pick it up." (R. 7954
at 94) In the negotiations, Badami joined Morgan-Fidelity in insisting on two additional
20-year Ski Lease extensions from United Park. (R. 7921 at 58, 139-40; 7939 at 237)
The 1975 Resort Agreements
In June 1975, AMOT, Morgan-Fidelity, Royal Street, Unionamerica and United Park
management entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (R. 6625-57), which divided up the
assets of GPCC as follows:
Royal Street. Royal Street was assigned GPCC's rights under the 1971 Land and
Water Agreements to purchase from United Park — at the favorable 1971 prices but with
further extended payments — the Deer Valley properties, other properties near the Park
City resort facilities and Thaynes Canyon, and one-half of United Park's water rights.
Royal Street valued these properties and water rights at more than $18 million. (R. 6521;
4751-52) The amounts remaining to be paid for these properties and water rights under
the 1971 Agreements was approximately $1.9 million. (R. 6638)
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In addition, United Park agreed to sell other properties with great potential value
as building sites that Royal Street needed to develop the Deer Valley area.

These

properties had not been included in the original 1971 Land Agreement, and were
subsequently sold to Royal Street at prices below their market value and some at prices
below United Park's cost. (R. 6374; 4752) Royal Street was also assigned the right to
lease for skiing purposes 1,834 acres in an expanded Deer Valley Lease for the same low
rentals as in the original 47-acre Deer Valley Lease, with two additional 20-year
extensions at nominal rental increases. (R. 5291-97; 6639)
In return, Royal Street cancelled $250,000 in subordinated notes, its shareholder
loan to GPCC of $694,420, and a questionable claim for accrued management fees of
$366,000.

Royal Street also sold the GPCC preferred and common stock which it

purchased for about $530,000 to AMOT and Unionamerica for $4,000. Royal Street also
agreed to assume a $1.5 million loan which it had previously guaranteed.
Morgan-Fidelity. Through their subsidiaries, GPI and PPI, Morgan-Fidelity became
the owners of 210 acres on which the Park City base resort facilities are located and 53
acres of contiguous property, and the lessees of United Park under the Resort Area and
Crescent Ridge Leases.

These two leases were extended for two additional 20-year

terms, from the year 2011 to the year 2051. Morgan-Fidelity then sublet the ski resort
property to GPCC for an increasing percentage of GPCC's ski lift revenue between 1975
and 1983. For the remaining 67 years on the lease, Morgan-Fidelity received either 123/4% of GPCCfs lift revenue for the base year 1983 (increased by a consumer price index
factor), or 8-3/4% of GPCC's lift revenue for the current year, whichever was greater.
Morgan-Fidelity was responsible for the 1/2 of 1% rental due United Park. As of 1986
Morgan-Fidelity had received $5.5 million in Ski Lease revenues with 65 years remaining
on the leases. In the past three years, 1987, 1988, 1989, their revenue percentage has
averaged close to $1 million annually. (R. 4768-69)
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In return, Morgan-Fidelity cancelled $5.5 million in subordinated notes; its
shareholder loan to GPCC of $407,000; and sold for a nominal amount their 20% share of
GPCC common stock which cost them $466,000. This unsecured investment, with accrued
interest, totalled about $6.8 million. (R. 6635-38)
Unionamerica.

Unionamerica received developed and undeveloped GPCC real

property with a 1975 value of $14,200,000; trust deeds, notes and contracts with a total
balance owing of $695,000, prepaid water connection fees worth $477,000, and
condominium furnishings and accessories. (R. 4768; 6651-53) Unionamerica also increased
its equity share of GPCC from 5% to 20% and received 15% of the equity in the MorganFidelity subsidiaries and 6% of the equity in Royal Street Land.

Shortly after the

Memorandum of Agreement was signed, Unionamerica sold its 20% interest in GPCC to
AMOT for $325,000 and its 15% equity interest in the Morgan-Fidelity subsidiaries for
$317,500. (R. 4765-66) United Park believes that Unionamerica also sold its interest in
Royal Street Land to Royal Street's major equity holder, but the district court's ruling
has precluded United Park from discovering these facts.

In return, Unionamerica

cancelled its loans to GPCC totalling $9,223,655, and its notes and shareholder loan to
GPCC which totalled $382,547. (R. 6626; 6653)
AMOT. AMOT acquired 80% of the GPCC common stock, by agreeing to infuse
$1,300,000 into GPCC to offset remaining book liabilities, and to guarantee GPCC loans,
including a First Security Bank loan of $450,000. (R. 6647-48; 5940)

For this modest

investment, AMOT acquired through GPCC the right to lease the Park City Ski Resort
operations from Morgan-Fidelity.

Using a discounted cash flow analysis based on the

actual 1974 skiing operations financial results, the Park City Ski Resort had a value of
$15,600,000 at a 12% discount rate. (R. 4765) AMOT also received certain development
properties including the golf course, worth $4.2 million in 1975, GPCC's share of United
Park's water rights, worth $L17 million in 1975, and the benefit of GPCC's tax loss
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carryforward of $6 million. (R. 4765; 7948 at 395-98)
United Park.

United Park relinquished its major equity interest in GPCC, which

had been the primary justification for the very favorable terms of the 1971 Agreements,
by selling its common and preferred stock in GPCC which had cost $972,000 for $2,000.
United Park remained bound under the 1971 Land Agreement, but extended the time for
payment by three years. United Park thus conveyed 4200 acres of real property, the ski
resort base facilities and the golf course at the favorable 1971 prices — even though
United Park was giving up its major equity interest, the properties had increased greatly
in value, and United Park had the right to reclaim the properties pursuant to the crossdefault provisions of the 1971 Agreements. 5

United Park also sold to Royal Street

additional valuable building site properties that were not included in the 1971 Land
Agreement at prices below market value and some even below cost.

(R. 4757)

United Park also remained bound under the favorable terms of the 1971 Water
Agreement, and extended the time for payment from 11 to 14 years, even though United
Park was entitled to terminate the Water Agreement.

The 1971 Water Agreement had

reserved to United Park only the water needed for "mining, milling and related purposes."
(R. 5089)

Because in 1971 United Park was to own a major share of GPCC and would

benefit from GPCCfs property development and sale of water, United Park sold more
water to GPCC than GPCC needed to develop all its Park City and Deer Valley properties.
(R. 4766)

With United Park relinquishing its equity in GPCC, however, there was no

longer any reason to sell more water than GPCC and Royal Street actually needed.
United Park should have and easily could have retained additional water to develop its

s

There is evidence that some of United Park's directors, like S.N. Cornwall, may have
agreed to do so based on the representations of GPCC that the land had no value.
(R. 6024-25; 4802-03) However, representatives of United Park's controlling shareholders
and the other parties to the transaction knew that the land had greatly appreciated in
value between 1971 and 1975, and that the undeveloped Deer Valley properties were
particularly valuable. See supra at 17-18.
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own properties or to sell to others.
United Park also agreed to extend the three Ski Leases for two 20-year terms,
or until the year 2051, and to substantially enlarge the acreage of the Deer Valley lease.
United Park received nothing for these extensions and enlargement, including no increase
in ski lease revenues from 1975 until 2011, and only a nominal 1/2 of 1% increase from
2011 until 2051. As a consequence, GPCC pays United Park approximately $60,000
annually in ski lease revenue, and pays Morgan-Fidelity approximately $1 million.6
(R. 4763-64) The refusal of Anaconda, ASARCO and United Park management to attempt
to retain the additional water in 1975, or to increase the minimal ski lease revenue, in
particular manifests their reckless indifference to the interests of United Park and its
outside shareholders.
In effect, the 1975 Resort Agreements restructured GPCC solely at the expense
of United Park. Royal Street cancelled debts, some very questionable, of no more than
$2 million, assumed a $1.5 million loan that it had previously guaranteed, and purchased
for $1.9 million the Deer Valley and Park City properties and water rights that it valued
at more than $18 million. Morgan-Fidelity cancelled debts of $6.8 million in return for
the valuable Park City Resort base facilities and more than $8.5 million in ski lift revenue
through 1989 and continuing to the year 2051. Unionamerica cancelled debts of $9.6
million in return for properties worth nearly $16 million; and AMOT purchased GPCC, the
golf course, and certain water rights worth more than $20 million in 1975, for less than
$2 million. United Park in contrast gave away its equity in GPCC for nothing, extended
the three Ski Leases from the year 2011 to the year 2051 for nothing, and sold its
property and water rights, valued by defendants at nearly $40 million, for $4 million.

6

The unfairness of the Ski Lease terms is further demonstrated by the fact that the
Memorandum of Agreement gave GPCC an option to develop the Deer Valley ski resort.
If exercised, the option entitled Royal Street to 3.5% of lift revenues, or seven times the
percentage paid to United Park. (R. 4751-52; 7940 at 160-62)
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The June 23, 1975 Memorandum of Agreement required United Park's shareholders
to approve the 1975 Resort Agreements at a special shareholder meeting which eventually
was held on October 7, 1975. Many terms of the Agreements, however, were performed
well before the scheduled shareholder meeting, Unionamerica received the property deeds
and contract rights even before the Agreements were signed, and sold or liquidated some
of the property during the summer of 1975. (R. 6626; 4753; 7953 at 97) In late spring
1975, Royal Street surrendered control and management of GPCC to AMOT, which infused
$675,000 into GPCC. (R. 7940 at 86; 5940) Anaconda and ASARCO caused United Park
to make the undisclosed sale of valuable real property in Deer Valley to Royal Street at
prices well below market value. (R. 4753-54) Unionamerica agreed to sell its twenty
percent interest in GPCC to AMOT for $325,000 following United Park shareholder
approval. (R. 7940 at 105-6)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The district court ignored the governing precedents of this Court, improperly
resolved disputed issues of fact against United Park, entered findings on issues not raised
by the motions, and violated "bedrock" principles of law in dismissing certain claims.
Specifically, United Park appeals the following fundamental errors:
First, the district court abused its discretion by denying United Park the
opportunity to complete relevant discovery*
Second, the district court improperly held that United Park's fiduciary duty claims
were time-barred because United Park discovered or should have discovered the claims
in 1975 through outside shareholders or independent directors.

The court rejected

compelling evidence that United Park could not discover or assert its fiduciary duty
claims before independent management assumed control of United Park in August 1985.
Those facts established that defendants ARCO and ASARCO, United Park's controlling
shareholders, and other defendants misrepresented and concealed essential information
24

from United Park's outside shareholders; and that United Park's directors were not
independent and would not or could not assert those claims.
Third, the court improperly held that United Park's fiduciary duty claims were
barred by the Bangor Punta doctrine, because Loeb purchased approximately 31% of
United Park's shares from Anaconda and ASARCO in 1985. The Bangor Punta doctrine
precludes a corporation from suing former management for mismanagement and corporate
waste where the wrongdoers had sold virtually all of the shares of the corporation to the
current shareholders at a price that reflected the wrongdoing. Bangor Punta does not
apply to United Park's fiduciary duty claims because Anaconda and ASARCO sold less
than one-third of United Park's shares. United Park, not Loeb, is the real party in
interest and defendants did not attempt to prove that United Park would receive a
windfall.

Further, Bangor Punta does not apply to United Park's claims against

defendants other than Anaconda and ASARCO. Finally, even if Bangor Punta applies, it
requires at most a pro rata reduction for the shares purchased by Loeb, and not a
complete bar of United Park's claims. The district court ruling stands Bangor Punta on
its head, and grants defendants the windfall the doctrine is intended to avoid.
Fourth, the district court improperly found that "no genuine issues of material fact
exist" regarding United Park's breach of fiduciary duty claims against Anaconda and
ASARCO. Anaconda and ASARCO unquestionably owed fiduciary duties to United Park
as its controlling shareholders, and United Park presented substantial evidence that
Anaconda and ASARCO breached those duties. These findings were particularly egregious
because Anaconda and ASARCO never moved for summary judgment on the ground that
they owed no duties or that they did not breach their duties.
Fifth, the district court improperly dismissed United Park's claims against AMOT
and GPCC for aiding and abetting Anaconda's and ASARCO's breaches of fiduciary duty.
Aiding and abetting liability is a "bedrock" principle of law and United Park presented
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to whether defendants breached fiduciary duties to United Park (or aided and abetted the
breaches of others), whether United Park could have discovered or asserted its fiduciary
duty claims in 1975, and whether GPCC and Royal Street have breached the Resort
Agreements. Moreover, the stay of discovery obtained by ARCO and ASARCO precluded
United Park's discovery.

Under these circumstances, the district court abused its

discretion in granting defendants' motions before permitting United Park to complete
discovery. Thus, the judgment must be reversed. Cox v. Winters, 678 P.2d 311, 312-15
(Utah 1984); Strand v. Associated Students of Univ. of Utah, 561 P.2d 191, 193-94 (Utah
1977).
II.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT
DISMISSING UNITED PARK'S FIDUCIARY DUTY CLAIMS AS BARRED BY THE
STATUTES OF LIMITATION.
United Park's first four causes of action allege breaches of fiduciary duty in

connection with the 1975 Resort Agreements.

United Park alleges that Anaconda and

ASARCO breached their duties of loyalty, fairness and care as controlling shareholders
by causing United Park to give away its equity share in GPCC so they could concentrate
on mining activities and protect their discrete interest in Park City Ventures.

United

Park alleges that the other defendants, Royal Street, Morgan-Fidelity, GPCC and AMOT,
induced or aided and abetted these breaches by Anaconda and ASARCO, or breached their
own fiduciary duties to United Park, by overreaching, making unwarranted threats, and
taking unfair advantage of United Park,
The district court held that these claims were time-barred because United Park,
in 1975, "knew or should have known of any alleged wrongdoing resulting from" the 1975
Resort Agreements. (R. 7854-55, H I ) 8 The court purported to make "factual findings"
8

The district court held that United Park's claims against Anaconda and ASARCO
are governed by the three-year statute of limitation in Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-27 (1953)
(actions against directors or stockholders of a corporation), and that United Park's claims
against the other defendants are governed by the four-year statute of limitations in Utah
Code Ann. § 78-12-25(3) (1953, as amended) (actions not otherwise provided for by law).
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that United Park's shareholders were informed of the terms of the Agreements and were
on notice of facts that would put a reasonable person on notice of a cause of action.
(R. 7854, U 12) The court also made "factual findings" that United Park's independent
directors were fully informed about the Agreements, were free from conflict of interest,
and were not otherwise implicated in the wrongdoing. (R. 7852-53, f 4)
In making these factual findings, the court improperly rejected evidence that
United Park could not discover and assert its claims before new management assumed
control of United Park in August 1985.9

United Park established that defendants

concealed from United Park's outside shareholders information essential to enable them
to judge the fairness of the Agreements or discover that defendants had breached their
fiduciary duties. Crucial information, including the value of the properties that United
Park gave to GPCC and other defendants, was never disclosed to shareholders at the
May 27, 1975 annual shareholder meeting (where the Agreements were first discussed),
in the September 2, 1975 Proxy Statement distributed to shareholders, or at the
October 7, 1975 special meeting (where the Agreements were approved).

United Park

Because United Park's Amended Complaint was filed in June 1988 and United Park alleges
that it could not discover and assert its claims before August 1985, the difference in the
two statutes is immaterial to the district court's ruling and to the issues on appeal.
9

A corporation discovers wrongdoing by its officers, directors or controlling
shareholders through outside shareholders or independent directors. "Discovery" of
fiduciary duty claims thus has two components: the shareholders or directors must have
knowledge of the wrongdoing, and must be sufficiently independent and disinterested to
be able to assert claims on behalf of the corporation. As long as the wrongdoers remain
in control of the corporation and/or conceal their wrongdoing from shareholders or
independent directors, the statute of limitations on the corporation's claims against them
is tolled. See, e.g., Mosesian v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 727 F.2d 873, 876-79
(9th Cir.), cert denied, 469 U.S. 932 (1984); HT, an Int'l. Inv. Trust v. Cornfeld, 619
F.2d 909, 928-32 (2nd Cir. 1980).
United Park alleges that it could not discover and assert its breach of fiduciary
claims until August 1985, both because Anaconda and ASARCO controlled United Park and
the other defendants were implicated in the wrongdoing and because they concealed
information about their wrongdoing from United Park's outside shareholders.
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also presented substantial evidence that United Park's outside directors Romney, Cornwall
and Steele, had conflicts of interest or were implicated in the wrongdoing, or that
defendants concealed crucial information from them. Finally, the district court ignored
United Park's investigation beginning in 1985, which established that

defendants

continued to conceal information throughout 1985, and that United Park exercised
reasonable, if not exceptional, diligence to discover its fiduciary duty claims, both before
and after United Park filed its initial complaint in 1986.
The district court's findings are particularly egregious because defendants' motions
were so fact-specific and because the issue of discovery is so seldom capable of
resolution on summary judgment. Following a discussion of the appropriate legal standard,
each of the facts that controverts the district court's findings is presented below,
A.

United Park's Claims Did Not Accrue Until United Park
Discovered or Should Have Discovered the Facts Constituting
the Breaches of Fiduciary Duty, and Defendants Bore An
Exceptionally Heavy Burden to Demonstrate No Genuine Issue
of Material Fact

As this Court has held again and again in a variety of contexts, an injured party
discovers a cause of action when he or she discovers "that there is a wrong to be
complained o f or "the facts constituting the cause of action." In Stewart v. K&S Co.,
591 P.2d 433, 435 (Utah 1979), this Court held that "where there is a fiduciary
relationship, such as between corporate officers and a stockholder, the statute of
limitations does not begin to run until the stockholder discovers, or in the exercise of
reasonable care should discover, that there is a wrong to be complained of" (emphasis
added).

In Myers v. McDonald, 635 P.2d 84, 86 (Utah 1981), this Court noted that in

"some enumerated areas of the law, our Legislature has adopted the discovery rule by
statute so that the limitations period does not begin to run until the discovery of facts
forming the basis for the cause of action" (emphasis added). And in Chapman v. Primary
Children's Hosp., 784 P.2d 1181, 1184 (Utah 1989), this Court recently held that
30

discovery of fraudulent concealment in the context of the Utah Health Care Malpractice
Act, includes the discovery of "legal injury" or "awareness of physical injury and
knowledge that the injury may be attributable to negligence."
United Park's fiduciary duty claims therefore did not accrue until United Park
discovered or should have discovered the facts constituting the breaches of fiduciary
duty. Knowledge of the 1975 Resort Agreements or their terms alone cannot trigger the
statute, because it does not constitute knowledge that a wrongdoing has been committed.
In Riddell v. Riddell Washington Corp., 866 F.2d 1480 (D.C. Cir. 1989), for example, a
closely-held corporation repurchased the shares of one shareholder. Corporate officers
told the shareholder that the purchase price had been determined by independent
appraisal, when in fact the corporate officers directed the preparation and outcome of
the appraisal.

The court held that the shareholder's claims for fraud and breach of

fiduciary duty against the corporate officers did not accrue when the shareholder
suspected the appraisal was too low, but only later when the shareholder discovered the
"facts that are central" to his claims — that the appraisals were not independent.

866

F.2d at 1494-95. In Mosesian v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 727 F.2d 873 (9th Cir.)
cert denied, 469 U.S. 932 (1984), the Ninth Circuit held that a corporation's financial
problems did not give its shareholders knowledge of fraud and malpractice by the
corporation' s accountants:
Financial problems, however, do not necessarily suggest
accounting fraud. Sudden losses, the "going concern" qualification, a decline in stock price, suspension of trading,
difficulty with creditors, and the resignation of top management may also be explained by financial mismanagement, cost
overruns, general market conditions, or other events unrelated
to accounting fraud.
727 F.2d at 878.
So it is here.

The Resort Agreements themselves do not give notice of

wrongdoing. It is only when United Park discovered or should have discovered the facts
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constituting the breaches of fiduciary duty — the wrongdoing — that United Park's
fiduciary duty claims accrued.10
The discovery rule imposes a heavy burden on summary judgment,11

because

"discovery" is so fact specific:
The question of when the alleged wrongdoing occurred or
should have been discovered is a question of fact. It may be
decided as a matter of law only when uncontroverted evidence
irrefutably demonstrates that the plaintiff discovered or
should have discovered the defendant's wrongful conduct.
* * *

The issue of what a reasonably prudent [person] should have
known is one that is particularly suited to a jury
determination. Because precedent dictates that the question
of actual or constructive notice of a cause of action is for
the trier of fact, the party seeking summary judgment has a
heavy burden to show that there exists no issue of material
fact regarding notice.
Washington v. Baenziger, 673 F.Supp. 1478 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (emphasis added), citing
Mosesian v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 727 F.2d at 877, 879; Admiralty Fund v. Hugh
Johnson & Co., 677 F.2d 1301, 1309-10 (9th Cir. 1982). Whether the injured person had

See also Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U.S. 467, 480-81 (1986) (although
claimants knew that Social Security Administration had denied their claims for benefits,
their causes of action did not accrue until they knew that the denial had been made
pursuant to an internal and illegal governmental policy); Richards v. Mileski, 662 F.2d 65,
69-70 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (cause of action by federal employee, who had been coerced into
resignation of employment under false charges of homosexuality, against employer for
knowing and malicious use of false information accrued when employee learned that his
employers had participated in the preparation of the false charges, not when he learned
that the charges were false or when he resigned).
n

Summary judgment is proper, of course, only if there is no genuine issue of material
fact and the moving party demonstrates that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
The facts forming the basis for summary judgment must be clearly established or admitted,
and any and all doubts, uncertainty, and inferences must be resolved in favor of the nonmoving party. See, e.g., Spor v. Crested Butte Silver Min. Inc., 740 P.2d 1304, 1307-08
(Utah 1987); Geneva Pipe Co. v. S & H Ins. Co., 714 P.2d 648, 649 (Utah 1986).
32

knowledge sufficient to put him on notice,12 whether the injured person exercised
diligence to discover the claims,13 and whether material information was concealed or the
person was otherwise misled,14 are all fact questions that render summary judgment
seldom appropriate.
For this reason, this Court recently emphasized that even where it "may be a close
call" whether a plaintiff discovered or should have discovered its cause of action, "[s]uch
close calls are for juries, not judges, to make." Chapman v. Primary Children's Hosp.,
784 P.2d at 1186. The facts here, however, do not present a close call. United Park
presented compelling facts from which a jury could conclude that United Park could not
have discovered its breach of fiduciary duty claims before 1985. The district court
improperly resolved those questions of fact against United Park.

l2

See, e.g., Admiralty Fund v. Hugh Johnson & Co., 677 F.2d 1301, 1309-10 (9th Cir.
1982) (because the "question of notice of fraud is for the trier of fact, the party seeking
summary disposition has an extremely difficult burden to show that there exists no issue
of material fact regarding notice").
13

See, e.g., Robertson v. Seidman & Seidman, 609 F.2d 583, 591 (2d Cir. 1979) (issues
of "due diligence and constructive knowledge depend on inferences drawn from the facts
of each particular case" and render summary judgment inappropriate when conflicting
inferences can be drawn); Azalea Meats, Inc. v. Muscat, 386 F.2d 5, 10 (5th Cir. 1967)
("[i]nevitably the factual issue of due diligence involves, to some extent at least, the
state of mind of the person whose conduct is to be measured against this test and it is
simply not feasible to resolve such an issue on motion for summary judgment"); First
Interstate Bank v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 744 P.2d 1197, 1201 (Colo. 1987) (en banc)
(whether "at a fixed moment in time a particular plaintiff should have known the material
facts forming the basis of one or more tort claims . . . is not a question . . . of lawff
and must be deemed a question of fact for determination by the fact finder).
14

See, e.g., Cavic v. Grand Bahama Dev. Co., 701 F.2d 879, 888 n.6 (11th Cir. 1983)
(whether fraud should have been discovered is question of fact, particularly where
conduct of fraudulent party was calculated to mislead, deceive, or dissuade inquiry from
the victim); Baker v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 114 Cal. Rptr. 171 (Cal. App. 1974) (whether
defendant fraudulently concealed fact material to claim for relief and whether plaintiff
exercised reasonable diligence in discovering fraud are questions for the jury).
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B.

United Park Presented Compelling Evidence That Defendants
Concealed Material Information And That United Park Could
Not Discover Its Fiduciary Duty Claims Until 1985.
1.

Defendants Concealed From United Park's
Outside Shareholders Information Essential to
Discovery of the Claims.

The district court found that United Park's outside shareholders had knowledge of
the 1975 Resort Agreements through the discussion at the annual shareholder's meeting
on May 27, 1975, through the September 2, 1975 Proxy Statement distributed

to

shareholders and through the discussion of the Agreements at the October 7, 1975 special
meeting.

(R. 7826-27, 1ffl 14-15, 18-19; 7853-54, Ml 6-7, 10-11)

The court concluded

that United Park's shareholders had knowledge of the transactions and notice of facts
that would put a reasonable person on notice that he may have a cause of action.
(R. 7836-37, U 2; 7854-55, H 1)
The district court did not specify what facts placed shareholders on "notice" of
the breach of fiduciary claims, aside from the terms of the Agreements and the
discussion of the Gartner letter at the special meeting (discussed infra at 38-44).
Contrary to the implication in the district court's findings of fact, shareholder knowledge
of the Agreements alone cannot trigger the statute of limitations because it does not
give shareholders knowledge, as this Court requires, that a wrongdoing has been
committed. See supra at 30-31.
Also contrary to the district court's findings, the presentation at the May 27,
1975 annual shareholder meeting did not provide shareholders with knowledge of the
Agreements.

That presentation consisted merely of a statement that the transactions

were to be performed.

(R. 5929-31)

Management did not disclose to the few

shareholders in attendance many critical facts, including the greatly enhanced values of
the real property interests or water rights; the increasing value and profitability of the
Park City Ski Resort operations; the full details of the Morgan-Fidelity leases; any
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details regarding the Royal Street - GPCC ski lease option; the side agreements with
Royal Street for the conveyance of additional United Park land; or Unionamerica1 s
agreement to sell its 20% equity position in GPCC to AMOT for $325,000. Management
also misrepresented that Unionamerica would receive only property on which it held
mortgages, when in fact, Unionamerica received additional properties.

Management

represented that Royal Street was to receive "undeveloped properties in the resort area,"
but failed to disclose that these properties included the very valuable but undeveloped
Deer Valley properties (R. 5929).
The September 2, 1975 Proxy Statement continued to conceal information material
to the fairness of the Agreements. The district court found that the Proxy Statement
"stated in detail what UPCM was giving and what it was receiving," but the short, sixpage statement (R. 6662-67), made the following material misrepresentations and
omissions:
First, the Proxy Statement failed to disclose the value of United Park's land, ski
resort, and water rights and misrepresented that United Park "does not know the current
market value of these property interests." (R. 6666) In fact, Clark Wilson, Anaconda's
representative on both the United Park and GPCC Board of Directors, knew in the spring
of 1975 that "[t]he value of the properties is now much greater than in the [1971] UPC
contract, perhaps 10 times." (R. 6467) Moreover, Royal Street and GPCC had substantial information from which an informed opinion on market value could easily have been
derived.

Royal Street prepared prospectuses for GPCC in late 1974 and early 1975

valuing the property that United Park had contributed to GPCC (excluding the ski resort,
golf course, water rights and other assets) at $37.8 million. (R. 6529)
Second, the Proxy Statement failed to disclose the increasing value and
profitability of the Park City Ski Resort operations.

The Proxy Statement did not

disclose, for example, that the resort had earned $1 million in profit during each of the
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1973-74 and the 1974-75 ski seasons, or that the operations were worth as much as $15.6
million based on discounted cash flow analysis of the 1974 financials. (R. 6390; 4765)
Third, The Proxy Statement stated the opinion of management that GPCC would
be unable to continue business operations if the Resort Agreements were not approved.
(R. 6663)

This statement was false.

Because Unionamerica had already cancelled

GPCC's major debt in exchange for property, United Park's management knew or should
have known that there was no real risk of bankruptcy, given the value of the real
property, water rights and the ski resort. (R. 4756; 4782-84; 4788-89; 4859; 6346)
Fourth, the Proxy Statement failed to provide any comparative analysis of what
each of GPCCfs stockholders had contributed to GPCC and what each of them was
receiving under the 1975 Resort Agreements or any facts which would permit a United
Park shareholder to make this critical comparison. (R. 4757)
Fifth, the Proxy Statement failed to disclose that Morgan and Fidelity annually
would receive more than 12% of Ski Lease revenues (R. 6636-37), or 24 times the
revenues United Park received on its rentals. The Statement also failed to disclose that
GPCC received an option from Royal Street to develop skiing at Deer Valley, which if
exercised, would have required GPCC to pay Royal Street 3.5% of lift revenues (R. 475152; 7940 at 160-62), seven times the percentage that United Park received.
Sixth, the Proxy Statement failed to disclose that Unionamerica would increase
its equity in GPCC from 5.5% to 20%, and obtain a 15% interest in GPI and PPI and a 6%
interest in Royal Street. (R. 6626-27)
Seventh, the Proxy Statement failed to disclose that United Park had additionally
agreed to convey some valuable building site properties in the Deer Valley area, not
included in the 1971 Agreements, to Royal Street at cost or below. (R. 4757)
Eighth, the Proxy Statement failed to disclose that AMOT acquired GPCC?s tax
loss carry forward of approximately $6,000,000, and valuable United Park properties that
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AMOT could sell to take full advantage of this tax benefit.

(R. 4757; 7948 at 397-8)

Ninth, the Proxy Statement falsely stated that the proposed transaction would
have no material effect on United Park's income, assets, and future economic viability,
and that the Agreements were in the best interests of United Park. (R. 6663; 6667) In
fact, the transaction greatly impaired United Park's financial position by terminating all
significant future participation in the expansion and development of the Park City and
Deer Valley resort operations, property, and property rights.

In short, all material

benefits from the surface utilization of United Park's developable properties and water
rights, including the operation of a world class ski area, were given away and United
Park was left dependent on its underground mining interests then operated by Anaconda
and ASARCO. (R. 4757-58)
Finally, the Proxy Statement failed to disclose several conflicts of interest.

It

failed to disclose the policy of Anaconda and ASARCO to concentrate on mining and to
have United Park get out of the resort and land development business, or that this policy
conflicted with the interests of United Park's other shareholders. See supra at 15-16.
It failed to disclose that the VanCott firm, which had drafted the Proxy Statement, was
also representing Royal Street and GPCC. (R. 7932 at 485-90; 7942 at 32-3, 45-7, 99100, 104)

It failed to disclose that Director Harold Steele's bank, First Security, had

made a large loan to GPCC which AMOT had agreed to guarantee.

(R. 5940)

In short, the September 2, 1975 Proxy Statement concealed information that
would have enabled United Park's shareholders to assess the fairness of the Agreements
or enabled them to discover that Anaconda and ASARCO and others had breached their
fiduciary duties to United Park.

Whether documents such as a prospectus give

shareholders knowledge of a cause of action
calls for a review of the documents in question by a trier of
fact in light of all the evidence. A trial judge should not
assign conclusive legal effect to such documents at the
summary-judgment stage when there can be a genuine
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difference of opinion as to their impact on a reasonable
person.
Briskin v. Ernst & Ernst, 589 F.2d 1363, 1368 (9th Cir. 1978).

In light of the Proxy

Statement's material omissions and misrepresentations, the court's finding that the Proxy
Statement "stated in detail what UPCM was giving and what it was receiving," is
insupportable and improper.
2.

The Gartner Letter Is Not Evidence That United
Park's Shareholders Had Notice Of The
Fiduciary Duty Claims, And In Fact, Presents
Compelling Evidence That United Park's
Shareholders Could Not Discover United Park's
Claims

Shortly before the October 7, 1975 special meeting, a few shareholders sent
letters to United Park's Board of Directors in response to the Proxy Statement. In one
letter, Jerome Gartner, a New York attorney for shareholder Timothy Donath, complained
that, based on his research at the SEC offices in New York, the Agreements appeared
unfair and that the Proxy Statement failed to disclose certain material information.
(R. 6669-82)

Gartner requested that the Board of Directors postpone the special

meeting until full and complete disclosure was made to shareholders. The district court
devoted significant attention to the Gartner letter, finding that it was reviewed and
discussed by United Park's Board of Directors, who voted to proceed with the special
meeting, and that the letter was disclosed to shareholders who attended the meeting.
(R. 7826-27, UH 16-18; 7853-54, Ml 8-10)
The district court did not specify whether the Gartner letter was undisputed
evidence that United Park's other shareholders had knowledge of the fiduciary duty
claims, because it was discussed at the special meeting, or whether the letter was
evidence that one shareholder — Donath — had knowledge of the claims, which could be
attributed to United Park.

Either way, the finding cannot stand as undisputed fact,

because it gives defendants the benefit of every inference and ignores all the facts and
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circumstances surrounding the letter.

In fact, the letter is strong evidence that

defendants concealed and misrepresented material information, because from the moment
defendants received Gartner's letter, they tried to convince Gartner and other United
Park shareholders that Gartner's assertions were utterly groundless, and to ensure that
neither Gartner nor any shareholder challenged the Agreements.
Clark Wilson, one of Anaconda's employees on the United Park Board, immediately
sent the Gartner letter to Anaconda and ASARCO lawyers in New York, and asked
Anaconda and ASARCO officials whether the meeting should be postponed.
142)

(R. 7930 at

Anaconda and ASARCO instructed the United Park Board to proceed with the

meeting as scheduled. Id. Representatives of Anaconda, ASARCO, and the other parties
to the Agreements then met at the VanCott law offices and discussed how to handle
Gartner and ensure shareholder approval. (R. 5940) Nick Badami, president of AMOT,
agreed to attend the shareholder meeting and was "coached" as to how to persuade the
United Park shareholders to approve the Agreements. (R. 7941 at 286)
Wilson and S. N. Cornwall then contacted Gartner by telephone to dissuade
Gartner and Donath from opposition.

(R. 5940; 4759)

Miles Romney, United Park's

president, and other management officials sent letters to Gartner and a few other
outside shareholders who had written letters raising questions, assuring them that the
Resort Agreements, while "very complex and difficult to understand" (R. 7252) were in
United Park's best interests and that "[t]he proposed arrangement was arrived at after
careful consideration of other alternatives and after exhaustive studies. The proposal is
the result of such studies and research . . . ." (R. 6934)

These reassuring statements

were demonstrably false because, among other things, the United Park Board had not
carefully considered alternatives or made any exhaustive studies. In fact, United Park's
position had been dictated by the policy of Anaconda and ASARCO to get United Park
out of the resort and land development business. See supra at 15-16.
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Only eighteen of United Park's more than 5,000 shareholders attended the October
7, 1975 special meeting. (R. 5939; 6962) Miles Romney told those eighteen shareholders
that a letter had been received requesting that the meeting be adjourned, and asked S.
N. Cornwall to explain the demand. Cornwall then summarized the Gartner letter in the
following terms:
[T]he letter asserts that we did not in our proxy statement
sufficiently inform the shareholders as to the nature of the
transaction which we propose to approve here today and that
the carrying out of this transaction would be detrimental to
the interests of this Company . . . . Mr. Gartner, in setting
out the reasons why he thought it was detrimental to the
interests of the company made a great many statements which
are not accurate in all details.
(R. 5940) Cornwall then told the shareholders that GPCC would be in bankruptcy if the
Agreements were not approved. Id.
Nick Badami, who had assumed control of GPCC in May 1975, then urged the
eighteen shareholders to approve the Agreements. Badami told the shareholders that time
was of the essence, that the meeting could not be postponed, and that the Agreements
were fair to United Park. (R. 5941-42) Badami characterized the Gartner letter as
quite a letter, it compares in some cases the operation to
Seward's folly in Alaska; however, the man doesn't know that
they haven't sold any mineral rights. The letter is a diatribe
of misfacts, really. Somebody had not done his homework and
these are the kinds of things that always get me a little upset
around the country when anybody can wite[sic] a crank letter.
I don't know if this is a crank letter, particularly, but it has
all the earmarks of being something upsetting, and I don't
think it should prevent good business practice.
(R. 5942)
Badami's disparagement of the Gartner letter includes at least one flat
misrepresentation of fact — because the Gartner letter never states that United Park
was relinquishing any mineral rights. Badami made these statements to convince the
eighteen shareholders that Gartner did not understand the Agreements and that his
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concerns had no merit. Badami and AMOT knew, however, the substantial values of the
United Park properties and ski resort, and knew that the Agreements were unfair to
United Park.

(R. 6529; 7946 at 131)

Soon after the Special Meeting, Anaconda's Chairman John B. M. Place called
Gartner.

(R. 4759)

United Park can only speculate as to what Place told Gartner,

because neither of them has been deposed. Ordinarily, a plaintiff's lawyer in Gartner's
position who received a phone call from the corporation chairman would conclude that
he had hit the jackpot and file suit. The only reasonable inference — and an inference
to which United Park was fully entitled — is that defendants somehow induced Gartner
to forego opposition.
If the district court intended to find that United Park's shareholders knew about
the fiduciary duty claims from the Gartner letter, that finding is clearly wrong.
Contrary to the district court's findings (R. 7826-27, 1! 18; 7854, U 10), defendants did
not "disclose" the Gartner letter to United Park's shareholders.

Defendants never

showed the letter or disclosed its specific allegations to the eighteen shareholders who
attended the special meeting. Those shareholders learned only what Cornwall and Badami
told them about the letter, that it "made a great many statements which are not
accurate," and was a "diatribe of misfacts" and a "crank letter." The vast majority of
shareholders who voted by proxy before the meeting (other than Anaconda and ASARCO)
never knew about the letter at all. In fact, this Court knows more about the letter than
United Park's outside shareholders ever did.
If the district court intended to find that United Park's shareholders had the same
knowledge and the same duty of inquiry as Gartner, that finding is clearly wrong.
Gartner was an experienced New York City lawyer who had litigated numerous plaintiff's
securities lawsuits. Gartner's letter begins:
The hurried presentation of this demand at this late
date stems directly from the misleading and confusing
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impression of the facts obtained from reading your proxy
statement for the October 7, 1975 meeting of shareholders.
Only intensive research and review of the incomplete set of
documents available for inspection in the New York Stock
Exchange and Securities and Exchange record room at Federal
Plaza, New York, made possible the facts and analysis outlined
below, to aid you to make the correct determination, before
it is too late, to preserve the rights of the UPK stockholders
to the valuable property being abandoned in the proposed
agreement set forth in your October 7 proxy statement.
(R. 6670) (emphasis added).
After reviewing the Proxy Statement, Gartner, who knew that the New York Stock
Exchange and the SEC maintain corporate records, took the first subway to Foley Square
for hours of "intensive research."

As a matter of law and fact, United Park's

shareholders are not held to the same standard of knowledge and inquiry as a plaintiff's
securities lawyer. They have no duty to review corporate books and records, much less
the records of United Park, Anaconda and ASARCO on file at the SEC or the New York
Stock Exchange. Nor do they have any duty to file a lawsuit to obtain concealed facts,
Baskin v. Hawley, 807 F.2d 1120, 1131 (2d Cir. 1986), or to proceed from the outset as
if they were "dealing with thieves," Richards v. Mileski, 662 F.2d 65, 71 (D.C. Cir. 1981),
United Park's shareholders were entitled to rely on the representations of defendants
who, as fiduciaries, had an affirmative duty to disclose all material information.

See,

e^g., deHaas v. Empire State Petroleum Co., 435 F.2d 1223, 1227 (10th Cir. 1970)
(stockholder reliance on corporate fiduciaries is to be expected, and where questions and
doubts arise concerning corporate actions, it is reasonable for a stockholder to rely on
the knowledge and integrity of corporate managers, although such reliance is not
absolute).

Defendants' failure to disclose lessens and may absolve United Park's

shareholders of any duty to inquire, but again, that is a question of fact for the jury. 15
15

See, e.g., Azalea Meats, Inc. v. Muscat, 386 F.2d 5, 9 (5th Cir. 1967); ("in the
event that a fiduciary relationship was present, the standard of reasonableness or
evidence of fraudulent concealment against which the plaintiff's diligence is measured
is lessened"); Currie v. Cayman Resources Corp., 595 F.Supp. 1364, 1375 (N.D. Ga. 1984)
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Finally, if the district court intended to find that one shareholder — Donath
through Gartner — had knowledge of United Park's fiduciary duty claims, that finding is
clearly wrong.

Even if Gartner was on inquiry notice, Gartner acted on the inquiry.

Defendants did not postpone the meeting or revise the Proxy Statement, as Gartner
requested. They presumably did not tell Gartner — as their fiduciary duties required, but
contrary to the Proxy Statement — that they believed that United Park's real property
had increased in value ten times since 1971 and might be worth $37.8 million. And they
certainly did not tell Gartner that, as he suggested, they did have a basis for valuing the
properties, or that any of his other allegations might have any foundation.

Instead,

Anaconda and ASARCO kept their proxies in place and directed their employees on the
United Park Board to proceed as scheduled. Defendants continued to conceal information
and misrepresent the unfairness of the Agreements. They told Gartner by telephone and
by letter before the meeting that he was mistaken, that the Agreements were fair to
United Park, and that he should take no action.

The chairman of Anaconda called

Gartner again after the meeting, presumably to reassure him or dissuade him from taking
further action.
Thus, the Gartner letter did not give United Park's shareholders knowledge of the
fiduciary duty claims.

But even if it might have, defendants' false and misleading

responses to Gartner and other shareholders absolved Gartner's client or any other
shareholder of any duty to inquire further. As this Court has held, ff[o]ne cannot justly
or equitably lull an adversary into a false sense of security thereby subjecting his claim

(same holding as Azalea Meets); FSLIC v. Williams, 599 F.Supp. 1184, 1194-95 (D. Md.
1984) (cause of action against former officers and directors of a corporation does not
accrue until it is known or can be discovered by a nonculpable person with authority to
bring the action; failure to use diligence may be excused where fiduciary duty exists
between defendant and corporation); Lucas v. Abbott, 601 P.2d 1376, 1379 (Colo. 1979)
(en banc) ( n [j]ustified reliance on representations made within the ambit of such a
fiduciary relationship lessens the duty of reasonable inquiry").
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to the bar of limitations, and then be heard to plead that very delay as a defense to the
action when brought." Rice v. Granite School District, 456 P.2d 159, 163 (Utah 1969).16
3.

United Park's Directors Were Not Independent,
Were Implicated In The Wrongdoing, Or Were
Uninformed of Information Essential to United
Park's Claims.

The district court also made findings that United Park's three "independent"
directors had "full knowledge concerning the terms of the restructuring and its effect"
on United Park, were not "implicated in any alleged wrongdoing, did not have any
conflict of interest and were fully informed of all the material facts." (R. 7825, 1111 1112; 7852-3, 11 3-4)

These findings ignore substantial evidence that United Park's

directors had conflicts of interest, were misinformed or uninformed about essential
information, were implicated in the wrongdoing, or otherwise could not discover or assert
claims on behalf of United Park.
From prior to 1971 through 1982, United Park's seven-man board of directors was
dominated and controlled by Anaconda and ASARCO, each of whom placed two employees
on United Park's Board. In 1975, United Park's so-called "independent" directors were
S. N. Cornwall, a retired partner of the VanCott firm ("VanCott"), Miles Romney, a
retired mining consultant, and Harold Steele, president of First Security Bank.
Each of these "independent" directors had prior or existing business relationships
with Anaconda and ASARCO. Miles Romney, a mining consultant and former director of

16

See, e^g., United Indus. Syndicate, Inc. v. Western Auto Supply Co., 686 F.2d 1312,
1318 (8th Cir. 1982) ("inquiry notice" does not defeat a fraud claim where affirmative
representations have led the defrauded party to forego inquiry which it might otherwise
have made) (Missouri law); Ballew v. A. H. Robins Co., 688 F.2d 1325, 1328 (11th Cir.
1982) (reversing summary judgment where evidence was "equally susceptible of showing"
that patient did not know Dalkon Shield caused her injuries and that "any suspicion she
had was quashed when in the exercise of reasonable diligence she asked her physicians
about a possible connection and they responded equivocally"); Augusta Bank & Trust v.
Broomfield, 643 P.2d 100, 108 (Kan. 1982) (action timely filed where plaintiff's suspicions
aroused but plaintiff was lulled into confidence by certain representations and abandoned
further investigations until after limitations expired).
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the Utah Mining Association, had longstanding business relationships with Anaconda and
ASARCO. For many years Cornwall's law firm, VanCott, served as counsel for Anaconda
as well as United Park.

Cornwall remained on United Park's Board following his

retirement from VanCott in 1969, and other VanCott attorneys continued to represent
Anaconda and United Park. During the restructuring of GPCC in 1975, VanCott acted as
counsel for United Park, Royal Street, GPCC and Anaconda. (R. 7932 at 485-90; 7942
at 32-3, 45-7, 99-100, 104) These conflicts were not disclosed in the September 2, 1975
Proxy Statement, which VanCott prepared.

These conflicts precluded Cornwall from

asserting a claim on behalf of United Park, even if he knew about it.

Cornwall,

however, told David Bernolfo and Louis Callister that he had been told by GPCC officials
in 1975 that the United Park properties had no value, directly contrary to the knowledge
of the principals of Anaconda and ASARCO. (R. 4803; 4786-87)
Director Harold Steele was president of First Security Bank, which had a
longstanding banking relationship with both Anaconda and ASARCO. Under the 1975
Resort Agreements, AMOT guaranteed a loan from First Security Bank to GPCC.
(R. 5940) This material conflict was not disclosed in the Proxy Statement. Steele may
never have known the contents of the Proxy Statement or the Gartner letter, because
he did not attend either the meeting approving the Proxy Statement or the special
shareholder meeting. (R. 5934; 5936; 5939)
Contrary to the district court's finding, Cornwall and Romney were implicated in
the wrongdoing.

They approved the false and misleading Proxy Statement (R. 5934;

5936), and faced potential liability for its misrepresentations and omissions. Romney and
Cornwall took active roles in assuring shareholder approval before and during the special
meeting. Romney directed the shareholder meeting to proceed, following instructions
from Anaconda and ASARCO, and sent letters to Gartner and other shareholders to
dissuade them from opposition. Cornwall also actively dissuaded Gartner, and disparaged
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the letter at the meeting. See supra at 39-40,
United Park does not know whether these "independent" directors participated in
the wrongdoing knowingly or recklessly, or because defendants concealed material
information (such as property values) from them. They may have been precluded from
asserting fiduciary duty claims on behalf of United Park because they had serious,
material conflicts of interest, or because they were implicated in the breaches
themselves. Or they may have been unable to discover the breaches because defendants
concealed material information from them. The district court's ruling has prevented
United Park from ascertaining the facts through discovery.

On defendants' summary

judgment motions, United Park was entitled to all reasonable inferences, and the district
court's findings improperly resolved those facts and those inferences against United
Park.
4.

United Park Could Not Discover Its Fiduciary
Claims Until 1985.

The district court's factual findings also ignored the investigation by independent
management beginning in 1985 that led eventually to the discovery and the assertion of
the fiduciary duty claims.

United Park established that independent management

exercised exceptional diligence and could not discover the fiduciary duty claims before
United Park filed its initial Complaint in 1986, because defendants continued to conceal
information and deflect inquiries through 1986, and because information essential to
discovery could not be found in United Park's files.
The Resort Agreements were approved in October 1975. The United Park Board
thereafter did not review or analyze the fairness or propriety of the Agreements.
(R. 5948-6235) United Park's Annual Reports to Shareholders for the year 1975 through
the year 1984 summarized the Agreements in general terms, but did not inform
shareholders of the values of United Park's properties or water rights as of the time of
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the Agreements, the terms of the Morgan-Fidelity Ski Lease payments or the conflicts of
interest of Anaconda, ASARCO, S. N. Cornwall, Harold Steele, or the VanCott firm.
(R. 5506-5832)
In August 1985, David Bernolfo, representing the Bambergers — United Park
shareholders since 1953 — became president of United Park.

(R. 4736; 4776) At that

time, certain problems with the performance by GPCC and Royal Street under the Resort
Agreements led Bernolfo to review documents in United Park's files relating to these
problems.

Bernolfo's review raised questions regarding the Agreements.

Answers to

those questions, including what properties United Park had given away and the values
of those properties, could not be found in United Park's records. (R. 4778-79)

Bernolfo

directed United Park employees to review title to more than 1,500 parcelSo Ultimately,
management was able to determine which properties had been transferred to Royal
Street, Unionamerica, and others, and which had been retained by GPCC. United Park
tried to assign values to these properties, but there were no applicable appraisals or
other valuation information in the files. (R. 4779-80)
During the fall of 1985, Bernolfo met with Clark L. Wilson, one of Anaconda's
employees on the United Park Board in 1975. Wilson refused to answer any questions
about the 1975 Resort Agreements and told Bernolfo that he would instruct the others
who were involved not to discuss the Agreements. (R. 4781)
Bernolfo then spoke with Mel Armstrong, a Park City property owner, who, in
1971, had sold some tracts of land in Park City to GPCC on contract.
that GPCC never defaulted or threatened bankruptcy.

(R. 4782)

Armstrong said

In January 1986,

Bernolfo first spoke with Ken Oswald, a GPCC property salesman in 1975, who said that
he knew the values of the real property in 1975, and that GPCC employees considered
the threat of GPCC's bankruptcy in 1975 "a joke/'

(R. 4783)

Several weeks later,

Oswald provided Bernolfo with a copy of a three inch thick master plan prepared for
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Royal Street around 1971. This plan showed that in 1971 Royal Street had a master plan
for developing the entire Park City area, including Deer Valley, and that Royal Street
considered the Deer Valley properties to be the most valuable properties in the area. Id.
At Oswald's suggestion, Bernolfo spoke with Hal Taylor, then mayor of Park City,
who had been a real estate broker for GPCC in 1975. Taylor told Bernolfo that he was
able to sell GPCC condominiums as fast as they were built, but GPCC construction
problems often delayed delivery.

Taylor said that there were a number of buyers

interested in GPCC's undeveloped properties but that GPCC would not sell any of them.
Taylor also said that no informed GPCC employee believed the rumors in 1975 of a GPCC
bankruptcy because of its valuable properties and profitable ski resort.

(R. 4783-84;

4858-59)
Bernolfo requested information from Nick Badami of GPCC and Edgar Stern of
Royal Street about the Agreements, but they would provide no information. At a meeting
in February 1986, however, Badami told Bernolfo he had never understood why United
Park had entered into the Agreements and that he had advised United Park not to enter
the transaction as far as Morgan-Fidelity was concerned.

(R. 4784-85)

This comment

by Badami was clearly inconsistent with Mr. Badami f s statements to the United Park
stockholders at the 1975 Special Meeting. (R. 5941-42)

See also supra at 40-41.

In March 1986, Bernolfo met with Scott Woodland of VanCott.

Mr. Woodland

refused to discuss the Agreements, and told Bernolfo to let the matter rest. He refused
to provide United Park documents in VanCott's files, even though he and VanCott had
represented United Park for many years.

United Park eventually obtained these

documents by subpoena. Mr. Woodland told Bernolfo he had not represented United Park
since 1971 and that he was not involved in any of the Resort Agreements.

Woodland's

statement is contradicted by United Park files which indicated that Woodland had
received a retainer and represented United Park throughout and long after 1975 and that
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the VanCott firm, with Woodland's assistance, had prepared the 1975 Proxy Statement.
(R. 7932 at 485-88; 7942 at 99-100)
In early April 1986, Bernolfo met with Robert Wells, a Royal Street employee who
served as GPCCfs chief financial officer from 1971 until June 1975 when AMOT took
over GPCC. Wells told Bernolfo about the 1974 Salomon restructuring proposals, which
had recognized United Park's status as GPCC's senior secured creditor and protected
United Park's interests in GPCC. (R. 4785-86)
Bernolfo also met with S. N. Cornwall in April and July 1986. Cornwall said that
he had been told by GPCC officials in 1975 that the United Park properties had no value.
Cornwall said that he not only thought that the land was worthless in 1975 but also that
the ski resort was losing money, and that the United Park Board members were told that
if United Park did not agree to the Agreements, GPCC was facing bankruptcy. (R. 478687; 4802-03, UH 5-6)
Based on the information provided by Messrs. Taylor, Cornwall, Armstrong, Oswald,
and others, and the refusal of Messrs. Badami, Stern, Wilson and Woodland to provide
information, United Park concluded that GPCC and Royal Street had concealed vital
information from Anaconda and ASARCO, United Park's minority shareholders, and United
Park's Board of Directors.

Accordingly, United Park's initial complaint, filed in May

1986, alleged fraud and other legal violations against those defendants, but did not name
Anaconda, ASARCO or Morgan-Fidelity as defendants.

(R. 2-85)

Limited discovery began in the summer of 1986 and continued intermittently
through 1987.

Through document production and deposition testimony, United Park

learned crucial information that it had been unable to obtain beforehand, particularly
with respect to 1975 values of United Park's land and the comparative values received
by the parties to the Agreements.

(Re 4790-91)

United Park also learned through

discovery and its further investigation that its controlling shareholders, Anaconda and
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ASARCO, knew the property values as well. (R. 4791) Despite their knowledge of the
property values, Anaconda and ASARCO decided in late 1974 to get United Park out of
the resort and land development business and to concentrate on their joint venture and
protect its ability to mine United Park's mining properties.
* * *

In summary, United Park presented compelling evidence from which a jury
reasonably could conclude that United Park could not discover the fiduciary duty claims
before 1985.

Anaconda and ASARCO controlled United Park in 1975.

Clark Wilson,

Anaconda's representative on United Park's Board admitted in deposition that Anaconda
and ASARCO had determined to "get out of the resort business" and protect the Park
City Ventures mining lease.

Concerned that a threatened bankruptcy of GPCC would

impair their ability to mine United Park's property, Anaconda and ASARCO directed
United Park to take no action that would interfere with the lease, but to give up its
major equity interest in GPCC and the Park City Ski Resort.

Anaconda and ASARCO

breached their duty as controlling shareholders to obtain a restructuring of GPCC fair to
United Park and its outside shareholders.

To maximize the evident windfall at the

expense of United Park, the other defendants threatened to force GPCC into bankruptcy
if all of their demands were not met, and otherwise induced or aided and abetted
Anaconda's and ASARCOfs breaches of fiduciary duties, or breached their own fiduciary
duties to United Park.
To ensure that United Park's shareholders approved the 1975 Resort Agreements,
defendants concealed information showing that the Agreements were unfair.

Defendants

told shareholders they did not know the value of the properties United Park had
contributed to GPCC, when in fact they had estimated the residual values of the real
estate, excluding the resort and golf course, at nearly $37.8 million. They failed to tell
shareholders what other parties received from the Agreements or that United Park was
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conveying additional properties with substantial value.

They failed to disclose the

continuing growth and profitability of GPCC's skiing operations. Defendants falsely told
shareholders that time was of the essence and that bankruptcy was imminent if the
Agreements were not approved. When certain shareholders questioned the fairness of the
Agreements, defendants reassured them with misleading statements and disparaged their
concerns to a few other shareholders without disclosing the concerns themselves. United
Park's "independent" directors had conflicts of interest which precluded them from
asserting claims on behalf of United Park, or were themselves ignorant of essential
information because defendants concealed it from them.
Before independent management assumed control in 1985, therefore, neither United
Park's shareholders nor its "independent directors" could discover or assert United Park's
fiduciary

duty claims.

Those claims could be asserted only after

independent

management performed a thorough review of United Park's files, met with the principals,
many of whom refused to provide meaningful information, and met with many other
persons. Not until United Park conducted discovery on its initial complaint in 1986 and
1987, could United Park discover that its former controlling shareholders had breached
their fiduciary duties by causing United Park to enter into unconscionable Agreements to
protect their own narrow and conflicting interests.

The evidence that United Park

presented to the district court is not even a "close call," and the district court
committed plain error in resolving these disputed fact issues against United Park on
summary judgment.
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III.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT
DISMISSING UNITED PARK'S FIDUCIARY DUTY CLAIMS AS BARRED BY
BANGOR PUNTA.
The district court improperly held that United Park's fiduciary duty claims are

"precluded by the doctrine enunciated in" Bangor Punta Operations, Inc. v. Bangor &
Aroostock R.R. Co., 417 U.S. 703 (1974). (R. 7855, H 4) The court held that because
"Loeb Investments purchased all of the stock of ARCO and ASARCO" in United Park in
1985 (R. 7854, H 13), it "would be inequitable and constitute a windfall for Loeb
Investments or the Bamberger Group, which together now control UPCM, to receive any
benefit resulting from suit against ARCO and ASARCO from whom the control stock was
purchased."

(R. 7855, H 3)

The district court rulings stand Bangor Punta on its head, because the district
court has enabled defendants to enjoy the windfall that Bangor Punta is intended to
prevent.

First, Bangor Punta bars claims by a corporation only where the current

shareholders have purchased all or virtually all of the corporation's shares from the
wrongdoers.

Bangor Punta does not bar claims where, as here, the corporation is the

real party in interest and asserts claims on behalf of itself and other shareholders
damaged by the wrongdoing.

Second, Bangor Punta applies only upon an established

finding that the current shareholder would recover a "windfall" through recovery.
Defendants failed to present any facts, much less establish as a matter of law, that Loeb
or the Bambergers would receive an improper windfall by recovery from the wrongdoers.
Third, even if Bangor Punta applies, it requires no more than a pro rata reduction in
United Park's right to recover from Anaconda and ASARCO equal to the percentage of
shares purchased by Loeb.

Finally, Bangor Punta does not bar United Park's claims

against non-selling third parties.
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A.

Bangor Punta Does Not Bar United Park's Claims Because
Anaconda and ASARCO Held and Sold Less Than One-Third of
United Park's Shares.

Bangor Punta barred a corporation from suing its former controlling shareholders
for mismanagement and other wrongs because the former shareholder had sold virtually
all the corporation's shares — more than 98 percent —.to the current shareholder.
Because the former shareholder had owned all the shares, the corporation in effect
sought recovery for wrongs the former shareholder "did to itself." Because the current
shareholder paid a price that reflected the wrongdoing, the current shareholder suffered
no injury.

And because the current shareholder owned all the shares, it was the real

party in interest.

The Court therefore disregarded the "corporate form" and held that

"where equity would preclude the shareholders from maintaining an action in their own
right, the corporation would also be precluded," 417 U.S. at 711-13.
Bangor Punta does not bar a corporation from recovery for wrongdoing by former
shareholders simply because those shareholders have sold their shares. Indeed, the case
upon which Bangor Punta relies, Home Fire Insurance Co. v. Barber, 93 N.W. 1024 (Neb.
1903),17 states precisely the opposite. Dean (then Commissioner) Roscoe Pound barred
a corporation from recovery because all current shareholders purchased their shares from
the wrongdoers. Dean Pound explicitly stated that the corporation would not be barred
if any of the current shareholders were shareholders at the time of the wrongdoing and
therefore are
entitled to complain of the acts of the defendant and of his
past mismanagement of the company; for, if any of them are
so entitled, there can be-no doubt of the right and duty of
the corporation to maintain this suit.
It would be
maintainable in such a case, even though the wrongdoers
continued to be stockholders and would share in the proceeds.
93 N.W. at 1028 (emphasis added).

17

A copy of the Home Fire Insurance decision appears in the Addendum to this Brief.
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As the court noted in National Union Elec. Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co.,
498 F.Supp. 991 (E.D. Pa. 1980), Bangor Punta announces a "narrow doctrine,"

498

F.Supp at 1005, whose principles are not "readily transferable beyond the factual
circumstances in which they were employed."

Id., at 1002.

It "does not follow" that

"recovery must be denied whenever a corporation seeks to recover for injury suffered
before new owners acquired its shares."

Id.

Significantly, there could have been no

lawsuit in either Bangor Punta or Home Fire Insurance until the wrongdoers sold their
shares:
[t]he former owners . . . had nothing to sell except a
corporation wasted by their acts of mismanagement. An
action brought by [the corporation] before the sale would
have been an action against itself, for the injury suffered by
[the corporation] was coextensive with the injury suffered by
the wrongdoers. In such circumstances it makes no sense to
adhere to the corporate fiction, for as a practical matter the
corporation has not suffered any cognizable injury.
Id., at 1003. See also In re Pittsburgh & Lake Erie R.R. Co. Securities and Antitrust
Litigation, 387 F.Supp. 906, 911 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (corporation is entitled to recovery if
"there are minority stockholders who were such at the time of the alleged wrongful
transactions;" the "net result of the Bangor Punta case" is that "no recovery can be had
by a plaintiff corporation where the beneficiary of a recovery would be a corporation
which had purchased 99% of the stock of the plaintiff corporation after the alleged
wrongful transactions") (emphasis in original). 18
Anaconda and ASARCO sold less than one-third of United Park's shares to one
shareholder, Loeb. (R. 4736-37)

Unlike the current shareholders in Bangor Punta and

Home Fire Insurance, Loeb is not the real party in interest, and its purchase of one-third

1

Virtually all of the cases applying Bangor Punta to bar a corporation from recovery
involve transfers of 99% or more of the stock. See, e.g., Noland v. Barton, 741 F.2d 315,
316 (10th Cir. 1984); In re Rea Express, Inc., Private Treble Damage Antitrust Litigation,
412 F. Supp. 1239, 1250 n.27 (E.D. Pa. 1976); Ford Tank Maintenance Co. v. Ford, 203
N.Y.S. 2d 542, 543 (1960).
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of United Park's shares does not justify disregarding the corporate form.19 Unlike the
wrongdoers in Bangor Punta and Home Fire Insurance, Anaconda and ASARCO injured the
shareholders who owned the other sixty-eight percent of United Park's shares. Unlike
the corporations in Bangor Punta and Home Fire Insurance, United Park's cause of action
existed before Anaconda and ASARCO sold their shares to Loeb, if United Park had been
able to discover and assert it.

Indeed, defendants' statute of limitations motions

asserted that United Park's shareholders, including the Bambergers should have
discovered the wrongdoing in 1975. Because the Bambergers and other United Park
shareholders were injured by Anaconda and ASARCO's wrongdoing, Bangor Punta does not
bar United Park's fiduciary duty claims.
B.

Defendants Have Made No Showing That Loeb or the
Bambergers Would Receive A Windfall From Recovery By
United Park.

Bangor Punta also rested on an established factual finding that the current
shareholder received full value for its purchase price; i.e., it in effect paid a discounted
price for the stock because of the wrongdoing of the defendants.

See 417 U.S. at

707-08. Defendants clearly bear the burden on summary judgment to establish a windfall
as undisputed fact. See, e.g., El Dorado Bancshares, Inc. v. Martin, 701 F.Supp. 1515,
1520-21 (D. Kan. 1988) (denying summary judgment where evidence of a windfall was in
conflict); National Union Elec. Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 498 F.Supp. at 1007-

19

As a general matter, the corporate form may be disregarded only where the
shareholder owns all or virtually all the shares. Disregard of the corporation form
requires "such unity of interest and ownership that the separate personalities of the
corporation and the individual no longer exist, and circumstances must indicate that the
adherence to the fiction of separate corporate existence would sanction a fraud or
promote injustice." Laborers' Pension Fund v. Litgen Concrete Cutting & Coring Co., 709
F.Supp. 140, 143 (N.D. 111. 1989), quoting Fletcher, 1 Cyclopedia of the Law of Private
Corporations § 41.30 (Rev. Ed. 1983). Since "it is the exceptional instance where a court
will disregard the corporation form, the party who wishes the court to disregard that form
bears the burden of proving that there are substantial reasons for doing so." Id., quoting
Contractors, Laborers, Teamsters & Engineers v. Hroch, 757 F.2d 184, 190 (8th Cir. 1985).
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09 (denying summary judgment because there was material issue of fact whether
wrongdoing was reflected in price of shares).
Defendants made no attempt to prove that Loeb paid a discounted price for its
shares or would receive a windfall from recovery by United Park. The only facts in the
record indicate that the price paid by Loeb did not reflect Anaconda's and ASARCO ?s
wrongdoing. In 1975 United Park stock sold at or substantially below the $2.37 average
price per share Loeb paid for its stock. (R. 4737) The record demonstrates that it is
unlikely that United Park will pay any dividend in the foreseeable future whether or not
it recovers from Anaconda and ASARCO.

(R. 4737)

Thus, there is no evidence to

support the district court's speculation that Loeb would receive a windfall.
Further, there can be no conceivable evidence that the Bambergers would receive
a windfall. Again, the Bambergers have been shareholders in United Park since 1953, and
they purchased no shares from Anaconda or ASARCO.

As outside shareholders, the

Bambergers suffered injury from the wrongdoing of Anaconda and ASARCO, and are
entitled to recovery under Bangor Punta and Home Fire Insurance. The court's finding
that the Bambergers would enjoy a "windfall" is a non-sequitur with no basis in law or
fact.

C.

At Most, Bangor Punta Requires Only a 31% Reduction in
United Park's Recovery From Anaconda and ASARCO.

Assuming arguendo that Bangor Punta precludes Loeb from benefitting from a
recovery against Anaconda and ASARCO, United Park is entitled to pro rata recovery
on behalf of its other stockholders. Bangor Punta did not address the propriety of pro
rata recovery because the plaintiff specifically disavowed any intention to seek it. See
417 U.S. at 718, n. 15. Subsequent cases, however, allow pro rata recovery for the
benefit of stockholders who did not purchase stock from the wrongdoers. See, Jannes v.
Microwave Communications, Inc., 385 F.Supp. 759, 760 (N.D. 111. 1974) (permitting
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corporation pro rata recovery for the less than 10% of the stockholders who did not buy
from the wrongdoers); Advanced Bus. Communications, Inc. v. Myers, 695 S.W. 2d 601,
606-07 (Tex. App. 1985). Pro rata recovery is clearly appropriate here, where more than
two-thirds of United Park stockholders did not buy from Anaconda or ASARCO. Anaconda
acknowledged the principle of pro rata recovery before the district court, but argued
that the Bambergers, as well as Loeb, should be precluded. For the reasons stated above,
the district court committed clear error when it barred the Bambergers from recovery.
(R. 7855, 11 3)
D.

Bangor Punta Does Not Bar Claims Against Non-Sellers.

Anaconda and ASARCO are the only defendants who sold shares in United Park.
The windfall that Bangor Punta seeks to avoid can occur only where a new purchaser,
having recovered for the wrongs alleged through a discounted purchase price, seeks to
recover again from the seller through litigation.

Thus, Bangor Punta applies only to

claims against the sellers and not to claims of wrongdoing against third parties.

It

certainly does not allow third-parties the windfall of avoiding liability for their
wrongdoing simply because the corporation's shares have been sold. See FMC Corp. v.
Boesky, 673 F. Supp. 242, 247 (N.D. 111. 1987), rev T d on other grounds, 852 F.2d 981
(7th Cir. 1988) (where corporation "seeks to recover from a third party for wrongdoing
done to it . . . none of the equitable principles which informed the Bangor Punta decision
have any relevance"); National Union Elec. Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Ind. Co., 498
F.Supp. 991 (E.D. Pa. 1980); see also Lewis v. Anderson, 477 A.2d 1040, 1050 & n.20
(Del. 1984).

The district court committed clear error when it concluded that Bangor

Punta barred United Park's Third and Fourth Claims against Royal Street, MorganFidelity, AMOT and GPCC. (R. 7855)
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IV.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT
DISMISSING UNITED PARK'S FIDUCIARY DUTY CLAIMS AGAINST
ANACONDA AND ASARCO.
Anaconda and ASARCO did not seek summary judgment on the ground that they

owed no fiduciary duties to United Park or its other shareholders, and did not assert that
there were no genuine issues of material fact as to whether they breached these duties.
Nonetheless, the district court entered a conclusion of law, drafted by counsel for
Anaconda and ASARCO, which purported to resolve these issues even though they were
not raised on summary judgment:
[n]o genuine issues of material fact exist regarding [United
Park's] allegations against ARCO and ASARCO. Therefore,
Defendant [sic] is entitled to Summary Judgment as a matter
of law dismissing all claims for relief contained in [United
Park's] Complaint.
(R. 7855, H 5)

This bald, unsupported conclusion was clear error.

United Park's

Amended Complaint stated claims for breach of fiduciary duty and presented substantial
evidence that Anaconda and ASARCO breached those duties.
United Park alleges that Anaconda and ASARCO controlled United Park and caused
United Park to give away its equity interest in GPCC, including the Park City Ski Resort,
its real property and water rights, to protect the Park City Ventures mining lease. This
allegation states a claim for breach of fiduciary duty under Delaware law,20 and
elsewhere.

Controlling shareholders who affirmatively dictate the direction of a

corporation are fiduciaries who owe the duties of loyalty, fairness and care to the
corporation and its other shareholders. See, e.g., Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining
Corp. 535 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1987); Singer v. Magnavox, 380 A.2d 969, 976 (Del. 1977).

United Park is a Delaware corporation. Claims involving the internal affairs of
corporation, including fiduciary duty claims, are governed by the laws of the state of
incorporation. See, e.g., Davis & Cox v. Summa Corp., 751 F.2d 1507, 1527 (9th Cir.
1985); Wilshire Oil Co. v. Riffe, 409 F.2d 1277, 1283, & n.16 (10th Cir. 1969);
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws §§302, 309 (1971).
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Controlling shareholders are liable to the corporation if they breach those duties through
self-dealing, through gross negligence or through a failure to disclose material facts.
See, e.g., TWA v. Summa Corp., 374 A.2d 5, 10 (Del. Ch. 1977); In re Reading Co., 551
F.Supp. 1205, 1215 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (applying Delaware law).
United Park presented substantial evidence that Anaconda and ASARCO controlled
United Park and breached their fiduciary duties, including the admissions of Clark Wilson,
Anaconda's representative on the United Park Board. Wilson admitted that Anaconda and
ASARCO controlled United Park in 1975, that United Park's position in connection with
the restructuring of GPCC was cleared with Anaconda and ASARCO management in New
York and dictated by their policy to get out of the resort business, and that WilsonTs
first duty was to make sure that United Park did nothing to interfere with the mining
lease. See supra at 15-16.
These facts were more than sufficient to defeat summary judgment even if
Anaconda and ASARCO had made the motion.
V.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING UNITED PARK'S CLAIMS
AGAINST AMOT AND GPCC FOR AIDING AND ABETTING THE BREACHES
OF FIDUCIARY DUTIES BY ANACONDA, ASARCO, MORGAN-FIDELITY
AND ROYAL STREET.
Pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), the district court held, as a matter of law,

that United Park failed to state claims for relief against AMOT and GPCC for aiding and
abetting breaches of fiduciary duty by Anaconda, ASARCO, Royal Street and MorganFidelity. (R. 7836-37, Ml 2-3) The district court also purported to make findings of fact
that AMOT and GPCC did not aid and abet any breaches of fiduciary duty. (R. 7827-29,
1111 21-34)

The district court clearly misapplied the standard governing dismissal under
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Rule 12(b)(6),

and improperly resolved disputed issues of fact under Rule 56.

It is beyond serious dispute that one who aids and abets a breach of duty by a
fiduciary is liable to the one to whom the duty is owed. See, e.g., Mills Acquisition Co.
v. MacMillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1284 n.33 (Del. 1989) ("it is bedrock law that the
conduct of one who knowingly joins with a fiduciary, including corporate officials, in
breaching a fiduciary obligation, is equally culpable"); Lynch v. McDonald, 367 P.2d 464
(Utah 1962) ("it has frequently been held that one who knowingly aids and abets a
fiduciary to make secret profits may be held liable jointly with the fiduciary for such
secret profits"); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 876 (1979). United Park alleges that
Anaconda and ASARCO breached their fiduciary duties they owed to United Park as its
controlling shareholders, and that Royal Street and Morgan-Fidelity breached their
fiduciary duties to United Park as co-shareholders in GPCC.22 United Park also alleges
that GPCC and AMOT aided and abetted those breaches. These allegations state claims

21

A motion to dismiss can be granted only where, assuming the truth of the
allegations, it is clear as a matter of law that the complaint fails to state any valid claim
for which relief can be granted. See Utah R, Civ. P. 12(b)(6); Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S.
41, 45-46 (1957).
22

Neither Royal Street nor Morgan-Fidelity challenged the merits of United Park's
claims that these two defendants, as co-shareholders with United Park in a closely-held
corporation—GPCC—owed fiduciary duties of loyalty and fairness to United Park, and
breached those duties by taking unfair advantage of United Park in the division of
GPCCfs assets under the 1975 Resort Agreements. See, e.g., Shane v. Shane, 891 F.2d
976, 986 (1st Cir. 1989) ("shareholders in a closely-held corporation owe one another a
duty of utmost good faith and loyalty that requires full disclosure"); Alaska Plastics, Inc.
v. Coppock, 621 P.2d 270, 276 (Alaska 1980) ("stockholders in the close corporation owe
one another substantially the same fiduciary duty in the operation of the enterprise that
partners owe to one another"); Delaney v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 564 P.2d 277, 281 (Or.
1977) (en banc) (equal owners of close corporation are entitled to each other's
performance of fiduciary duties of loyalty, good faith, and full disclosure); Donahue v.
Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505, 515 (Mass. 1975) (same holding as Alaska Plastics);
Nash v. Craigco, Inc., 585 P.2d 775, 776 (Utah 1978) (controlling shareholder of close
corporation owes fiduciary duty to deal fairly and openly with other shareholders).
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against GPCC and AMOT.23
United Park presented substantial evidence that GPCC and AMOT aided and
abetted these breaches of fiduciary duty by Anaconda, ASARCO, Royal Street and
Morgan-Fidelity.

GPCC mismanaged its affairs between 1971 and 1975, creating the

financial difficulties that ultimately led to the division of GPCC pursuant to the 1975
Resort Agreements. GPCC refused to take reasonable steps to solve its difficulties, such
as selling off certain properties, because Royal Street, GPCCfs manager, wanted those
properties for itself. It defaulted on its obligations to United Park, but at the same time
did not default on obligations to other land vendors. (R. 4782) There is also evidence
that GPCC officials told S. N. Cornwall that the GPCC properties had no value in 1975,
when at the same time it was representing in prospectuses given to potential investors
that the properties were worth $37.8 million.24 VanCott, while representing GPCC and
Royal Street, prepared the false and misleading Proxy Statement. Through these acts,
GPCC induced the breach of fiduciary duty by Anaconda and ASARCO, and substantially
assisted the breaches of duty by Royal Street and Morgan-Fidelity.
AMOT also substantially assisted the breaches by Anaconda and ASARCO, and
Royal Street and Morgan-Fidelity. When AMOT began negotiations with Royal Street
and Morgan-Fidelity in the Spring of 1975, the owners of Aspen and Vail were still
interested in pursuing discussions. AMOT knew the values of the real property and the
ski resort from the GPCC Prospectuses. It joined with Morgan-Fidelity in insisting that
United Park agree to two additional 20-year extensions on the Ski Leases, even though

2J

It is no answer for AMOT to claim that it owed fiduciary duties to its own
shareholders. Those duties do not absolve AMOT from liability for inducing breaches by
United Park ! s fiduciaries. See, e.g., Gilbert v. El Paso Co., 490 A.2d 1050, 1057 (Del. Ch.
1984); Penn Mart Realty Co. v. Becker, 298 A.2d 349, 351-52 (Del. Ch. 1972).
24

There is also evidence that GPCC failed to disclose to Cornwall the Salomon
restructuring proposals, under which United Park would have retained its equity interest
in GPCC. See supra at 18, fn. 4.
61

United Park was to receive wholly inadequate consideration for those extensions.
AMOT played a major role in assuring that United Park shareholders approved the
1975 Resort Agreements and that there would be no legal opposition. After receipt of
the Gartner letter, Mr. Badami of AMOT joined the other parties to the Agreements at
a meeting in the VanCott offices and was "coached" as to how to insure shareholder
approval.

Badami told the shareholders that the meeting must not be postponed and

essentially vouched for the adequacy of the Proxy Statement and the fairness of the 1975
Resort Agreements. He then disparaged the Gartner letter as a "diatribe of misfacts" and
factually misrepresented the content of the Gartner letter by telling the shareholders
that Gartner believed that United Park was giving up mineral rights. (R. 5941-42)
also supra at 40-41.

See

Badami's false and misleading attack on the Gartner letter was

clearly part of an orchestrated effort by Badami, Anaconda and ASARCO through their
control of United Park management, and other defendants, to convince the shareholders
that Gartner's position had no merit and should be ignored. At a minimum, AMOT played
a critical role in insuring that United Park shareholders were pressured into taking a
hasty vote on inadequate information and that shareholders would not challenge the
transaction.
These facts squarely contradict the district court's finding that
statements were "opinions only."

(R. 7828, H 25)

Badami's

Badami made at least one

misrepresentation of fact, because he misrepresented the content of the Gartner letter.
Equally important, the court's findings that United Park's shareholders did not rely and
were not entitled to rely on Badami's "opinions" misstate both fact and law. Once Mr.
Badami volunteered to speak at the meeting, he had a duty to speak truthfully and to
disclose all material facts. See, e.g., Christenson v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co.,
666 P.2d 302, 306 (Utah 1983); Uptegraft v. Dome Petroleum Corp., 764 P.2d 1350, 135354 (Okla. 1988); Meeker v. Lanham, 604 P.2d 556, 558-59 (Wyo. 1979). Even if Badami's
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statements at the meeting were opinions only, they are actionable because they were
made without a reasonable basis or genuine belief as to their truth, and Badami intended
others to rely on them.

See, e.g., Meeker v. Lanham, 604 P.2d at 558;

Restatement

(Second) of Torts § 525 (1977).
Further, the court's finding that Badami's statements "were not detrimentally
relied upon by the UPCM shareholders" (R. 7828, H 25), is unsupported in the record and
gives AMOT the benefit of an inference to which it is not entitled. Badami attended the
meeting at the invitation of United Park management and Anaconda and ASARCO after
he was "coached" how to help obtain shareholder approval.

He was presented to the

shareholders in a context in which management was clearly urging the shareholders to
rely on Mr. Badami in deciding whether to adjourn the meeting in order to permit fuller
disclosure.

After Badami's presentation, the shareholders voted not to adjourn the

meeting, consistent with the wishes of Anaconda and ASARCO. Given these facts, the
court could not properly conclude, as a matter of law, that the shareholders did not rely
on Badami.
VI.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT
DISMISSING UNITED PARK'S PRAYER FOR REFORMATION OF THE
RESORT AGREEMENTS.
In addition to its damage claims, United Park seeks reformation of the 1975 Resort

Agreements to remedy the unconscionable unfairness of those agreements resulting from
defendants' breaches of fiduciary duty and aiding and abetting such breaches. 25 While
styled as "reformation," United Park's claim is that because the 1975 Resort Agreements
are unconscionable, the court may, on equitable grounds,

refuse to enforce the

unconscionable provisions, or construe the agreements to avoid an unconscionable result.

25

In its Amended Complaint, United Park prayed for other alternative remedies,
including rescission and termination of the 1975 Resort Agreements. United Park does
not pursue those remedies on this appeal.
63

See Resource Management Co. v. Weston Ranch and Livestock Co., 706 P.2d 1028, 104041 (Utah 1985); Bekins Bar V Ranch v. Huth, 664 P.2d 455, 459 (Utah 1983).
Specifically, United Park seeks a construction of the Water Agreement to permit United
Park to use its prior reservation of 2,850 gallons per minute of Group II water for all
purposes rather than simply for "mining, milling and related purposes" as the agreement
presently provides. United Park also asks the Court not to enforce the two additional
extensions of the Ski Leases given in 1975. These remedies are appropriate because the
1975 Agreements are both procedurally and substantively unconscionable.

The district

court dismissed United Park's reformation claims as a matter of law. This was error.
A.
The

Reformation Is An Appropriate Remedy Because the 1975
Resort Agreements Were Unconscionable.
1975 Resort Agreements

substantively.
effective.

were unconscionable, both

procedurally

and

The Agreements required United Park shareholder approval to be

From the perspective of the shareholders, the Agreements bore many of the

classic indicia of procedural unconscionability. 26
length; indeed there were no negotiations.

The negotiations were not at arms

United Park's controlling shareholders

dictated United Park's position — to get out of the resort and land development business
— and did not attempt to protect United Park's equity interest in GPCC, including
GPCC's resort operations and development properties.

The Proxy Statement was

demonstrably false and misleading. When a few shareholders raised questions, they were
told that the Agreements were "very complex and difficult to understand" (R. 7252), but
that

the shareholders should trust

management.

26

When Gartner

requested

that

As this Court has stated, "[i]ndices of procedural unconscionability include . . .
phrasing contractual terms in language that is incomprehensible to a layman . . . ; hiding
key contractual provisions in a maze of fine print . . . ; minimizing key contractual
provisions by deceptive sales practices; lack of opportunity for meaningful negotiation,
. . . ; [and] whether the aggrieved party was compelled to accept the terms . . . ."
Resource Management, 706 P.2d at 1042 (citations omitted).
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consideration of the Agreements be deferred to permit fuller disclosure, Anaconda and
ASARCO and management directed the special meeting to proceed.

Management, with

Badami f s help, coerced a quick vote by claiming that time was of the essence and that
GPCC and the Park City Resort would cease to operate if the Agreements were not
immediately approved.27
These facts clearly demonstrate that United Park shareholders, in approving the
1975 Resort Agreements, were confronted by an "absence of meaningful choice11, the
essence of procedural unconscionability.

Resource Management, 706 P.2d at 1042,

quoting Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
The 1975 Resort Agreements were also substantively unconscionable 28 at the time
of their making.29 For $2,000, United Park relinquished its 39% equity interest in GPCC,
which was critical to its 1971 sale of land and water to GPCC at discounted prices and
for which it had paid nearly $1 million. (R. 6627-28) It sold land and a world class ski

27

Management knew the terms of the 1975 Resort Agreements as early as May 1975.
Yet, it waited until early September to distribute the Proxy Statement and scheduled the
meeting for early October. By that point in the year, defendants could and did coerce
a quick vote by claiming that immediate approval was required if the ski resort was to
open for the winter season. (R. 5941-42) However, it would have been possible to
disseminate the Proxy Statement and hold the Special Meeting much earlier in the year.
28

Substantive unconscionability is indicated by "contract terms so one-sided as to
oppress or unfairly surprise an innocent party; an overall imbalance in the obligations and
rights imposed by the bargain; excessive price; or significant cost-price disparity."
Resource Management, 706 P.2d at 1041-42 (citations omitted).
29

United Park alleged in its Amended Complaint, and demonstrated on summary
judgment, that the 1975 Resort Agreements were unconscionable when entered into. It
also argued that the Water Agreement has become even more unconscionable with the
passing of time, due to events not foreseen in 1975. The district court purported to
dismiss United Park's claim for reformation because United Park was attempting to prove
unconscionability through subsequent events alone. (R.7844, H 21) That was error
because United Park also claims contemporaneous unconscionability. It was also error
because "a court is not powerless in equity to remedy that which it perceives as present
unconscionability, and may refuse to enforce a contract that, while equitable when made,
has become unconscionable with passage of time." Resource Management, 706 P.2d at
1045-46 (quotation omitted).
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resort worth well over $40 million for $5 million payable over an extended period of
time. It sold water worth more than $2 million in 1975 for a present value payment of
$350,000 (R. 4762-63). It leased its land for minimal rentals for the first 40 years and
then agreed to an additional 40 years, again for essentially no consideration. See supra
at 22-23. These terms manifest an excessively low price and an inexplicably unfair costprice disparity. In sum, they are unconscionable.
In the court below, defendants produced no evidence that the 1975 Resort
Agreements were fair to United Park and the court made no finding that the Agreements
were not unconscionable. The district court erred in dismissing United Park's claim for
reformation.
B.

The District Court Erred In Holding That United Park Has
Waived Or Is Estopped From Seeking Reformation.

The district court's dismissal of United Park's reformation claim appears to be
based on two grounds.

First, the court suggested that United Park could not seek

reformation because it continued to accept payment from defendants under the 1975
Resort Agreements and, as of January 1990, the purchase price under the Water
Agreement had been fully paid. (R. 7838, H 7) Second, it held that United Park was
barred from seeking reformation against Royal Street because in 1981 and 1982 United
Park had signed Estoppel Certificates and had consented to mortgages on the Deer Valley
Resort given to Wells Fargo by Royal Street.

(R. 7841-42, Ml 17-19)

These legal

conclusions were error.
The focus of a claim of unconscionability is the fairness of the contract terms,
and the circumstances surrounding its formation, not on the performance of either party.
See Resource Management, 706 P.2d at 1041-49. Furthermore, the court may account for
performance by the party against whom relief is sought by partially enforcing the
contract so that the performing party is compensated, but the contract as enforced is not
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unconscionable. 30
The court's reliance on the fact that United Park continued to accept payments
under the various contracts suggests notions of waiver or estoppel. To establish waiver,
defendants must prove that United Park intentionally relinquished a known right. Morgan
v. Quailbrook Condo Co., 704 P.2d 573, 578 (Utah 1985); Masters v. Worsley, 777 P.2d
499, 503 (Utah App. 1989); to establish estoppel, defendants must prove that they
justifiably relied to their detriment on United Park's conduct.

Rothey v. Walker Bank

& Trust Co., 754 P.2d 1222, 1224 (Utah 1988); Celebrity Club, Inc. v. Utah Liquor
Control Comm'n, 602 P.2d 689, 694 (Utah 1979). Defendants must prove each element
of waiver or estoppel by clear and convincing evidence. See Corporation Nine v. Taylor,
513 P.2d 417, 420 (Utah 1973); Mercer v. State, 739 P.2d 703, 706 (Wash. App. 1987);
Kenneth P. Collins Agency v. Hagerott, 684 P.2d 487, 490 (Mont. 1984).
Defendants, however, presented no evidence to support either waiver or estoppel,
much less establish waiver or estoppel as a matter of law. The only evidence is that
United

Park

accepted

payments

under the Agreements before

new

management

investigated and discovered United Park's claims. Shortly after United Park discovered
its claims, it put defendants on notice that it was challenging the 1975 Resort
Agreements and was seeking equitable remedies, including reformation.

(R. 2-85; 6732-

42; 6744-47) Defendants continued to make payments after that notice with knowledge
of United Park's claims and there is no evidence whatsoever they have been unfairly
prejudiced. Defendants owed the money in all events, because they have had beneficial
use of the properties.

Acceptance of benefits under a contract does not bar a claim for reformation. See,
§ £ M Gablick v. Wolfe, 469 P.2d 391, 396 (Alaska 1970); Nab v. Hills, 452 P.2d 981, 988
(Idaho 1969).
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Similarly, the Wells Fargo Estoppel Certificates do not bar United Park's
unconscionability claim. The Estoppel Certificates state only that, as of 1981 and 1982,
United Park was not aware of any defaults under the Deer Valley Lease.

(R. 4473-

74; 4482-84) They say nothing about potential claims against Royal Street for breach of
fiduciary duty.

The record does not establish who drafted the Estoppel Certificates

because United Park has not yet had discovery on that issue; however, United Park is
entitled to the reasonable inference that Wells Fargo drafted the certificates, which
should be construed against it. See Hoffman v. Life Ins. Co. of North America, 669 P.2d
410, 416 (Utah 1983) (contract language construed against drafting party). Thus, the
record does not support the legal conclusion that United Park intentionally relinquished
a known right to seek reformation of the Ski Leases or the Water Agreement against
Royal Street on the basis of unconscionability when it executed the Estoppel
Certificates.
Moreover, Wells Fargo made no factual showing of any undue prejudice to support
an estoppel of United Park's reformation claims. Reformation of the Water Agreement
to permit United Park to use its reserved water for all purposes cannot possibly prejudice
Wells Fargo. Due to United Park's prior reservation of water for mining, milling and
related purposes, neither Royal Street nor its lender, Wells Fargo, could have relied on
that water. As to United Park's prayer that the two 20-year lease extensions given in
1975 for no consideration be cancelled, Wells Fargo made no showing that, or to what
extent, its security would be impaired.31

Given defendants failure to establish any

detrimental reliance, the district court's dismissal of United Park's unconscionability
claims must be reversed.

31

Neither did Wells Fargo make any showing of prejudice that would estop United
Park from its alternative reformation claim that defendants should be required to pay a
fair rental under the Ski Leases if the extensions are not cancelled.
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VII.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT
DISMISSING UNITED PARKfS CLAIMS FOR BREACH OF THE RESORT
AGREEMENTS.
United Park alleges that GPCC and Royal Street breached the 1975 Agreements,

and presented substantial evidence of these breaches in opposition to summary judgment.
The district court granted summary judgment dismissing these claims on the grounds that
(1) GPCC and Royal Street cured any alleged breach of the Water Agreement by making
payment in full thereunder, and (2) that United Park has "waived and is estopped from
asserting" all pre-August 1985 claims for breach of contract and lease against GPCC and
Royal Street, and all continuing breaches that began before August 1985, "based on
statements in its annual reports that GPCC and Royal Street were current on all
agreements, and its certifications to the escrow agent that GPCC and Royal Street had
paid all amounts of lift revenue that were owed." (R. 7835-36, 11 61 )32 This was error.
United Park's Twelfth Claim for Relief alleges in part that GPCC and Royal Street
breached paragraph 14 of the Water Agreement by opposing in bad faith United Park's
applications to the State Engineer for extensions of time to resume use of certain water
rights.

(R. 2835-40)

The Water Agreement reserves to United Park the prior right to

use for "mining, milling and related purposes" up to 2850 gallons per minute from eleven
underground water claims. These reservations include five claims that United Park is not
currently using, but will use if mining activity resumes. When United Park is not using
the water, the Water Agreement gives GPCC and Royal Street the right and the
affirmative obligation to use the water to protect it from forfeiture.

Royal Street has

not used this water and GPCC refuses to tell United Park whether it uses the water, how
it uses the water, or how much it uses. (R. 4825; 4831)

,2

The district court held that United Park's breach of contract claims, to the extent
those claims arose before May 1980, were barred by the six year statute of limitations.
While erroneous in certain respects, this conclusion is irrelevant because United Park
seeks recovery only for breaches occurring after that date.
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To protect its right to use the water in the future, United Park filed the
applications for extensions with the State Engineer in April 1987.

GPCC and Royal

Street filed written protests and opposed the applications at a hearing, jeopardizing both
title to the water rights and United Park's prior reservation for future use. (R. 483132) These actions violate Paragraph 14 of the Water Agreement, which prohibits GPCC
and Royal Street from taking any action without the written approval of United Park
"which will or might jeopardize or impair the rights of the parties with relation to the
Purchased Flow or the Purchased Rights." (R. 5098)

Their protests were made in bad

faith and are continuing violations of the Water Agreement.
United Park's Fifth Claim alleges in part that GPCC has breached Paragraph 5 of
the Water Agreement, by refusing to pay the cost of treating water from the portal of
United Park's Ontario No. 2 Drain Tunnel. (R. 2818-19) Paragraph 5 requires that GPCC
shall accept water "in the condition in which it reaches the point of delivery11 and "at its
sole expense, treat or purify the Purchased Flow to the extent that the same is necessary
before it may be used for the purposes of" GPCC. (R. 5091)

Because water from the

Ontario No. 2 Drain Tunnel flows into the Provo River, federal and state law require it
to be treated when it flows from the tunnel portal. For the past several years, United
Park has treated the water at a cost of $2,650,000 (R. 4833), even though Paragraph 5
of the Water Agreement clearly imposes the obligation and cost of treatment on GPCC.
Since 1985, United Park has repeatedly demanded that GPCC pay the treatment costs,
which increase each year, but GPCC has refused.

Id.

United Park's Fifth Claim also alleges that GPCC and Royal Street

have

understated their lift revenue and paid United Park substantially less than United Park
is entitled to receive under the Ski Leases. (R. 2819-26)

United Park audited the lift

revenue accounting records for the first time in 1985, and discovered that GPCC and
Royal Street have been exchanging lift passes for goods and services, and issuing
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complimentary or discounted passes. GPCC and Royal Street have failed to include the
value of the exchanges and discounts in the lift revenues, resulting in an underpayment
to United Park.

(R. 4787-88)

The district court erred in dismissing these claims. First, the fact that GPCC and
Royal Street made final payment under the Water Agreement in January 1990 does not
render moot United Park's claims for breach of that Agreement. GPCC and Royal Street
have breached contractual obligations — to pay for water treatment and to avoid
jeopardizing United Park's water rights — that are clearly continuing in nature. Those
obligations are not extinguished upon payment of the purchase price.
Second, the district court's finding that United Park has waived or is estopped
from asserting these claims is nonsensicaL The district court based its findings of waiver
and estoppel solely on statements in United Park Annual Reports between 1976 and 1984
to the effect

that defendants were current on all obligations under the Resort

Agreements, and on certifications United Park made to the escrow agent that the
defendants had paid all sums due under the Ski Leases.
These general statements cannot constitute waiver or estoppel. 33

United Park

cannot have waived its claims for understatement of lift revenue when United Park did
not discover the understatements until it first audited the records in 1985. (R. 4787)
And United Park cannot have waived its claims for payment of water treatment when
United Park has demanded that GPCC pay these costs since 1985. (R. 4833) None of the
statements in the Annual Reports or to the escrow agent support a finding that United
Park intentionally relinquished a known right.

33

Again, waiver requires proof of an existing right, knowledge of its existence, and
an intention to relinquish it. Masters v. Worsley, 777 P.2d 499, 503 (Utah App. 1989).
Estoppel requires proof of a statement or act by the party asserting the claim
inconsistent with the claim, action by the other party in reliance on the statement or act,
and injury to the party from the reliance. Celebrity Club, Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control
CommTn, 602 P.2d 689, 694 (Utah 1979).
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The district court's findings also fail to address the two crucial elements of
estoppel. There is no evidence that defendants relied to their detriment on statements
in the Annual Reports or to the escrow agent.

Defendants cannot show how the

statements caused them to protest in bad faith United Park's applications for extensions,
to fail to pay the costs of water treatment, or to understate lift revenue. Nor can they
show detriment or injury as a result. The only effect has been to their benefit, because
GPCC and Royal Street have paid less to United Park than they are required, and GPCC
has wrongfully avoided paying the costs of water treatment.
VIII. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT
DISMISSING UNITED PARK'S TRESPASS CLAIMS.
United Park's Seventh Claim for Relief alleges that GPCC has committed trespass
by constructing a maintenance building and a ski lift tower (the "Town Lift") on United
Park property not leased to GPCC.

The district court erroneously found that both

trespass claims "fail" because of United Park's contractual duties of cooperation with
GPCC under Paragraph 19 of the Land Purchase Agreement (R. 7845, 11 23), because of
United Park's "written and verbal consent to GPCC's use of the land in question," id.,
and because the Town Lift was constructed on property subject to the Resort Area Lease.
(R. 7844-45, 11 22) These findings were error.
Contrary to the district court's finding, paragraph 19 of the Land Agreement does
not require United Park to grant easements for the maintenance building or for the
construction of ski lifts on United Park's property. 34

Further, United Park did not

Paragraph 19 of the Land Agreement only provides that United Park
will, upon request, grant to [GPCC] such easements over its
properties as may be reasonably necessary for ingress and
egress to and from any of the Subject Properties, provided
that the nature and duration of such easements shall be
subject to the approval of [United Park] and the use thereof
shall be subject to such reasonable conditions and restrictions
as [United Park] shall impose. (R. 4913)
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consent to GPCCfs construction of the maintenance building or the Town Lift. (R. 484952):*
Finally, the district court erred in holding, as a matter of law, that the Town Lift
property was subject to the Resort Area Lease. (R. 7844-45, H 22) Paragraph 14 of the
Resort Area Lease gives United Park the right to sell certain ski lease property to third
parties if the lessee is not using the property. (R. 5319-21) In 1980, United Park gave
John Sweeney an option to purchase 75 acres, including the property where GPCC built
the Town Lift.

The Resort Area lease gave GPCC a right of first refusal to match

Sweeney's offer, but GPCC did not do so.

(R. 4854)

Sweeney never exercised the

option, which expired in 1984. (R. 4855)
In December 1980, United Park, GPCC and GPI entered into the Third Amendment
to the Resort Area Lease, which deleted the Sweeney option parcel from the lands subject
to the Resort Area Lease. (R. 5379-83; 4854) At the time, United Park and GPCC both
knew that Sweeney had an option to purchase the property, and that, by definition,
options need not be exercised. The Third Amendment to the Resort Area Lease makes no
mention of the Sweeney option and is not conditioned in any way on Sweeney's exercise
of the option. The district court's conclusion that the Amendment became effective only
if United Park sold the property (R. 7844-45, U 22) is inexplicable, unsupported, and
squarely contradicted by the plain language of the Amendment. United Park and GPCC
removed the Town Lift property from the resort area lease in 1980, whether or not

In the court below, GPCC flatly misrepresented the deposition testimony of LaMar
Osika when it claims Mr. Osika testified that United Park consented to GPCC's use of
these United Park properties. (R. 3733). In fact, Mr. Osika testified that, in response
to a letter (R. 7976) from GPCC to United Park dated July 15, 1974, requesting that
United Park give GPCC a blanket agreement permitting GPCC to use United Park lands
for ski lifts and skiing, "I don't think [the requested agreement] was provided . . . .
(R. 7945, p.214). Similarly, certain correspondence cited by GPCC (R. 7155-58; 7976,
Ex. 50, 51) only involved proposed easements over the Thaynes and Spiro Tunnel mining
reservations for ski lifts and run. It provided no support for the claim that United Park
consented to the maintenance building trespass or the Town Lift trespass.
73

Sweeney ever purchased it. GPCC's construction of the Town Lift, in the face of United
Park's protest, is trespass. At a minimum, these facts precluded summary judgment.
CONCLUSION
The judgment dismissing United Park's Amended Complaint must be reversed and
the case remanded for the completion of discovery and trial.
DATED this I f

day of December, 1990.
WATKISS & SAPERSTEIN

DAVID K. WATKISS
DAVID B. WATKISS
PERRIN R. LOVE
CAROLYN COX
Attorneys for
United Park City Mines Company
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STEPHEN B. MITCHELL, Esq. (#2278
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL
Attorneys for Defendant
Atlantic Richfield Company
139 E. South Temple, Suite 2001
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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MERLIN 0. BAKER, Esq.
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
Attorneys for Defendant ASARCO
79 South Main, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801) 532-1500

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

UNITED PARK CITY MINES COMPANY,
a Delaware corporation,
Plaintiff,

FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF
LAW, AND ORDER

vs.
GREATER PARK CITY COMPANY,
a Utah Corporation, et al.

Civil No. C-86-3347
Judge Pat B. Brian

Defendants.

Defendants Atlantic Richfield Company's

("ARCO") and

Defendant ASARCO, Inc.'s ("ASARCO") Motions for Summary Judgment
came on for hearing before the court, the Honorable Pat B.
Brian, Judge, on April 4, 1990. Richard D. Burbidge and Stephen
B. Mitchell

of Burbidge

4 Mitchell

appeared

on behalf of

Defendant Atlantic Richfield Company, Merlin O. Baker of Ray,
Quinney & Nebeker appeared on behalf of Defendant ASARCO, and

David K. Watkiss and David B. Watkiss of Watkiss & Saperstein
appeared on behalf of Plaintiff United Park City Mines Company.
The

court

having

considered

the Memoranda,

Affidavits and

Exhibits filed in connection with the motions by the parties,
having taken the matter under advisement, and having previously
entered its Memorandum Decision granting the motions, finds that
there are no genuine issues of material fact with regard to the
following:
FINDINGS OF FACT

1. In 1975, three "independent" directors served on the
United Park City Mines Company's ("UPCM") Board of Directors
when the restructuring plans and Resort Agreements involving the
Greater Park City Company ("GPCC") were considered and approved
by the seven-member Board of Directors.
2.

At

the time

the restructuring

agreement

was

approved, ARCO and ASARCO each had two directors on the UPCM
Board of Directors. There were also three independent directors
serving on the Board.
3. The independent directors of UPCM had full knowledge
concerning the terms of the restructuring and its effect upon
UPCM and voted in favor of the restructuring.
4. The three independent directors were not implicated
in any alleged

wrong-doing,

did not have any conflict of

interest and were fully informed of all the material facts

2

involving

the

1975

restructuring

plan

and

the

subsequent

execution of the Resort Agreements.
5.

The leases and agreements relating to the 1975

Resort Agreements, involving the restructuring of GPCC, were
reviewed and approved by the three independent members on the
UPCM Board of Directors.
6.
in

May,

At the annual meeting of shareholders of UPCM held
1975,

the

shareholders

were

informed

of

the

restructuring proposals and were informed that these proposals
would be submitted to a vote of the shareholders in October,
1975.
7. On or about September 2, 1975, a proxy statement was
sent to all shareholders of UPCM, which stated in detail what
UPCM was giving and what it was receiving as part of the
proposed restructuring.
8.

Shortly before the special meeting of shareholders

on October 7, 1975, the UPCM Board of Directors received several
written

complaints

from shareholders,

including

a detailed

milti-paged letter from Jerome Gartner, an attorney representing
a shareholder named Timothy Donath.
9.

Shareholder Donath demanded that the meeting be

postponed and that the directors reconsider their"decision to
approve the restructuring. Several shareholders complained that
the restructuring was unfair to UPCM and that the proxy sent to
shareholders was incomplete and missing important information.

3

10.

Shareholder

Donath's

letter was

reviewed

and

discussed by the Board of Directors of UPCM, including the
independent directors.

The directors voted to proceed with the

shareholders meeting.

Donath's letter was disclosed to the

shareholders at the special meeting on October 7, 1975.
11.

The special

shareholders meeting was held on

October 7, 1975, and more than ninety percent

(90%) of the

shareholders approved the restructuring plan.
12.
knowledge

In 1975, the shareholders of UPCM had actual
of

the

restructuring

plan

and

the

leases

and

agreements relating thereto, or they were put on notice of facts
which would lead a person of ordinary prudence to discover the
alleged wrong-doing, sufficient to commence the running of the
statute of limitations.
13.

In 1985, Loeb Investments purchased all of the

stock of ARCO and ASARCO in UPCM.

Loeb does not dispute that it

paid a fair price for the stock.

The stock was purchased with

knowledge that the assets of UPCM did not include those which
had been given up in the 1975 restructuring.

The court, having made its Findings of Fact, now makes
and enters its:

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

In 1975, UPCM, through three independent directors

on its seven-member Board of Directors, and through several
4

shareholders, knew or should have known of any alleged wrongdoing

resulting

from

the

1975

restructuring

plan

and

the

execution of numerous leases and agreements relating to the 1975
restructuring plan and Resort Agreements.
2.

The claims against ARCO and ASARC0 contained in the

First and Second Claims for Relief of UPCMfs Complaint are
barred by the three-year statute of limitations contained in
Utah Code Annotated, § 78-12-27.
3.

It would be inequitable and constitute a windfall

for Loeb Investments or the Bamberger Group, which together now
control UPCM, to receive any benefit resulting from suit against
ARCO and ASARCO from whom the control stock was purchased.
4.

Therefore, the First, Second, Third and Fourth

Claims for Relief are also precluded by the doctrine enunciated
in Banaor-Punta Operations v. Bangor and A.R. Co.
5.
UPCMfs

No genuine issues of material fact exist regarding

allegations

against

ARCO

and

ASARCO.

Therefore,

Defendant is entitled to Summary Judgment as a matter of law
dismissing all claims for relief contained in UPCM's Complaint.

ORDER

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Summary
Judgment shall be and the same hereby is entered in favor of
Atlantic
Plaintiff

Richfield
United

Company

Park

City

and

ASARCO,

Mines
5

Inc.

Company

and

against

dismissing

with

prejudice the Amended Complaint on file herein in its entirety
against Defendants Atlantic Richfield Company and ASARCO.

DATED this /S

day of

j$H&.
BYf THE
THE COJ
COPRTi:

^ 2

THE HONORABLE PAT B. BRIAN
THIRD DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

js arco\findord
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I mailed a copy
of the proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order
to the following parties by depositing the same in U.S. mails,
postage prepaid, this I

day of April, 1990:

Merlin 0. Baker, Esq.
Ray, Quinney & Nebeker
79 South Main, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Donald N. Dirks, Esq.
Davis, Polk & Wardwell
One Chase Manhattan Plaza
New York, New York 10015
David K. Watkiss
Stuart W. Hinckley
Watkiss & Campbell
310 South Main, Suite 1200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Gordon Strachan, Esq.
James A. Boevers, Esq.
Erik Strindberg, Esq.
Prince, Yeates & Geldzahler
City Centre I, Suite 400
175 East Fourth South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Richard W. Giauque, Esq.
Gary F. Bendinger, Esq.
Wendy A. Faber, Esq.
Giauque, Williams, Wilcox & Bendinger
500 Kearns Building
136 South Main
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Randy L. Dryer, Esq.
Parsons, Behle & Latimer
185 South State, Suite 700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

7

Michael F. Jones, Esq.
Puitt, Gushe & Fletcher
136 South State, Suite 1850
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Howard L. Edwards, Esq,
515 South Flower Street
Los Angeles, California 90071
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STRACHAN & STRACHAN
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER
Attorneys for Defendants
Greater Park City Company and
Alpine Meadows of Tahoe, Inc.
GIAUQUE, WILCOX & BENDINGER
Attorneys for Defendants
Royal Street Land Company,
Royal Street Development Company,
Inc., Deer Valley Resort Company
and Royal Street of Utah

PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
DAVIS, POLK & WARDWELL
Attorneys for Defendants
Greater Properties, Inc.
Park Properties, Inc.
Morgan Guaranty & Trust
Company of New York and
Fidelity Bank of Philadelphia
PRUITT, GUSHEE & FLETCHER
Attorneys for Intervenor
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

UNITED PARK CITY MINES COMPANY,
a Delaware corporation
Plaintiff,
vs.
GREATER PARK CITY COMPANY, a
Utah corporation; et al.,
Defendants.
WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A.,
Intervenor.
GREATER PROPERTIES, INC., a
Delaware corporation, et al.,
Plaintiffs,

vs
FIRST SECURITY BANK OF UTAH,
N.A., a national banking
association; et al.,
MCE. YEATES
IELOZAHLER
•ntr*I.Sult*900

Defendants.

FINDINGS OF FACT
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
AND ORDER
GRANTING MOTIONS TO
DISMISS OR FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT OF DEFENDANTS
GREATER PARK CITY COMPANY,
ALPINE MEADOWS OF TAHOE,
INC., MORGAN GUARANTY
TRUST COMPANY OF NEW YORK,
FIDELITY BANK OF
PHILADELPHIA, GREATER
PROPERTIES, INC., PARK
PROPERTIES, INC., ROYAL
STREET LAND COMPANY, DEER
VALLEY RESORT COMPANY,
ROYAL STREET OF UTAH,
ROYAL STREET DEVELOPMENT
COMPANY, INC., and
INTERVENOR WELLS FARGO
BANK, N.A.
Civil No. C-86-3347
and
Civil No. C-86-8907
Judge Pat B. Brian

The Motions to Dismiss of defendants Atlantic
Richfield Company ("ARCO"); ASARCO, Inc. ("ASARCO"); Greater
Park City Company ("GPCC"); Royal Street Land Company, Deer
Valley Resort Company, Royal Street of Utah and Royal Street
Development Company, Inc. (all collectively referred to as
"Royal Street- or the "Royal Street defendants"); Alpine
tteadows of Tahoe, Inc. ("AMOT"); Morgan Guaranty Trust Company
of New York ("Morgan"); Fidelity Bank of Philadelphia
("Fidelity"); Greater Properties, Inc. ("GPI"); Park
Properties, Inc. ("PPI"); and intervenor Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
("Wells Fargo"), pursuant to U.R.C.P. 12(b), and for Summary
Judgment, pursuant to U.R.C.P. 56, seeking dismissal of
plaintiff United Park City Mines Company's ("UPCM") Amended
Complaint came on for hearing before the Court on April 4, 1990.
All parties were represented by counsel.

Plaintiff

UPCM was represented by its counsel, David K. Watkiss, David B.
Watkiss and Perrin R. Love; defendant ARCO was represented by
its counsel, Richard D. Burbidge and Stephen B. Mitchell;
defendant ASARCO was represented by its counsel, Merlin 0.
Baker and Jonathan A. Dibble; defendants GPCC and AMOT were
represented by their counsel, Gordon Strachan and James A.
Boevers; defendants Morgan, Fidelity, GPI and PPI were
represented by their counsel, Gordon Roberts and Elisabeth R.

Blattner; the Royal Street defendants were represented by their
counsel, Wendy A. Faber and Richard W. Giauque; and intervenor
Wells Fargo was represented by its counsel, Michael F. Jones.
Prior to the hearing, the parties submitted voluminous
legal memoranda, affidavits and exhibits.

The Court heard oral

argument from all parties for approximately 3-1/2 hours.
Thereafter, all parties filed proposed Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law at the Court's request.

The Court, having

read the memoranda and affidavits, having heard oral argument,
having considered the proposed Findings and Conclusions, and
having entered Memorandum Decisions with respect to each of the
defendants' and intervener's motions, hereby makes the
following Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order with
respect to the motions to dismiss or for summary judgment of
defendants GPCC, Royal Street, AMOT, Morgan, Fidelity, GPI, PPI
and intervenor Wells Fargo.

These Findings and Conclusions

constitute the written statement of the grounds for the Court's
decision under U.R.C.P. 52(a).
I.
1.

FINDINGS OF FACT

UPCM has had adequate opportunity to conduct

discovery relating to the issues in the motions to dismiss or
for summary judgment.
2.

Based upon the record, there is no genuine

dispute as to any of the following material facts.

RINCC YEATES
i QELOZAHLCR
C«ntr«l,Sult«900
£*»t Fourth South

A.
3.

BACKGROUND

In February, 1971, GPCC entered into the

following Resort Agreements with UPCM.
4.

Pursuant to the Land Purchase Agreement UPCM

agreed to sell to GPCC approximately 4,200 acres of real
property for commercial, condominium and subdivision
development, including the base facilities, golf course, other
resort improvements and the personal property of the existing
resort operations for the sum of $5.4 million, payable over
time.
5.

UPCM entered into three separate ski leases with

GPCC wherein it leased 432 acres known as Crescent Ridge [Lease
(Crescent Ridge)], 470 acres in Deer Valley [Lease (Deer
Valley)] and 5,631 acres which included the then existing ski
runs [Lease (Resort Area)].
6.

Pursuant to the Water Rights Purchase Agreement

UPCM agreed to sell its water rights to GPCC for $500,000, but
reserved the right to use a portion of the water for mining and
related activities.
7.

In 1975, the shareholders of GPCC (including

UPCM, Royal Street, Morgan, Fidelity and non-party Union
America) decided to restructure GPCC to solve certain financial
problems GPCC had encountered.

8.

In 1975, ARCO owned 18.4% of UPCM's stock and

ASARCO owned 12.7%.
B.

THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS ON THE THIRD AND

FOURTH CLAIMS (AMOT, GPCC, ROYAL STREET, MORGAN, FIDELITY)
9.

In 1975, three directors independent of ARCO and

ASARCO served on the UPCM Board of Directors when the
restructuring plans and Resort Agreements involving GPCC were
considered and approved by the seven-member UPCM Board of
Directors.
10.

At the time the restructuring agreement was

approved, ARCO and ASARCO each had two directors on the UPCM
Board of Directors, in addition to the three independent
directors serving on the Board.
11.

The independent directors of UPCM had full

knowledge concerning the terms of the restructuring and its
effect upon UPCM and voted in favor of the restructuring.
12.

The three independent directors were not

implicated in any alleged wrongdoing, did not have any conflict
of interest and were fully informed of all the material facts
involving the 1975 restructuring plan and the subsequent
execution of the Resort Agreements.
13.

The leases and other agreements relating to the

1975 Resort Agreements involving the restructuring of GPCC were

approved by the three independent Board members on UPCM's Board
of Directors.
14.

At the annual meeting of UPCM shareholders held

in May, 1975, the shareholders were informed of the
restructuring proposals and were told that these proposals
would be submitted to a vote of the shareholders in October,
1975.
15.

On or about September 2, 1975, a proxy statement

was sent to all shareholders of UPCM.

The proxy statement

stated in detail what UPCM was giving and what it was receiving
as part of the proposed restructuring.
16.

Shortly before the special meeting of

shareholders on October 7, 1975, the UPCM Board of Directors
received several written complaints from shareholders,
including a detailed multi-page letter from Jerome Gartner, an
attorney representing a shareholder named Timothy Donath.
17.

Shareholder Donath demanded that the meeting be

postponed and that the directors reconsider their decision to
approve the restructuring.

Several shareholders complained

that the restructuring was unfair to UPCM and that the proxy
statement sent to shareholders was incomplete and missing
important information.
18.

Shareholder Donath*s letter was reviewed and

discussed by the UPCM Board of Directors, including the
independent directors.
shareholders meeting.

The directors voted to proceed with the
Donath's letter was disclosed to the

UPCM shareholders at the special meeting on October 7, 1975.
19.

At the UPCM special shareholders meeting held on

October 7, 1975, 96.4 percent in interest of the shareholders
who voted approved the restructuring plan either at the meeting
or by proxy, which represented 60.2 percent of the total
outstanding shares.
20.

In 1975, the shareholders of UPCM had actual

knowledge of the restructuring plan and the leases and
agreements relating thereto or they were put on notice of facts
which would lead a person of ordinary prudence to discover the
alleged wrongdoing, sufficient to commence the running of the
statute of limitations.
C.
21.

THIRD AND FOURTH CLAIMS (AMOT)

The adversary relationship in 1975 between AMOT

as the buyer of GPCC, and UPCM as the seller, precluded any
fiduciary duty from AMOT to UPCM.

No such duty was created by

AMOT's pre-October 7, 1975 assistance in opening the resort for
the 1975-1976 ski season.

All parties benefitted from the

timely opening of the ski resort.
22.

AMOT did not induce or encourage any person,

party or entity to breach any alleged fiduciary duties.

23.

AMOT's participation was minimal in preparing and

approving the proposed restructuring, including the two 20-year
extensions of the Lease (Resort Area),

These transactions were

agreed upon in substance by the other parties and UPCM prior to
being presented to AMOT for approval.
24.

Prior to being presented to AMOT, the

restructuring proposal had been rejected by other potential
investors.
25.

The statements of AMOT's Board Chairman, Mr.

Badami, at the October 7, 1975 UPCM shareholders meeting,
called to approve the proposed restructuring, were opinions
only and were not detrimentally relied upon by the UPCM
shareholders.
26.

More than 62 percent in interest of the UPCM

stockholders had voted by proxy on the proposed restructuring
and did not attend the October 7, 1975 meeting.
27.

AMOT did not participate in the preparation or

submission of the proxy materials sent to UPCM shareholders.
28.

AMOT was not involved in the restructuring plan

until 1975.
29.

AMOT had no business relationship with any of the

participants in the restructuring proposal until 1975.
30o
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In 1975, AMOT did not have knowledge superior to

UPCM officers and directors, who were independent of ARCO and
ASARCO, including, among others, UPCM President and Director
Miles Romney, UPCM Director Harold Steele, and UPCM SecretaryTreasurer Lamar Osika.

These individuals also either served on

GPCC's Board or attended the critical GPCC Board meetings
relating to the restructuring proposals.
31.

AMOT also had no knowledge of any alleged

breaches of fiduciary duty by the other parties involved in the
restructuring plan.
32.

AMOT was not a substantial participant in

preparing or consummating the 1975 restructuring.
D.
33.

THIRD AND FOURTH CLAIMS (GPCC)

In 1975, UPCM was a controlling shareholder in

GPCC, owning 39 percent of the common stock and two-thirds of
the preferred stock.

Therefore, GPCC owed no fiduciary duties

to UPCM in 1975.
34.

GPCC neither induced nor aided and abetted

alleged breaches of fiduciary duties by third parties in 1975.
E.

FIFTH, SIXTH AND TENTH CLAIMS (GPI, PPI)

35.

GPI was formed by Morgan and Fidelity pursuant to

the 1975 restructuring of GPCC to act as their agent for the
purpose of receiving an assignment of the Lease (Resort Area)
and Lease (Cresent Ridge) between UPCM and GPCC.
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36.

GPI was not assigned an interest under the Lease

(Deer Valley).
37.

GPI leased back the assigned ski run leases to

GPCC in return for payment of a certain percentage of the ski
lift revenues collected each year.
38.

PPI was formed by Morgan and Fidelity to act as

their agent for the purpose of receiving an assignment of
certain ski resort properties being purchased from UPCM by GPCC
under the Land Purchase Agreement.
39.

PPI was not assigned any interest under the

UPCM/GPCC ski run leases or the Lease (Deer Valley).
40.

PPI leased back the assigned properties to GPCC

in return for payment of a certain percentage of the ski lift
revenues collected each year.
41.

UPCM expressly consented to the assignments of

the ski run leases and ski properties to GPI and PPI.
42.

UPCM expressly agreed to look solely to GPCC (and

not to GPI or PPI) for performance of the underlying lease and
purchase obligations.
43.

UPCM is suing GPI and PPI for alleged breaches of

the ski run leases by GPCC.

The factual bases upon which GPI

and PPI relied in seeking dismissal of plaintiffs Fifth, Sixth
and Tenth Claims for Relief against them in the Amended
Complaint were not rebutted by UPCM.
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F.

THIRD, FOURTH, FIFTH, SIXTH, NINTH, TENTH
AND TWELFTH CLAIMS (ROYAL STREET)

44.

As the result of the restructure of GPCC in 1975,

Royal Street Land Company (Land) acquired, with UPCM approval,
the following rights in the 1971 contracts between GPCC and
UPCM.
45.

GPCC conveyed to Land GPCC's interest in the

property located in Deer Valley which was subject to the Land
Purchase Agreement with UPCM.

Land's interest was assigned,

with UPCM's consent, to Royal Street of Utah (RSU) and then to
Deer Valley Resort Company (Deer Valley)46.

GPCC assigned an undivided one-half of its rights

under the Water Rights Purchase Agreement to Land.
47.

GPCC assigned to Land the right to lease 1,834

acres for skiing purposes in an expanded Lease (Deer Valley).
This Lease was amended on May 21, 1979 and July 31, 1980.
Land's interest was then assigned, with UPCM's consent, to RSU
and then to Deer Valley.

The primary term of the lease runs

until April 30, 1991 and may be extended at the option of Deer
Valley for three 20-year periods.
G.

1981 AND 1982 ESTOPPEL CERTIFICATES
(WELLS FARGO/ROYAL STREET)

48.

In 1981, $6.6 million of bonds (1981 Bonds) were

issued for the benefit of Deer Valley and purchased by Wells
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Fargo, and the proceeds were paid to or for the benefit of Deer
Valley.

Such 1981 Bonds are secured by the 1981 Mortgage (as

identified in the Complaint in Intervention, paragraph 4a),
under which Mortgage is pledged the entire real estate
[including the land leased under the Lease (Deer Valley)] and
personal property consisting of the operating ski resort known
as "Deer Valley Resort".
49.

UPCM gave Wells Fargo an Estoppel Certificate

(1981 Estoppel Certificate) and a Consent and Agreement (1981
Consent and Agreement) to induce Wells Fargo to accept the 1981
Mortgage and as a stated "condition precedent" to the purchase
of the 1981 Bonds.
50.

Wells Fargo1s purchase of the 1981 Bonds was made

in reliance upon the affirmative assurances and rights given to
it by UPCM in the 1981 Estoppel Certificate and the 1981
Consent and Agreement concerning the Lease (Deer Valley).
51-

In 1982, $6,000,000 of bonds (1982 Bonds) were

issued for the benefit of Deer Valley and purchased by Merrill
Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith Incorporated (Merrill Lynch), and
the proceeds thereof were paid to or for the benefit of Deer
Valley.

A material inducement to Merrill Lynch's purchasing

such bonds was Wells Fargo's issuance of a Letter of Credit
(1982 Letter of Credit) in the amount of $6,742,500 as
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collateral which, in addition to the Deer Valley Resort itself,
secured the 1982 Bonds.

The Letter of Credit was issued

pursuant to a Letter of Credit Agreement (1982 Letter of Credit
Agreement) entered into by Deer Valley with Wells Fargo as an
integral part of the subject 1982 Bonds transaction.

The 1982

Letter of Credit and Letter of Credit Agreement are secured by
the 1982 Mortgage (as identified in the Complaint in
Intervention, paragraph 4b). The Deer Valley Resort is pledged
under the 1982 Mortgage.
52.

As a part of the 1982 Bonds transaction, for the

purpose of providing Wells Fargo the same condition precedent,
affirmative assurances and rights concerning the Lease (Deer
Valley), UPCM executed and delivered to Wells Fargo an Estoppel
Certificate (1982 Estoppel Certificate) which is identical in
all material respects to that provided in 1981; and gave Wells
Fargo a Consent and Agreement (1982 Consent and Agreement)
likewise identical in all material respects to the 1981 Consent
and Agreement.
53.

Wells Fargo's extension of credit in connection

with the 1982 Bonds transaction was made in reliance upon the
assurances and rights under the 1982 Estoppel Certificate and
the 1982 Consent and Agreement concerning the Lease (Deer
Valley).
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54.

W e l l s Fargo has also provided Deer V a l l e y with a

revolving Line of C r e d i t

(Line of C r e d i t ) of approximately $4.5

m i l l i o n in p r i n c i p a l amount, which Line of C r e d i t

is secured by

various parcels of real property that are c o n t i g u o u s to and/or
in the immediate v i c i n i t y of the Deer V a l l e y Resort

(Line of

Credit C o l l a t e r a l P r o p e r t y ) , the value of w h i c h parcels is
dependant upon D e e r V a l l e y ' s continuing as t h e operator of the
Deer V a l l e y Resort
H.

as a ski resort.

R E S C I S S I O N O F T H E 1975 AGREEMENTS S O U G H T BY T H E THIRD

A N D FOURTH C L A I M S
55.

(AMOT, GPCC, ROYAL STREET, MORGAN,

UPCM does not seek to rescind the Royal

FIDELITY)
Street

D e f e n d a n t s ' i n t e r e s t s under the Land P u r c h a s e A g r e e m e n t or seek
the return of any land parcels already released to Royal Street
II
or G P C C .

Royal S t r e e t has received all land parcels to which

it is e n t i t l e d .
56.

A s of M a y 10, 1988 Land had received deeds to all

of its parcels u n d e r the Land Purchase A g r e e m e n t .
57.

UPCM

is estopped from asserting

rescission or

reformation of the 1975 agreements because U P C M continued to
accept the b e n e f i t s and performance of the a g r e e m e n t s

both

before and after its claims for rescission and reformation w e r e
filed.
58.

For e x a m p l e , after the o r i g i n a l Complaint was

filed in M a y , 1 9 8 6 , UPCM continued to accept payments under t h e
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Lease (Resort Area) and Lease (Deer Valley) through November 7,
1989/ as well as under other Resort Agreements, and to
authorize the release of parcels under the Land Purchase
Agreement.
I.
59.

INSTRUMENTS OF TITLE IN ESCROW

Title to the water sold to and paid for by GPCC

and Royal Street under the Water Rights Purchase Agreement
remains in escrow as do certain instruments of title paid for
under the Land Purchase Agreement.
J.

THE FIFTH, SIXTH, EIGHTH, NINTH AND TENTH CLAIMS

ALLEGING CONTRACT DEFAULTS (GPCC, ROYAL STREET, GPI, PPI)
60.

GPCC and Royal Street have made payment in full

under the Land Purchase Agreement and Water Rights Purchase
Agreement, curing any alleged defaults pursuant to the terms
and conditions of these agreements.

UPCM does not allege that

GPCC or Royal Street has committed any defaults under the Land
Purchase Agreement.
61.

UPCM has waived and is estopped from asserting

all contractual defaults alleged to have occurred prior to
August, 1985, and all alleged continuing defaults alleged to
have begun prior to that time, based on statements in its
annual reports that GPCC and Royal Street were current on all
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agreements, and its certifications to the escrow agent that
GPCC and Royal Street had paid all amounts of lift revenue that
were owed.
62.

There was no concealment of alleged GPCC

contractual defaults from UPCM, because UPCM had one or more
representatives on GPCC's Board until August, 1985 pursuant to
paragraph 17 of the Lease (Resort Area) as amended.
K.
63.

SEVENTH CLAIM (GPCC)

Regarding the Seventh Claim for trespass against

GPCC, the sale of the Town Lift property to Sweeney never
occurred, and his option to purchase the property expired.
64.

Prior to August, 1985, UPCM gave its written and

verbal consent to GPCC to use the rest of the land which
involves the trespass allegations.
II.
1.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

No genuine issues of material fact exist

regarding any of the defendants' and interveners' motions to
dismiss or for summary judgment.

All defendants and intervenor

are entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.
A.

THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS ON THE THIRD AND FOURTH

CLAIMS (AMOT, GPCC, ROYAL STREET, MORGAN, FIDELITY)
2.

In 1975, UPCM, through three independent

directors and several shareholders, knew or should have known

MtlNCE, YEATES
A QELDZAHUft
CKyCftMrtt, Suit* 900 i

of any alleged wrongdoing in connection with the 1975
restructuring plan and the execution of numerous leases and
agreements relating to the 1975 restructuring plan and Resort
Agreements-

Accordingly, there is no basis for tolling the

statutes of limitations applicable to the claims arising from
the restructuring, which statutes began to run in 1975.
3.

The Third and Fourth Claims against GPCC, Royal

Street, Morgan and Fidelity, for breach of fiduciary duty or
inducing or aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty, and
against AMOT, for inducing or aiding and abetting breach of
fiduciary duty, are barred by the four-year statute of
limitations contained in U.C.A. 78-12-25(3).
B.
4.

THIRD AND FOURTH CLAIMS (AMOT)

The only duties owed by AMOT Board Chairman, Mr.

Badami, in 1975, were to AMOT's shareholders,

UPCM

shareholders had no basis to rely on opinions expressed by Mr.
Badami at the October 7, 1975 meeting.
5.

The Third and Fourth Claims in the Amended

Complaint do not state a cause of action against defendant AMOT.
C.
6.

THIRD AND FOURTH CLAIMS (GPCC)

The Third and Fourth Claims fail to state a cause

of action against GPCC for inducing, aiding or abetting, or for
breach of fiduciary duty.

D.

RESCISSION OF THE 1975 AGREEMENTS SOUGHT BY THE THIRD AND

FOURTH CLAIMS (AMOT, GPCC, ROYAL STREET, MORGAN, FIDELITY)
7.

The Third and Fourth Claims against GPCC, Royal

Street, Morgan, Fidelity and AMOT are also barred to the extent
they seek to rescind or reform the Resort Agreements, because
of UPCM's continued acceptance of benefits and performance of
the agreements both before and after claims for reformation and
recission were filed, and because of payment in full under the
Land Purchase Agreement and Water Rights Purchase Agreement by
GPCC and Royal Street.
E,

THE FIFTH, SIXTH, EIGHTH, NINTH AND TENTH CLAIMS

ALLEGING CONTRACT DEFAULTS (GPCC, ROYAL STREET, GPI, PPI)
8.

All allegations of contractual defaults

applicable to the claims against GPCC, Royal Street, GPI or PPI
in the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth or Tenth Claims for Relief
and which are alleged to have occurred prior to May 8, 1980,
are precluded by the six-year statute of limitations, U.C.A.
§ 78-12-23(2), and all new allegations of default alleged in
the Amended Complaint to have occurred prior to June 20, 1982
are precluded for the same reason.

There is no basis for

tolling this statute of limitations.
9.

All alleged contractual defaults applicable to

the claims against GPCC, Royal Street, GPI or PPI, in the
Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth or Tenth Claims for Relief either
are not defaults according to the terms of the Resort
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Agreements, or have been performed, cured or waived.
Alternatively, these alleged defaults are not material
defaults, are not the subject of adequate notice required by
the Resort Agreements and applicable law governing contractual
forfeiture, are subject to the terms of the judicial
ascertainment provisions of the Resort Agreements allowing cure
after any final judgment determining defaults, or are subject
to an adequate remedy in damages, and, thus, termination or
forfeiture of these agreements is not permitted.

The Court

reserves for further determination the issue of whether UPCM
has a claim for damages against GPCC based upon defaults under
the Lease (Resort Area) alleged in paragraph 116(e)(ii) of the
Amended Complaint.
10.

To the extent the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth or

Tenth Claims against GPCC, Royal Street, GPI or PPI, are based
on alleged breaches of the Land Purchase Agreement or Water
Rights Purchase Agreement, these claims also must be dismissed
based on payment in full under these agreements by GPCC and
Royal Street.
F.

FIFTH, SIXTH, TENTH AND ELEVENTH CLAIMS (GPI, PPI,
MORGAN, FIDELITY)
11.

Because UPCM's claims that would provide a basis

for contract termination or other equitable relief are being
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dismissed, the Eleventh Claim for Relief against GPI, PPI,
Morgan and Fidelity must also be dismissed as a matter of law.
12.

PPI was not assigned any interest under any of

the UPCM/GPCC ski run leases.

Therefore, UPCM's Fifth and

Sixth Claims for Relief fail to state a claim against PPI.
13.
(Deer Valley).

GPI was not assigned an interest under the Lease
Therefore, UPCM's Sixth Claim for Relief fails

to state a claim against GPI.
14.

UPCM expressly consented to the assignments of

the GPCC ski run leases to GPI, thus limiting its right to
recover, for any alleged breach, only against GPCC.
15.

UPCM expressly agreed it would not look to any

assignee for performance under the agreements.

Therefore,

UPCM's Fifth Claim for Relief fails to state a claim against
GPI.
16.

Any alleged duty of good faith arising out of the

ski run leases and the property purchases is a contractual
duty, and UPCM's express consent to the assignment of the GPCC
ski run leases to GPI and the property purchases to PPI, and
its limitation of its right to recover to GPCC, bars UPCM from
recovering from PPI and GPI for any breach of that duty by
GPCC.

Therefore, UPCM's Tenth Claim for Relief fails to state

a claim against PPI and GPI.
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G.

THIRD, FOURTH, FIFTH, SIXTH, TENTH AND TWELFTH CLAIMS
(WELLS FARGO/ROYAL STREET)
17.

The doctrine of Equitable Estoppel precludes UPCM

from asserting legal and equitable claims against Wells
Fargo/Royal Street because UPCM negligently or intentionally
made representations which Wells Fargo reasonably and
justifiably relied on.

UPCM is now estopped from pursuing any

claims against Wells Fargo/Royal Street which are inconsistent
with the plain language of the Estoppel Certificates and
Consent and Agreement documents.
18.

If UPCM did not knowingly and willingly make the

statements in the Estoppel Certificates, it was negligent in
executing the Certificates, to the detrimental reliance of
Wells Fargo.
19.

Having given the two Estoppel Certificates in

1981 and 1982, expressly stating there were no defaults under
the Lease (Deer Valley), and having given the two Consent and
Agreement papers, which were silent regarding the Water Rights
and Land Purchase Agreements, UPCM is bound by what the
documents stated or omitted to state, irrespective of whether
said silence was intentional or negligent, regarding the Lease
(Deer Valley), the Water Rights and Land Purchase Agreements,
and any other property rights necessary to the ownership and
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operation of the Deer Valley Resort by Royal Street.

UPCM is

equitably estopped and has waived all of the claims for
contract termination, forfeiture, rescission, reformation and
declaratory relief sought against Royal Street in the Third,
Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Tenth or Twelfth Claims for Relief in the
Amended Complaint.
H.
20.

INSTRUMENTS OF TITLE IN ESCROW

All remaining unreleased instruments of title,

deposited in escrow under either the Land Purchase Agreement or
Water Rights Purchase Agreement, should be released from escrow
by the escrow officer, defendant First Security Bank of Utah,
N.A.

The escrow agent should also release funds held in escrow

to the party to which they are owed, including UPCM, GPI and
PPI.

First Security shall release these instruments as follows:
a.

To GPCC:
(i)

Original Conveyance covering resort

facilities dated October 11, 1975, identified as
document (dd) in the Substituted Escrow Agreement
dated October 11, 1975 (-Substituted Escrow
Agreement-).
(ii)

Original Special Warranty Deed (from UPCM

to GPCC) covering Parcel 18 dated October 11, 1975,
identified as document (ee) in the Substituted Escrow
Agreement.
(iii)
PftlNCt. YCATE8
* QELOZAHLEA
OtyC«ntr»l, Suit* 900
17S E*»t Fourth South II

Special Warranty Deeds to any other

parcels of the Development Properties (as that term is
used in the Substituted Escrow Agreement), not
previously delivered, including the Original Special
Warranty Deed (from UPCM to GPCC) covering Parcel 2E
dated October 11, 1975, identified as document (j) in
the Substituted Escrow Agreement (if not already
delivered), and any undelivered Original Special
Warranty Deed (from UPCM to GPCC) covering Parcel
7-2B.

Further, UPCM is hereby ordered to deliver to

GPCC any and all policies of title insurance required
to be delivered under the provisions of the Land
Purchase Agreement as amended.
(iv)

Original Conveyance dated October 11, 1975

covering water rights purchased under the Water Rights
Purchase Agreement as Amended, identified as document
(ff) in the Substituted Escrow Agreement.
(v)

Original Lease (Crescent Ridge) dated May 1,

1975 and identified as document (e) in the Substituted
Escrow Agreement.
b.

To Royal Street Land Co./Deer Valley
Resort Co.:
Original Conveyance dated October 14, 1975

covering an undivided one-half interest in water
rights covered by the Water Rights Purchase Agreement
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as Amended, identified as document (xx) in the
Substituted Escrow Agreement,
c,

To PPI:
(i)

Original Special Warranty Deed (from GPCC to

PPI) covering Parcel 2E dated October 14, 1975,
identified as document (ccc) in the Substituted Escrow
Agreement.
(ii)

Original Special Warranty Deed from GPCC to

PPI covering Parcel 7-2B dated October 14, 1975,
identified as document (ddd) in the Substituted Escrow
Agreement.
(iii)

Original Special Warranty Deed from GPCC

to PPI covering Parcel 18 dated October 14, 1975,
identified as document (eee) in the Substituted Escrow
Agreement.
I.
21.

TWELFTH CLAIM (GPCC, ROYAL STREET)

Because UPCM's Twelfth Claim against GPCC and

Royal Street for reformation of the 1971 Water Rights Purchase
Agreement is based on events that occurred subsequent to the
execution of the agreement, and events that occurred subsequent
to the 1975 amendments to that agreement, that Claim fails to
state a cause of action upon which reformation may be granted.
J.
22.

MINCE. YEATES
A QELOZAHLER
CltyC«ntr*l,S4jlt«900
175 East Fourth South

SEVENTH CLAIM (GPCC)

Pursuant to paragraph 14 of the Lease (Resort

I Area) and the Third Amendment thereto, the sale of the Town
Lift property by UPCM was required in order for the Third
Amendment to become effective.

Because that sale never

occurred, the Town Lift property remains part of the Lease
(Resort Area), and this portion of UPCM's Seventh Claim for
I trespass against GPCC shall be dismissed,
23.

The balance of the Seventh Claim for trespass

against GPCC fails because of UPCM's contractual duties of
cooperation with GPCC under Paragraph 19 of the Land Purchase
Agreement, and because of UPCM's written and verbal consent to
GPCC's use of the land in question.
III.
1.

ORDER

Defendants' and intevenor's motions to dismiss or

for summary judgment are granted.
2.

The Amended Complaint is dismissed with prejudice

as to defendants AMOT, Morgan, Fidelity, GPI, PPI, Royal Street
and intervenor Wells Fargo.
3.

The Amended Complaint is also dismissed with

prejudice as to defendant GPCC, except that the Court reserves
for further determination the issue of whether UPCM has a claim
for damages against GPCC based upon defaults under the Lease
(Resort Area) alleged in paragraph 116(e)(ii) of the Amended
Complaint.
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4.

Defendant First Security Bank of Utah, N.A., is

ordered to release certain instruments of title from escrow
forthwith, as follows:
a.

To GPCC:
(i)

Original Conveyance covering resort

facilities dated October 11, 1975, identified as
document (dd) in the Substituted Escrow Agreement
dated October 11, 1975 ("Substituted Escrow
Agreement").
(ii)

Original Special Warranty Deed (from UPCM

to GPCC) covering Parcel 18 dated October 11, 1975,
identified as document (ee) in the Substituted Escrow
Agreement.
(iii)

Special Warranty Deeds to any other

parcels of the Development Properties (as that term is
used in the Substituted Escrow Agreement), not
previously delivered, including the Original Special
Warranty Deed (from UPCM to GPCC) covering Parcel 2E
dated October 11, 1975, identified as document (j) in
the Substituted Escrow Agreement (if not already
delivered), and any undelivered Original Special
Warranty Deed (from UPCM to GPCC) covering Parcel
7-2B.
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Further, UPCM is hereby ordered to deliver to

GPCC any and all policies of title insurance required
to be delivered under the provisions of the Land
Purchase Agreement as amended,
(iv)

Original Conveyance dated October 11, 1975

covering water rights purchased under the Water Rights
Purchase Agreement as Amended, identified as document
(ff) in the Substituted Escrow Agreement.
(v)

Original Lease (Crescent Ridge) dated May 1,

1975 and identified as document (e) in the Substituted
Escrow Agreement,
b.

To Royal Street Land Co./Deer Valley
Resort Co.:
Original Conveyance dated October 14, 1975

covering an undivided one-half interest in water
rights covered by the Water Rights Purchase Agreement
as Amended, identified as document (xx) in the
Substituted Escrow Agreement.
c.

ToJPPI:
(i)

Original Special Warranty Deed (from GPCC to

PPI) covering Parcel 2E dated October 14, 1975,
identified as document (ccc) in the Substituted Escrow
Agreement.
(ii)

Original Special Warranty Deed from GPCC to

PPI covering Parcel 7-2B dated October 14, 1975,
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identified as document (ddd) in the Substituted Escrow
Agreement,
(iii)

Original Special Warranty Deed from GPCC

to PPI covering Parcel 18 dated October 14, 1975,
identified as document (eee) in the Substituted Escrow
Agreement.
5.

Defendant First Security Bank of Utah, N.A. is

also ordered to release (at the same time the above instruments
of title are released from escrow) funds held in escrow to the
party to which they are owed, including UPCM, GPI and PPI.
DATED this

/5

day of May, 1990.
BY THE COURT:

7^4, /
PAT B. BRIAN
Third District Court Judge
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ADDENDUM C

C-1

78-12-25

JUDICIAL CODE

78-12-25. Within four years.
Within four years:
(1) An action upon a contract, obligation, or liability not founded upon
an instrument in writing; also on an open account for goods, wares, and
merchandise, and for any article charged on a store account; also on an
open account for work, labor or services rendered, or materials furnished;
provided, that action in all of the foregoing cases may be commenced at
any time within four years after the last charge is made or the last
payment is received.
(2) A claim for relief or a cause of action under the following sections of
Chapter 6, Title 25, the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act:
(a) Subsection 25-6-5(l)(a), which in specific situations limits the
time for action to one year, under Section 25-6-10;
(b) Subsection 25-6-5(l)(b); or
(c) Subsection 25-6-6(1).
(3) An action for relief not otherwise provided for by law.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943,
upp., 104-12-25; L. 1988, ch. 59, § 14.
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amendtent, effective April 25,1988, inserted Subsec-

tion (2); redesignated former Subsection (2) as
Subsection (3); and made minor stylistic
changes in Subsection (1).
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78-12-27

JUDICIAL CODE

78-12-27. Action against corporate stockholders or directors.
Actions against directors or stockholders of a corporation to recover a penalty or forfeiture imposed, or to enforce a liability created, by law must be
brought within three years after the discovery, by the aggrieved party, of the
facts upon which the penalty or forfeiture attached, or the liability accrued,
and in case of actions against stockholders of a bank pursuant to levy of
assessment to ^oltect their statutory liability, such actions must be brought
within three years after the levy of the assessment.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-12-27.
Cross-References. — Corporations gener-

Liability of bank stockholders, Utah Const.,
Art. XII, Sec. 18.
Stock ownership by banks, § 7-3-21.
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Rule 12

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

Rule 12. Defenses and objections.
(a) When presented. A defendant shall serve his answer within twenty
days after the service of the summons and complaint is complete unless otherwise expressly provided by statute or order of the court. A party served with a
pleading stating a cross-claim against him shall serve an answer thereto
within twenty days after the service upon him. The plaintiff shall serve his
reply to a counterclaim in the answer within twenty days after service of the
answer or, if a reply is ordered by the court, within twenty days after service
of the order, unless the order otherwise directs. The service of a motion under
this rule alters these periods of time as follows, unless a different time is fixed
by order of the court:
(1) If the court denies the motion or postpones its disposition until the
trial on the merits, the responsive pleading shall be served within ten
days after notice of the court's action;
(2) If the court grants a motion for a more definite statement, the
responsive pleading shall be served within ten days after the service of
the more definite statement.
(b) How presented. Every defense, in law or fact, to claim for relief in any
pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim,
shall be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one is required, except
that the following defenses may at the option of the pleader be made by
motion: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. (2) lack of jurisdiction
over the person, (3) improper venue, (4) insufficiency of process, (5) insufficiency of service of process, (6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted, (7) failure to join an indispensable party. A motion making any of
these defenses shall be made before pleading if a further pleading is permitted. No defense or objection is waived by being joined with one or more other
defenses or objections in a responsive pleading or motion or by further pleading after the denial of such motion or objection. If a pleading sets forth a claim
for relief to which the adverse party is not required to serve a responsive
pleading, he may assert at the trial any defense in law or fact to that claim for
relief. If, on a motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure
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Rule 12

of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters
outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the
motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as
provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to
present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56
(CJ Motion for judgment on the pleadings. After the pleadings are closed
but within such time as not to delay the trial, any party may move for judgment on the pleadings If, on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, matters
outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the
motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as
provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to
present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56
(d) Preliminary hearings. The defenses specifically enumerated (l)-(7) in
subdivision (b) of this rule, whether made in a pleading or by motion, and the
motion for judgment mentioned in subdivision (c) of this rule shall be heard
and determined before trial on application of any party, unless the court
orders that the hearings and determination thereof be deferred until the trial
(e) Motion for more definite statement. If a pleading to which a responsive pleading is permitted is so vague or ambiguous that a party cannot
reasonably be required to frame a responsive pleading, he may move for a
more definite statement before interposing his responsive pleading The motion shall point out the defects complained of and the details desired If the
motion is granted and the order of the court is not obeyed within ten days
after notice of the order or within such other time as the court may fix, the
court may strike the pleading to which the motion was directed or make such
order as it deems just
(f) Motion to strike. Upon motion made by a party before responding to a
pleading or, if no responsive pleading is permitted by these rules, upon motion
made by a party within twenty days after the service of the pleading upon
him, the court may order stricken from any pleading any insufficient defense
or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter
(g) Consolidation of defenses. A party who makes a motion under this
rule may join with it the other motions herein provided for and then available
to him If a party makes a motion under this rule and does not include therein
all defenses and objections then available to him which this rule permits to be
raised by motion, he shall not thereafter make a motion based on any of the
defenses or objections so omitted, except as provided in subdivision (h) of this
rule
(h) Waiver of defenses. A party waives all defenses and objections which
he does not present either by motion as hereinbefore provided or, if he has
made no motion, m his answer or reply, except (1) that the defense of failure
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the defense of failure to join
an indispensable party, and the objection of failure to state a legal defense to a
claim may also be made by a later pleading, if one is permitted, or by motion
for judgment on the pleadings or at the trial on the merits, and except (2) that,
whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the court
lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the action. The
objection or defense, if made at the trial, shall be disposed of as provided m
Rule 15(b) in the light of any evidence that may have been received.
d) Pleading after denial of a motion. The filing of a responsive pleading
after the denial of any motion made pursuant to these rules shall not be
deemed a waiver of such motion
(j) Security for costs of a nonresident plaintiff. When the plaintiff m an
action resides out of this state, or is a foreign corporation, the defendant may
file a motion to require the plaintiff to furnish security for costs and charges
which may be awarded against such plaintiff Upon hearing and determination by the court of the reasonable necessity therefor, the court shall order the
plaintiff to file a $300 00 undertaking with sufficient sureties as security for
payment of such costs and charges as may be awarded against such plaintiff
No security shall be required of any officer, instrumentality, or agency of the
United States
(k) Effect of failure to file undertaking. If the plaintiff fails to file the
undertaking as ordered within 30 days of the service of the order, the court
shall uDon motion of the dpfpndant on*** o^ ^w^~ J
^

ADDENDUM F

F-l

Rule 56. Summary judgment.
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the
expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of
a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any
part thereof.
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time,
move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his
favor as to all or any part thereof.
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall be served at least
10 days before the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse party prior to the
day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a
genuine issue as to the amount of damages.
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule
judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a
trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the
pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if
practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial controversy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It
shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without substantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or
other relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the
action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be
deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly.
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set
forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein.
Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories,
or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the
mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or
as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him.
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits
of a party opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the
application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be
obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such
other order as is just.
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of
the court at any time that any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule
are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall
forthwith order the party employing them to pay to the other party the
amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused
him to incur, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or
attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt.
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to

Cross-References. — Contempt generally,
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i instituted to reverse or modify it in i
respect The appellees filed their re
it for a stay thus acknowledging the
Ilty of the decree and agreeing to its
is It follows that both parties are bound
eby and the appellees are estopped by
recitals of that decree from pleading it
ar to the prosecution of this s u i t After
dgment or decree in rem a party to the
rd is estopped from asserting any claim
rary to the facts determined t h e n by
tie orders made therein Rector v Rot
3 Neb 171 McIIugh v Smilcj 17 Neb
020 20 N W 29<> 24 N W 277 Spit ley
rost (C C ) 15 I ed 304 South Omaha I
ber Co v Central Inv Co 32 Neb 629,
W 429
may be conceded t h a t the decree was
leous and that if proceedings h i d been
u to reverse or modify it in a n j man
such proceedings would have been sus
>d But It cannot be said t h a t the dewas void The court had jurisdiction
le subject matter and the parties to t h a t
and its decree, even if erroneous, is
ing alike upon all of them In the ap
tion of the principle of res j u l i c i t a
» is no difference between courts of law
courts of equity When an issue of fact
f law has been adjudicated upon the
ts in either tribunal it cannot be again
ited in another Black on Judgnu nts
2, sec 518 A decree of a court of eq
whenever the parties to a suit and the
BCt of the controversy between them
within its jurisdiction is a s binding a s
d be the judgment of a court of law
the parties and their Interests regu
within its cognizance Black on Judg
s sec 517 By the terms of the decice
is made subject to the lien of the $1 (MM)
gage which is sought to be foreclosed
is action Its effect was to preserve the
of the mortgage and authorize its sub
ent foreclosure The matter was t h u s
ti out of the general rule a b o \ e mention
It follows that the court eired in finding
the former foreclosure was a bar to the
^cution of this suit and in dismissing
appellant's cause of action
In any
t under the facts in this case a s dis
d by the record the appellant was en
1 to a foreclosure of its mortgage for
valance due thereon
B therefore lecoinmend t h a t the decree
tie district court be reversed and the
B remanded, with instructions to the dis
court tp render a decree of foreclosure
tayed for in the appellant's petition.
DHAM and POUND, CC

concur

JR CURIAM The conclusions reached
tie Commissioners a r e approved and it
arlng t h a t the adoption of the recom
lations made will result in a right deci
of the cause, it it ordered t h a t the de*
of the district court be reversed, uud
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the cause remanded with directions to the
distiiet court to enter a decree of foreclosure
in favor of the appellant

HOME F I R E INS CO r B U t B C R et al
(Supreme I ourt of Nehraska I eh 17 1903 )
CORPORATIONS — MISMAN VGPMPNT — STOCK
HOLDERS—RIGHTS—COR1 OKVTh ENTITY—LQ
UITABLE RIGHTS - CONTRACT OF EMPLOY
MENT—CONTINUATION—PRESUMPTION

1 Subsequent stockholders ha\e no stinding
as a general rule to attack prior mismanage
incut of the cori >ratiou
2 Such a stallholder ought not to be allow
ed to HiK unites tin mixinnmigenient or its
effetts continue and are injurious to inui or it
affects him specially aud peculuuly la some
other manner
3 Stockholders who have acquired their
shares and thur interest in the coiporation
from the ailt ged wrongdoers and through the
prior mismanagement have DO standing to
complain theieof
4 Stockholdtis as such have no title to the
corpoiate property whuh they may convey or
incumber in their o\\ n name, but this is onlv
another way of sayiug that the coiporation
muht act through itb proper agents and in the
prescribed way
6 Where a corporation is pioceeding at law
or wheie it is asserting a title to propeitv or
the title to property is involved the eorpoia
tiou is regarded as a person separate and dis
tinct from its stockholders or any or all of
them
6 Put where it is proceeding in equity to as
sert rights of an equitable nature or is seek
ing relit f upon rules or print n i t s of equity the
court of equity will not forget that the stock
holders are the real and substantial benehcianes of a recovery and if the stockholders
have no standing in equitj and are not equita
bly entitled to the remedy sought to be en
forced by the corporation in their behalf and
for their advantage the corporation will not
be peimittcd to ret over
t I he proposition announrod In the ft urth
paragraph of the syllabus m l itrgtrald v Fit/
M raid 4 Mallory C onstnit lion Co ^9 N W
K*8 41 Neb 374 was in tffttt if not express
1> retracted on relit ann>, in I it/>,erald v Fitz
gerald & Mallorj Constnn tion Co 62 N W
990 44 Neb 473 and is disapproved
8 A plaintiff must recover on the strength
of his own case not on the weakness of the
defendant s case It is his right not the de
fendant a wrongdoing that is the basis of recoverv
9 Where service undt r a/ contract of em
plovment for a fixed peii>l continues aftei
stub period has ex| ired it H irtsuiiud to be
under the same contmtt but this pit sumption
miM yield to evidtiue showing a change of
terms
10 The general manager of a corporation aft
err o\t iration of a contiaot fixing his salary at
$> 000 per annum continued in the same em
plo\ment without any new agreement and
ufttiwards voluntaiily reduced his salaiy to
$3 000 per annum drawing it from mouth to
m« nth thereafter on tint basis for many years,
until he gave up the office After the original
I contract no action was taken by the directors
with reference to his salary, but the evidence
that he took the less sum from time to time in
I full payment was clear and convincing Held
that a judgment for bat k salary at the rate of
$2 000 per annum could not be sustained
| (Syllabus by the Court)
Commissioners opinion Department No.
2 Appeal from district court, Douglas county, Keysor, Judge.
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HOME F I R B INS CO v

Action by the Home Fire Insurance Com
pany against Charles J Barber and others
Trom the judgment defendant Barber ap
peals and certaiu other parties bring cross
appeals
Reversed
Byron G Burbank and Halleck F Rose,
for plaintiff
W W Morsman and V O
feti Ick lei for defendant Barber
POUND, C The plaintiff is an insurance
company organized in 1884 with a capital
stock of $100 000, divided into 1 000 shares
of $100 each Its business is conducted by a
boaid of directors a finance committee an ex
eeutive committee, and certain other officers
Including a secretary and general manager
It appears that the secretary and general
manager, at least down to December 1899
was at all times intrusted with the active
management and control of the company s
affairs and the president and the remaining
officers appear to have given very little if
any, attention thereto The appellant and
piincipal defendant Charles J Barber was
one of the original incorporators of the com
pany, and was a stockholder therein from its
organization until December 2 1899 During
that period he was secretary and general
manager one of the directors and a member
of the executive committee His codefend
ants, Lovett Woodman and Reynolds were
ilso original incorporators and stockholders
ind from time to time from its organization
jntil December 2 1899 were directors and
members of the executive and finance com
mittees On December 1899 the defendant
Barber entered Into a contract with one
funkhouser whereby he agreed to sell to
said Funkhouser all of the shares of the capital stock of said company except 2 shares
which be w a s to obtain if possible and to
procure the resignation of all the officers and
a majority of the directors He also agreed
not to engage in the insurance business di
rectly or indirectly for a period of three
years By the terms of the contract he was
to furnish to Funkhouser a true and complete
statement of all the assets and liabilities of
the company, and if, upon Investigation the
statement of assets and liabilities proved to
be correct and satisfactory to Funkhouser
the latter was to pay the sum of $75 000 for
said shares, less $200 for the two shares
above mentioned in case they could not be
obtained and a further sum of $40 000 as a
bonus for obtaining all of the shares of stock
and for procuring the resignation of the offi
cere, relinquishing his control of the com
pany, and agreeing not to engage further in
the business of insurance On December 2
1899 pursuant to said contract the defend
a n t Barber delivered to said Funkhouser all
of the shares of the capital stock of said
company, except 8 He also delivered an option contract for 6 of the remaining share*
and subsequently procured and delivered the
other 2 In payment therefor he received
the sum of $04 880 80 In cash and $20,619 40
93NW-65
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in assets of the company—namely $12 350
of collateral loans which he h i d agieed to
accept at the time when the tonti ict of sale
was made and cert un othei assets amount
jng to $8 2oJ 40 which 1 unkhousei had re
fused to accept at the time when the list of
assets was under consult lation
\ccoidinjJy
the s h u e s of stotk were t i i n s f e i i e d on the
books ot the eompiny undei the direction of
Funkhousci to himself md certain others
his associates in the ti lusiction and he and
his said associates bicmie thereupon and
now are the only stocl holeltis In the com
pany None of them li ui held stock theiein
theretofore
At the s u m tune puisuant to
the contiact the defendant Raibci leslMicd
his office and proem ed the lcsignation of the
defendants Reynolds Woodmin and I ovett
and of the other principil officers and direct
ors of the comptiij a n ] a new he ud of di
rectors was elected and m w ofh u s took
charge On No\ember 20 18 H evidently in
contemplation of a trmsfer of ill his inter
est in the corporation the detent! tut Barber
drew out $2 200 of the comn my H moneys
upon a claim of unpaid salaiy
feubsetpieut
to the change in management of the com
pany this was discovered aud a controversy
arose between B i r b t r and the new manage
ment with reference thereto as a result of
which suit was brought by the company to
recover said sum
Thereupon Barber made
a counterclaim for some $10 000 of sal iry
alleged to be due him and not withdiawn
and as a lesult of examination and iiivesti
gation of the company s I o >ks with refer
ence to this claim certain uie^uhirities and
mism inagement came to lifeht which weie
set forth in an amended petition and fin
nlshed the principal points of controversy in
the case as linally tued
Thus theie are two branches to the case
Upon the one hand a suit by the eorpoiation
to recover the money taken out by Barber as
back salary just piior to the time he sold
his stock and certain other moneys which
a t vaiious times he is alleged to have appro
priated wrongfully to his own use and on
the otht i hand a suit to r t t o v t r for Barbel s
mismanagement and for piohts made by him
through the use of the conipin> s money at a
time \*hcu he stood in a fiduciary lelation
thereto The principal mismanagement con
sisted In borrowing funds of the company to
purchase its stock and in making a profit
out of the purchase of the stock and the divi
elends actiuing thereon At the time the
stoek was bought with money borrowed from
the company it was woi th about $55 per
share But seven years later when the defendant Barber sold out his interest in the
company it had come to be woith $115 per
share During that time dividends had ao
crued in considerable amounts and had been
paid to aud received by Barber The decree
compels Barber to account for the profit*
and for the dividends on the ground that the
loan of the company s fund* and the use of
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those funds in purchase of the stock was un
authorized and that the profits and the dlv
idends belonged in equity to the company
Upon the issue as to silary, the couit found
t i n t Barber was entitled to recover for back.
stlaiy, as elalmed, and applied the amount
found to be due him t h e n on upon the
amounts found due the company by leuson
of his mismanagement
I h e f a d s with refeience to the mismanagement as found b j the eourt are substantial
ly these
In Januaiy 1802 and for some
time piior to that date, the stoekholdeis of
the company were dhlded into two factions
The one consist*d of the defendants Barber,
1 ovett Reynolds and Woodman who tuld
237 shaies, and some other stockholders not
sufficient, however, to constitute a majority
The other faction was contioiled by one
Hamilton, and held in tin aggicgate 507
shaies
As the c o n t r o \ n s y liuatiie acute
the Hamilton faction ic quit eel the Barber
faction to pmchase theh 507 shares of stock
or else to submit to the election of a board
of directors who would choose a new secretary and general manager and eutiiely alter
the policy and management of the compiny
It appears that Barber and his assoe iates
were experienced Insuiance men while Ham
Hton and his faction weie not and the court
has found that Baiber, Lovett Woodman and
Reynolds believed it to be for the best in
terests of the company, as well as for their
own interest, that the company should be
managed by persons of experience in the
business
Accordingly they ogieed among
themselves to purchase the 507 shares and
thus preserve control of the compuny
For
that purpose they agreed also to procure mon
ey temporarily by borrowing of banks on
their own notes paying said notes with mon
ey which they could boriow from the com
pany as soon as they could obtulu control
thereof, unless In the meantime they were
able to sell enough of the shares purchased
to pay off their notes or to pay,them off by
the sale of other property
In pursuance of
this design, they boirowed the neeessaiy
funds of banks purchased the shares and
distributed them among themselves, the ma
jonty going to the defend nit Barber A peuod of financial depnssion was Imminent,
and after the purchase it became Impossible
to dispose of the shaies as the defendants
had hefped so that It was m n s H u i y to bor
row of the company in oidti to pay off tin lr
notes at the banks Accordingly the defend
ants resorted to the company s funds bor
rowing a portion upon real estate secuiity,
and another portion upon notes secured by
pledge of the stock
As to the money borrowed upon real estate
security, the court has found that the loans
were made In good faith, with bona fide In
tendon of repaying them In full piincipal
and interest, that the security was fair and
reasonable, that the loans were made ac
coidlng to the usual mode of business of the
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company were entered upon the books In the
regulai \va} weie known to the officers, dl
rectois and stockholders of the compiny,
were in large p i r t included in the annini re
poits of the company and have all been paid
In full either by (ash or com < t u r n s of
piopertv to the compiny evcept the intuc^t
on a uioitgige loan to the defendant B u b e i
The loans on collateral secuiity on the con
trary, were not earned on the books of the
company openly in the name of the p u t i e s
who obtained them
The3 weie not such
loans as the statute authonzed the company
to make and fie court has found that they
weie not properly secured
The court has
also found that It was agieed between the
defendants Baiber lovett, and Remolds
when these collateial loans were originally
obtained fiom the company that they would
pay no interest thereon, and that aftt r a
short time tin y ceased to pay any
'these
loans weie kept standing on the books In
one foim or another until the sale of the
stock to I unkhouser in December 1800 when
the collateial loin account which consisted of
these items was turned over to Baibei as
abo\e stated
Ihe eouit found on this point
that the appoitlomm nt of the consideration
which Funkhousei was to pay and did pay
to Baiber for all the shares of stock in the
company, as provided for In the contract,
w hereby $75 000 was stated to be the consid
eratlon for the shares of stock, and the re
malniug $40 000 a bonus, was made after
the sale was practically consummated, to en
able Barber to buy in the shares of the com
pany held by other stockholders for the pur
l*>se or selling and delivering them, and that
the real value of the stock and the true con
sldeiatlon received therefor was not $75,000
but the full sum of $115 000
Upon this
basis the court found that the portion of said
507 shaies of stock which was covered by
the collateral loans namely 203% shares was
at all times after the sale by Hamilton in
equity the property of the company and that
the company was entitled to reco\ei the full
consideiatlon which Funkhouser paid Barbei
therefor namely, $115 per shaie
Another item of mismanagement grew out
of a mortgage loan to the defendant Wood"
man
In 1880 Woodman and his wife bor
rowed $1,400 of the plaintiff upon a moit
gage
In January, 1808 there was $l,b00
clue upon the loan and on that date Wood
man a l i g n e d to Baiber his half Interest in
75 shares of the stock purchased from Hamll
ton and his associates which had been ap
portioned to I ovett and Woodman as part
ners Thereupon the company released the
moitga t e e and Baiber charged the $1000 on
the books of the company as cash
This
item was carried on the books in various
ways until December 1, 1890, when Barber
paid it
I h e court considered that this
amounted to a use of $1 GOO of the company's
funds In the purchase of the stock, and that
the profits on 87Mi shares, amounting to $2,
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612 50, should be Accounted for to the com [ and Reynolds In preventing legislation hos
pany.
tile to the compiny and other s i m i h r n n t
A similar item grows out of the put chase teis and the court has found t i n t such claims
by Barber from the plaintiff of 20 shares of weie not bom tide and weie b i n e d by the
stock, originally held by the wife of the de- statute of limit itions and t i n t the t i n i s t c
fendant Reynolds
This stock was sold to tlon was in eflect a convcibion of $3 0(H) of
the company on August 1, 1809, and applied the compiny s money It has also found that
on a mortgage of $2,700, given by her and at various times the defend int collected sums
her husband to the company
The court amounting to $237 37 belonging to the com
found that Barber purchased the stock of p i n j , for which he failed to account
We
the company, giving his note for a portion, think that the item of interest on the moit
and carrying the remainder upon the books gage loan above mentioned is to be put in
of the company by various devices uiitJi De
the same category
cember 1, 1809, when the whole was paid [ And here belongs also the elilm for $2 200
It held, therefore, that he was liable to the of the compiny s funds wilhli iwn by Bar
company for the pioflt on these shares
ber on N o u m h i 20 is »') on iccount of back
A further Item of mismanagement glows salary Upon the issues as to s i l u y the
out of a mortgage for $2,600 executed by one court found t i n t in 1S00 a contract w is en
Raff
In January, 1894, an Installment of teied into between B u l e i and the compiny
whereby he was to receive a ccitiiu silaiy
principal and a large amount of acciued in
terest and taxes had fallen due At that time for the remainder of t i n t 3ear and for the
the mortgage was assigned by Its then holder year 1891 and from Januaiy 1 1S02 to J in
to the defendant Baiber for about the sum uary 10 I8J0 a s i l u y at the nt< of $HMM>
of $1,300 The court has found that Barber per annum The tenn of employment untl 1
knew at the time that foreclosure would be the contract was for five ycu& Baibei st 1 \
necessary, and Immediately instituted a suit ed, however continuously from the ineeptien
In his own name for that purpose Pending a of the conflict until December 2 lb.)0 and
stay, on order of sale pursuant to decree in after the e\pii it ion of the tcnn piovided no
the foreclosure suit. Barber assigned the I action of any kind was ever t iken by the
company by its board of duectors or by any
moitgage to the plaintiff company as collat
eral security for a note which he owed it, • committee or othcer other thin Barber, with
reference to the amount of salary But in
and afterwards drew out $2 500 of the com
1895, on account of general financial depies
pany's money In payment therefor
Subse
quently the foieclosure sale was confirmed, slon, It became necessary to reduce the sail
rles
of all employes and at that time Bat
and a large deficiency judgment entered
This judgment was never assigned to the ber voluntuilv reduceel his own salaiv to
company, but, after receiving a m a s t e r s $3 000 per annum r lhe court finds that fremi
deed in the foreclosure proceedings, he con I that date he drew his sulaiy from mouth to
veyed the property by warranty deed to the month substantially on the basis of such ie
plaintiff
The court found that the company ductlon until he terminated his connection
with the company I h e evidence tends to
paid taxes amounting to nearly $1 200 and
taking this Into account, held that the total show that dm lug the peiioel fiom lS*>i to
amount of the company's money used in the 18f)9 he nneh lepeited admissions t i n t his
salary was p u d that he made state me ids of
transaction was over $5,100 It found, fur
the condition of the company fiom which it Is
ther, that this was an Improvident and un
lawful Investment, In case the mortgage was evident be considered his sahay was $$000
bought originally for the company, as Barber per year and that the statement of the assx U
alleged, and that, If it was not so bought and liabilities which he m ide to I unkhouser
originally, the sale to the company pending pursuant to his contract was m ule upon the
stay In the foreclosure suit was a violation of I same basis. I h e court found howevci, t i n t
his trust, so that In either event he did not he was not estopped bv his volunt u y action
but was entitled to receive s i l i r y at the 1 itc
act for the best Interests of the compinv
and upon reconveyance should account to it of $5 000 per annum dming the whole pen *l
101 said sum of $5,100.
1 fiom 1S0~» and that theie was due him on
account of undiuwn salaiy the sum of $0
The other items are of a different natuie
4S"i 22
In 1895 Barber, while secretary and man
ager of the company, drew two checks, for
t h u s as already Indicated this suit In
$1 500 each—one to the defendant Reynolds
\olves two distinct questions
Ihe Inblhtv
and the other to the defendant Lovett 1 he se of the defendant B11 ber to aecount to the
checks were Indorsed and deposited by Bai
company as at present constitute d for hh
ber In his personal account Thereupon he mismanagement and uiiauthotizcd dealings
drew his check in favor of the company for with the company s funds piior to the sale of
the aggregate sum, deposited it to the credit all the stock to 1 unkhouser and hLs ass H lutes
of the company, and credited said sum of is one ejuestlon His liability to the company
$3 000 on collateral notes signed by himself for moneys and ass< ts of the company with
and said defendants, as a payment thereon
drawn and convcited to his owu use Is quite
t h e s e checks were issued In payment of al
another eiuestiou Connected with this last
leged claims for services rendered by Lovett I question is his claim for unpaid salaiy
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We shall first address ourselves to the ques|
would
be
for
distribution
among
them—the
tion of Barber's liability for mismanagement.
Complaint is made of the findings of tact of I sole stockholders of the company as now constituted.
the trial judge upon the several items with
This raises numerous and difficult quesrespect to which mismanagement is charged.
The evidence on these points Is very volumi- ! tious. It must be determined whether the
nous, and in some respects is conflicting. present stockholders, or any of them, are
Much of it takes the form of expert testi- entitled to complain of the acts of the demony with reference to the company's books, I fendant and of his past management of the
and is made up of conclusions deduced by company; for, if any of them are so enaccountants from their examinations of the titled, there can be no doubt of the right
books and papers of the company, which are and duty of the corporation to maintain this
difficult to follow, and at times a r e somewhat suit. It would be maintainable in such a
conjectural. But upon review of the evidence I case, even though the wrongdoers continued
we are satisfied that the findings of fact are to be stockholders and would share In the
accurate and complete, and are well sustained proceeds. 1 Mora we tz, Private Corporations,
by competent and credible evidence. We S 2D4. We have, therefore, to consider first,
have no disposition to interfere with any of
how far, if at all, subsequent shareholders
them. Accepting these findings of fact, how- may complain of prior mismanagement of
ever, several important questions of law arise, the corporation. Next we must consider how
with reference to which the decree rendered far subsequent shareholders may complain of
must be tested.
mismanagement, when they bold through
Counsel for appellant makes three points. such mismanagement OR have acquired their
The first is that the several transactions re- [ shares from persons who participated there?ited amounted to loans of the company's in. The third question to be considered is
iioney to Barber, and that, as the money whether the result of a recovery in this case
jorrowed has been repaid, he and not the would be inequitable, as permitting the prescompany is entitled to the profits. We can- J ent stockholders to recover back purchase
money, or a portion thereof, for which they
tot assent to this proposition. The use of
he company's money amounted, as the court received full consideration, and to acquire
ias found, to a speculation by one of the ©fil- shares worth $115 each at $55 per share,
ers In violation of his trust, which resulted j and, in addition thereto, recover and divide
i a profit. Were this an ordinary case, we among themselves a further sum of $00 per
bink there can be no question that the cor- share, imposed upon the defendant Barber
oratiou would be entitled to sue, or a stock- for his delinquencies in matters which have
older on Its behalf and for the benefit of all In no way injured the present stockholders,
there. But it is urged t h a t this is not an or any of them, or their interests. Finally,
'dinary case. None of the present stock- assuming that, by reason of the foregoing
elders were owners of stock in the corpora- propositions, the present stockholders are in
cm at any time previous to December 2, no position to complain and have no standS99. All of them acquired their interest In ing in equity, may the court look beyond the
ie corporation by and through the sale from coriH>ratlon to the ultimate and substantial
irber to Funkhouser on that date. Ac- iM'iiehYiarles of a recovery, or Is it bound to
rdlngly, the second point made by counsel Is I deal with the corporation as a separate perat as the defendant Barber came to own son in all respectsV
I of the stock, and the present stockholders
Sound reason and good authority sustain
quired their stock through him, there was a
the rule that a purchaser of stock cannot
?rger in said defendant of all the claims , complain of the prior acts and management
licb the corporation or its stockholders of the corporation. Hawes v. Oakland. 104
gbt have held against him, and such claims D. S. 450, 20 L. Ed. 827; Dlmpfel v. Ohio &
came extinguished thereby. We do not
M: R. Co., 110 U. S. 209, 3 Sup. Ct. 573, 28
nk this point is well taken. The trial L. Ed. 121; Taylor v. Holmes, 127 U. S.
irt has, found, upon conflicting evidence, 481), 8 Sup. Ct. 1192, 32 L. Ed. 179; Southit the defendant was never the owner of all west Natural Gas Co. v. Fayette F u e L G a s
j stock In the corporation, but was only
Co., 145 Pa. 13, 23 Atl. 224; Alexander v.
s agent of some of those whose stock he Searcy, 81 Ga. 53G, 8 S. E. 630, 12 Am. St.
•cured and sold to the present stockholders. Hep. 337; Clark v. American Coal Co., 86
?re Is ample evidence to show that tbis Is Iowa, 436. 53 N. W. 291, 17 L. R. A. 657;
e, and that a s to several shares of stock I United Electric Securities Co. T. Louisiana
had at no time any beneficial interest. Electric Light Co. (C. C.) 08 Fed. 673; Venner
s third and most serious point Is that a v. AtchlsJi, T. & S. F. R. Co. (C. C.) 28 Fed.
>very in the present case would be en- 581, Heath v. Erie R. Co., 8 Blatchf. 847,
ly for the advantage and Inure to the Fed. Cas. No. 6,306; Danumeyer v. Coleman
eflt of the present stockholders. It would ' (C. C.) 11 Fed. 97, 8 Sawy. 61; Pennsylvania
>unt, In substance, to a recovery back by Tack Works v. Sowers, 2 Walk. 416; 4
n of the purchase money which they paid Thomp. Corp. i 4569. In Alexander v. Seardefendant Barber for his stock, since the j cy, supra, the court says: "The weight of
ey, when recovered for the corporation, I authority seems to be that a person who did
not own stock at the time of the transac-
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tions complained of cannot complain or bring This consideration alone disposes of the critia suit to have them declared illegal." In cism. The rule has its foundation in a sound
United Electric Securities Company v. Louis- and wholesome principle of equity, namely,
iana Electric Light Company, it is said: "As that the rules worked out by chancellors in
a general proposition, the purchaser of stock furtherance of right and justice shall not be
In a corporation is not allowed to attack the used, because of their technical character,
acta and management of the company prior as rules to reach inequitable or unjust reto the acquisition of his stock; otherwise, sults. Resting on this basis, "the value and
we might have a case where stock duly importance of the rule * * * are conrepresented in a corporation consented to and stantly manifested." Field, J., in IHmpfVl
participated In bad management and waste, v. Ohio & M. K. Co., 110 II. S. 2<X), 3 Sup.
and, after reaping the benefits of such trans- Ct. 573, 28 L. Ed. 121. The right of the
actions, could be easily passed into the hands stockholder to sue exists because of special
of a subsequent purchaser, who could make .Injury to him for which otherwise he is
his harvest by appearing and contesting the without redress. If his interest is trifling,
very acts and conduct which his vendor had and the injury thereto of no consequence,
consented to." These remarks are not with- he cannot sue to compel righting of wrongs
out application to the case a t bar.
The to the corporation. Mcllenry v. New York,
present shareholders are all subsequent pur- P. & O. U. Co. (C. C.) 22 Fed. 130; Albers
chasers. They obtained then.- stock through v. Merchants' Exchange, 45 Mo. App. 2<R>.
the defendant Barber. They hold a large Hence there is obvious reason for holding
number of their shares under a purchase that one who held no stock at the time of
from him and his associates through the the mismanagement ought not to be allowed
very mismanagement now complained of. A to sue, unless the mismanagement or its efmajority of the remaining shares come direct- fects continue and are injurious to him, or
ly from Barber and his associates in the it affects him specially and peculiarly in some
wrongs upon which this suit is based. In other mani»er. City of Chicago v. f a melon,
other words, the present stockholders are con- 22 111. App. 91, on appeal 120 111. 447, U N . K.
testing acts through which they get title to 899, is a case of the first type. Carson v.
a large portion of their stock, and acts which Iowa City Gaslight Co., 80 Iowa, 038, 45 N. W.
those through whom they derived the greater 1008, is of the second type. Except in such
part of the remainder could not have chal- cases, the purchaser ought to take things as
lenged because they participated therein, and, he found them when he voluntarily acquired
by contesting these acts, which did not in- an interest. If he was defrauded in the
j u r e any of the present stockholders In the purchase, he should sue the vendor. As tc
least, are recovering back a large part of the corporation and its managers, so long as
the purchase price of stock which was ad- he is not injured in what he got when he
mittedly worth all t h a t they paid for i t purchased, and holds exactly what he got
Such cases illustrate forcibly the wisdom of I and in the condition in which he got it,
confining complaints of this kind to those there is no ground of com plaint. Clark v.
who were stockholders at the time or their American Coal Co., 80 Iowa, 430. 53 N. W.
successors by operation of law.
291. 17 L. R. A. 557.
The rule t h a t a suit for mismanagement
The cases which bold that n subsequent
cannot be maintained by one who was not stockholder may sue for mismanagement
a stockholder at the time has been criticized may be noticed briefly. Those commonly
as based on jurisdictional considerations pe- cited a r e : Ramsey v. Gould, 57 Barb. 398;
culiar to the federal courts and on obsolete Young v. Drake, 8 Hun, 01; Parsons v. Jocommon-law doctrines as to champerty and seph, 92 Ala. 403, 8 South. 788; Winsor v.
maintenance. 4 Thompson, Corporations, §S Bailey, 55 N. II. 218; Forrester v. Boston
4569-4571; 1 Morawetz, Private Corporations, & M. Consolidated Silver Min. Co., 21 Mont.
| 270. In our judgment it does not depend 544, 55 Pac. 229. 353. In Ramsey v. Gould,
upon either. T h e federal equity rule, while plaintiff, believing that there had been mis
designed in part to prevent collusive pro- management, bought shares for the purpose
ceedings in fraud of the jurisdiction of those of proceeding against the directors and oth
courts, goes far beyond the requirements of cers and "bringing them to justice." The
such a purpose. If t h a t were the sole pur- court permitted the suit upon the ground
pose of the rule, it should go no further than that plaintiff's motives were immaterial.
to prevent such suite where the vendor of But it assumed, without discussion, that he
the stock was a citizen of the same state bad an interest to vindicate, and had sufas the corporation. If the vendor and pur- fered some wrong, which is the real queschaser were citizens of the same state, and tion on which such cases depend. Moreover,
the vendor, an original stockholder, had nev- it is by no means clear that the motives beer had the same citizenship as the corpora- hind a stockholder's suit are immaterial.
tion, no fraud on the jurisdiction of the court Where stock is acquired for the purpose of
would be possible, and in such case, if re- bringing suit. It has been held that the com
covery were proper and the purchaser's cause plainant Is a mere interloper, entitled to no
were meritorious, it would be highly unjust consideration. Hawes v. Oakland, 104 TJ. S.
for the court to abrogate its jurisdiction.
I 401, 26 L. Ed. 827; Moore v. Silver Valley
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oing Co 104 N 0 534 10 S E 679, i t h a t case he also b i s a power of proceeding
lgman v Rome W & O R Co 30 H u n I or remaining inactive as he may prefer
Du Pout v Northern Pnc R Co (C I Where he is not injured he can take no
18 Fed 407,471 And s t o c k h o l d e r suits a d v a n t a g e of the power which was In his
In ought in good faith in the inteiests of
vendor and the latter did not care to exei
corpoiation have been dismiss*d on that else tn Graham v l a O o s s c A M R C o ,
uud Beshoar v Chappell b Colo App
supra the point was urged which Is so often
40 P a e 244 Belmont v E n e R C o , made in connection with suits by subsequent
Barb 637 In Young v Drake the court s t o c k h o l d e r and upon which Mr Moiawetz
ow Ramsey v Gould The further point I bases his statement that such stockholders
nade t h a t ' tbe plaintiff acquired all the should be allowed to sue Field J says
its of the person of whom he purchased " "But it is contended that this is a case
course in a case where those of whom where the debtor corporation was defrauded
purchased bad participated or acquiesced of Its property and that, a s the company
he mismanagement this view would pre- had a right of proceeding for its recovery
le the purchaser from suing And he any of its judgment and execution creditors
Id not sue a s being a bona fide purchaser have an equal right that it is a property
gnorance of the disability attaching to right and one that Inures to the benefit of
vendor, because shares of stock are not creditors
Conceding t h a t a s to creditors
otiable and the sale cannot pass greater who were such when the fraudulent procure
its than those possessed by the vendor
meut of the debtor s property occurred
rk v American Coal Co 86 Iowa 436,
• • • the question still remains whether
4 W 291, 17 L R A 557, 4 Thompson
porations p 3410 But it may be doubt , • • • subsequent creditors have such an
Interest that they can reach the property for
whether a purchaser of stock buys or in
satisfaction of their debts We doubt
Is to buy anything beyond the vendor s t)
lent interest In the corporation and its | whether any case going as far as this can
ts His vendor's causes of action for be found * * • It seems clear that sub
sequent creditors have no better right than
injuries and rights to complain of past subsequent purchasers to question a prevl
management are scarcely in conteinpla
ous transaction in which the debtor's fu*op
of the parties We must not suffer our- erty w a s obtained from him by fraud, which
es to be deceived by speaking of causes he h a s acquiesced in and which he has man
ction of the corporation in this connec
ifested no desire to disturb Yet In such
since causes of action of this character case subsequent purchasers have no such
ng to the corporation for the beueflt and r i g h t ' Hence, upon review of the author
he interest of Its stockholders
Parsons ities and the principles on which they a p
oseph and Winsor v Bailey adopt the pear to proceed notwithstanding the posi
r of Mr Morawetz t h a t the rule announ
tion ot some of the text writers the sounder
by the federal courts Is a rule of practice doctrine sustained by tbe better and more
d on Jurisdictional peculiarities of those numerous adjudications appears to be that
ts and not of general application
In subsequent stockholders have no standing,
ester v Mining Co the transaction w a s as a general rule to attack prior mlsinan
complete and still required ratification agement of the corporation
he stockholders The complainants al
It appears to be well settled also that
gh they bought after the acts were done
stockholders who have acquired their shares
1
stockholders while the matter w a s still and their Interest in the corporation from
latlve, and bad an undoubted right to the alleged wrongdoers and through the
fere to prevent its consummation
prior mismanagement have no standing to
ce w h a t Is said a s to the point in ques
complain thereof Brown v Duluth M A
Is dictum only
N R Co (C C ) 53 Fed 880, Matter of
ic fallacy In the view that one who has Application of Syracuse C & N Y It Co
been injured by a transaction and Is not 91 N Y 1, Schilling & Schneider Brewing
ted thereby can acquire a right to sue Co v Schneider 110 Mo 83, 10 S W 67,
qulty to set It aside because he has Langdon v Fogg 14 Abb N C 435 P a r
ired the shares of the person injured, sons v Hayes 18 Jones & H 4 ) , Uoliins
[posed In such cases as Graham v La v Ht Paul M & M It Co (Sup) 0 N V
se & M R C o , 102 U S 148 26 L
Supp 900, Clark • American Coal Co 86
106 and Hoffman v Bullock (C O ) 34 Iowa 430 53 N W 291 17 L R A 557,
248 The right to complain of such 4 Thompson, Corporations p 3410, Cook,
tactions is one which the stockholders Corporations (f 40 736, note If a stock
ed may or may not exercise a s they holder's predecessor in title has acquiesced
se Where such transactions are not a b I in a course of mismanagement, it has even
tly void, they may, If they so elect, been held that he cannot maintain a suit to
lesce and treat them as binding The restrain its continuance Trimble v Am
etlon whether to sue to set them aside Sugar Refining Co 61 N J Eq 340, 48 Atl
acquiesce in and agree to them is in
912 In I h o m p s o n Corporations, supra, the
[>le of transfer If the new stock hold
learned author says
But a s share certlfl
Injured there is another question In I catcs do not, under any theory, rise to the
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grade ot strictly negotiable paper, it should
follow, and especially in regard of the trans
fer of any litigious rights which may attach
to tin m, t h a t their holder cannot by se 11
ing them to another transfer to that other
any better litigious rights inhering in them,
than he himself possesses If therefore he
has by his conduct as a shareholder estop
ped himself from maintaining a suit in equl
ty to undo corporate action, this estoppel
will attend the shaies In the hands of his
v e n d e e " In consequence It would make no
great difference tn the case a t bar as to the
standing of the present shareholders of the
company in a court of equity, if we held
t h a t subsequent shareholders could attack
prior mismanagement The present share
holders hold 260 shares through a purchase
from Barber, who acquired title through the
acts complained of, and the money which
they paid for those very shares, which they
hold through such purchase, is now claimed
to belong to the corporation, and is sought
to be recovered from their vendor Nor is
this all The greater p a r t of the remain
ing shares were held by Barber and his as
sociates when the alleged wrongs were com
mitted, and a r e now held by the present
stockholders under a purchase from Barber
To allow them to open up these transactions
is to allow them to go counter to their own
title to a large p a r t of the stock, and to
assert rights and claims which their vendor
could never have asserted and this too a s
to past transactions which have no present
effect upon the value of their stock and do
not continue to be felt in any way in the
corporate management
There is another and still stronger reason
why the present stockholders have no stand
ing in a court of equity to complain of the
transactions on which this suit is based To
permit them to recover, under the circum
stances of the case a t bar, would be highly
inequitable It would be to give them mon
eys to which they have no Just title or claim
whatever, and enable them to speculate upon
wrongs done to others with which they have
no concern It would enable them to recov
er back a large p a r t of tbe purchase money
they paid and agreed to pay for the stock
notwithstanding the stock was worth all t h a t
they paid for it, and notwithstanding they
obtained and now retain all t h a t they bar
gained for So long as they received all that
was contracted for there is no equity in
allowing them to recover back a considera
ble portion of w h a t they paid merely because their vendor had previously wronged
some one else who could have obtained
redress In the name of the corporation which
they are now able to use This is especially
manifest in respect to the dividends
As
Barber and his associates acquired shares by
unauthorized borrowings of the company's
money, and so held them in trust for tbe
corporation, a s representing all the then
stockholders, In equity the dividends paid
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upon such s h i r e s doubtless were r»< i\ 1
impressed with the same t r u s t
But who
were the b e n e f k i u i e s of that t i n s t ' \ >t
the othe r stoe 1 he Ide is onl> but B u b e i t u t
his a s s o c n t e s together with suth Kimim
ing stockbold is R u b e r and his tss iites
held most of the stock outside of the s h u e s
in question lnstt id of r e t c h i n g all the
dividends on those s h i r e s the} should have
received m eqmtv the fen iter poiiion onh
Had a stockholder gone into equity at t i n t
time and lecovercd the dividends for the
comp my they would snnplj h i v e been for
disliibution tmong those who held the
shaies not subject to a trust for the com
p t n y and R u b e r and bis isseuntes would
still have been the heaviest benefiiiarhs
For it is well se ttled th it a reeovt ly tn sue h
case Inures to the bene tit of all stockholders
as well those who wcie wton^doeis as those
who were Innocent
4 Ihompson Corpora
tlons § 4491 But after an entliely new set
of stockholders have come in holding these
shares under Barber and his associates and
the re nninde r of the latter s s h i r e s under
purchase fiom them to let them rceove i
back these dividends is to let them reeliun
over 60 per cent of the put chase money
and recover from B i r b e r moneys which in
equity belonged to him when he took them
The fact t h a t a rel itivelj small portion be
longed to others cannot alter the uncon
scionable character of such a recovery so
long as the present stockholders are not
those others and have no stinding in equity
as their representatives Recovery by or fo r
the benefit of the present stocl holders means
to put it plainly that through the instru
mentality of a court of eciulty they are to
get shares worth bv their own valuation
$115 each for $>> c a h a i e to get back dlvl
dends which never would h i v e been p i y i h l e
to them in any event m l we re not bni gained
for when they bought and are to receive
In addition to the 8h ires worth $1 15 on the
dollar 00 cents more on each dollar inipos
ed on Barber for his delinquencies
Birber
wronged the old stockholders His conduct
in many respects was unconscionable and in
defensible But his fellow st 1 holders wen
supine for many years The y took no steps to
Investigate what he w i s doing or to protect
or asse it the ir rights Now third parties who
bought all of Barbe r s share s tne hiding those
wide h he hell as a re milt e>f tils wiougful
manipulations seek to assert those ilj,hl«and
reap a protlt t h e n by Because the Inequlta
ble conduct of Barber s h o d s the conscience
of the chancellor is no re ison why he should
give his conscience a fin the r shock by allow
ing I unkhouser and his associates to recover
monejs to which they have no legal or eq
uitable el lim
Conceding then that all of the
Btocklioldeis are so chcunistanced
relief should be afforded them in a
equity may the corporation recover
standing? We think n o t Where a

present
t i n t no
couit of
notwlth
corpora

(Neb.
tion is not asserting or endeavoring to protect
a title to property, it can only maintain a suit
e
t0 the eor
in equity as the representative of its stockt
e V M C , , t
holders. If they have no standing In equity tbat a X ^ t C
/ r t ™ rte n
a , in
tv
a person
to entitle them to the relief sought for their or thini; d i s t i l l f,.™. i*
benefit, they cannot obtain such relief through
the corporation or in its own name. Ara
Co,,
name for the ^ r » J ™ I
eetive
kansas lliver Land Town & Canal Co. v. compost
,
iZV
?*! 0T m e m l > e r s who
Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 13 Colo. .587, 22 In \ i «
tat-orporated
association" T,i
Pac. 954; Des Moines Gas Co. v. West, 50
lorta, 16; Schilling & Schneider Brewing Co.
v. Schneider, 110 Mo. 83, 19 S. W. 67; Flagler Engraving Machine Co. v. Flagler (C. C.)
19 Fed. 468; Parsons v. Hayes, 14 Abb. N.
0. 419; Langdon v. Fogg, 14 Abb. N. C. 435.
it would be a reproach to courts of equity
1 this were not so. If a court of equity
rould not look behind the corporation to the
iharebolders, who are the real and substanlal beneficiaries, and ascertain whether
bese ultimate bencticJaries of the relief it
s asked to grant have any standing to deaand it, the maxim that equity looks to the
ubstance, and not the form, would be very
inch limited in its application. 'It is t h e
rovince and delight of equity to brush a w a y
lere forms of law." Post, J., In Fitzgerald
Fitzgerald ic Maliory Construction Comwy, 44 Neb. 403, 492, 62 N. W. 899. Nohere is It more necessary for courts of
juity to adhere steadfastly to this maxim,
id avoid the danger of allowing their reinies to be abused, by penetrating all legal
tions and disguises, than in the complex
lations growing out of corporate affairs,
cordingly, courts and text-writers have
en In entire agreement that equity will
ik behind the corporate entity, and coner who are the real and substantial pars in interest, whenever it becomes necesrecognized «« , u e Kai b e l ) e .
y to do so to promote Justice or obviate flciarv 11*
qultable results. In 4 Thompson, Corpolons, $ 4479, the learned author says: "As
point of substance and sense the corporai consists of the aggregate body of Its
reholders, it Is obvious that in the most
stantlal sense the directors are trustees
the shareholders, and that, In any action Quentiy
h ! V ' ^ * m , , i e d fre ~
w ere 1
edregs breaches of trust on the part of the
ctors, the shareholders are the real p a r
in interest." Again: " F o r the purpose
ubstantial right, though not for the conences of legal procedure, the aggregate Sheldon T ^ . A t e ^ o r a t i o n s , | 2«2 :
klckeroeyer, »0 N. Y. 007 611
7 ot shareholders in a Joint-stock com- i uZ^r.
r should be deemed the corporation." 1 Ho,e. Co. r. Wade. 97 U. 8 . 1 3 , j * . J ^ ™ '
up son, Corporations, i 17. Mr. Mora; also writes very cogently to the same
t: " I t Is essential to a clear underling of many branches of the law of cordons to bear in mind distinctly that the
ence of a corporation Independently of
hareholders Is a Action, and that the
j and duties of an incorporated associat e in reality the rights and duties of the
ns who compose it, and not of an 1 nary being." 1 Morawetz, Private Corpois, f 1. "While a corporation may,
one point of view, be considered as an
' ^o., the court «ay.
s a v "Th«
«„•!
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an ideal legal entity is attributed to a duly
formed incorporated company, existing separate and apart from the individuals composing it, is of such general utility and application as frequently to induce the belief that
it must be universal, and be In all cases adhered to, although the greatest frauds may
be perpetrated under the fiction as a shierd.
But modern cases, sustained by the best text
writers, confine the fiction to the purposes for
which it was adopted." It has likewise been
applied to cases of estoppel.
Thus Mr.
Thompson says: " W e may also conclude,
from the premise that the body of stockholders are in substance the corporation, that
estoppels are concurrent as between the
stockholders and the corporation; in other
words, that whatever will estop the stockholders will estop the corporation, and whatever will estop the corporation will estop the
stockholders." 4 Thompson, Corporations, 8
5269. But the commonest instance of application of this principle Is in stockholders'
suits for mismanagement. Ordinarily such
suits are to be brought in the name of the
corporation, a t the instance of the corporate
authorities. But where, for some reason,
this course is not open, the stockholders Injured will not be deprived of all remedy, but
upon proper showing will be permitted to sue
directly by*jolning the corporation as a defendant. The very basis of these suits is
that "courts of equity recognize that the
stockholders a r e ultimately the only beneficiaries."
City of Chicago v. Cameron, 120
111. 447, 11 N. E. 899. Stockholders are allowed to sue, in order to obtain redress for
such wrongs, "because in their effect and essential character they are wrongs to the individual shareholder, inflicted upon his corporate interests! by means of the control over
those lnterestb secured through tht corporate organization and management." Brewer v. Boston Theater, 104 Mass. 378, 395.
See, also, State v. Holmes, 60 Neb. 39, 42, 82
N. W. 109. I t is but another application of
the same principle to hold t h a t where no
question of title is involved, but some equitable remedy is sought in the corporate name,
depending purely upon the doctrines of a
court of equity, the court, to prevent abuse
and perversion of its doctrines and remedies,
will look through the corporation to the real
parties in interest, and, if those parties have
no standing hi equity, will refuse the remedy.
Cases of this kind must be differentiated
sharply from those where the proceeding is
at law, or where a question of title to the
corporate property is involved. There is no
question that stock holders, as such, have no
title to the corporate property which they
can convey or Incumber in their own names.
Humphreys v. McKissock, 140 U. S. 304, 11
Sup. Ct. 779, 35 L. Ed. 473; Wheelock v.
Moultou, 15 Vt. 519; Smith v. Hurd, 12
Mete. (Mass.) 385, 46 Am. Dec. 690; Parker
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• . Bethel n o t el Co., 96 Tenn. 252, 31 S. W.
200, 81 L. R. A. 706; Button T. Hoffman, 61
Wis. 20, 20 N. W. 607, 50 Am. Rep. 131;
Spurloek v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 90 Mo. 200,
2 S. W. 219. But this, in substance, is only
another way of saying that the corporation
must act through its proper agents and In the
prescribed way. 4 Thompson, Corporations,
§ 4476. It is also true, for convenience of
legal procedure ami to avoid confusion, that
restitution or redress, even where the injury
has affected the interests of the stockholders.
is to be sought primarily through the corporation. But this rule must always yield to the
requirements of equity, and is cast aside in
view of the fact that the stockholders a r e
the real beneficiaries whenever the usual
course is not opeti. Brewer v. Boston Theater, supra; 4 Thompson, Corporations. § 1177.
Cases like the one at bar are obviously within the same reason. To penult persons to
recover through the medium of a court of
equity that to which they are not entitled,
simply because the nominal recovery is by a
distinct person through whom they receive
the whole actual and substantial benefit, and
that nominal person would, in ordinary cases,
as representing beneficiaries having a right
to recover, be entitled to relief, is perversion
of equity. It turns principles meant to do
Justice into rules to be administered strictly
without regard to the result. It is contrary
to the very geuius of equity. When the cor
poration comes into equity and seeks equitable relief, we ought to look at the sub
stance of the proceeding, and, if the bene
ficlarles of the judgment sought have no
standing in equity to recover, we ought not
to become befogged by the fiction of corporate individuality, and apply the principles of
equity to reach an inequitable result.
Hence, we think the rule to apply to such
cases is this: Where a corporation is pro
ceeding at law, or where it is asserting a title
to property, or the title to property is involved, the corporation is regarded a s a per
son separate and distinct from its stork
holders, or any or all of them. But where
it is proceeding in equity to assert rights of
an equitable nature, or is seeking relief upon
rules or principles of equity, the court of
equity will not forget that the stoekholders
are the real and substantial beneficiaries or
a- recovery, and if the stockholders have no
standing in equity, and are not equitably entitled to the remedy sought to be enfoived by
the corporation in their behalf and for their
advantage, the eorporation will not be permitted to recover. This rule finds many II
lustrations in the authorities.
In Arkansas River 1/and, Town & Canal
Co. v. Farmers* l o a n & Trust Co., 13 CoJo.
587, 22 Pac. 954, the court said: "It is true
that, for some purposes, a body corporate
is sometimes regarded as a legal entity, or a
fictitious person having a distinct existence.
This fiction is not recognized in equity. The
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reason Is clear. Without organization a n d j In Flagler Engraving Machine Co. v.
members, without officers and stockholders, Flagler (C. C.) 19 Fed. 468, the promoters
a corporation is but a naked body. It may and directors of a corporation put in cer
be authorized to exercise corporate fran- tain patent rights as part of its capital.
chises, but is without means or Instrumen- Afterwards by fraudulent practices they intalities for such exercise. It is clear, there- duced others to buy stock at extravagant
fore, that a body corporate cannot maintain prices. The purchasers got control of the
u suit for equitable relief, except as the corporation, and brought a suit in equity in
representative of the stockholders. It neces- the name of the corporation against the forsarily follows that, If the shareholders a r e mer directors for mismanagement.
The
without equity, they cannot, through the cor- court said that the purchasers might have a
porate organization or In its name, obtain ! right to set aside the sales of stock made to
•elief either for themselves or for the cor- them through fraud, but that they could not,
poration. 'In equity the conception of a cor- by obtaining control of the company, set up
>orate entity is used merely a s a formula an artificial case and recover through the
'or working out the rights and equity of company what was really their loss individhe real parties In interest, while at law this ually, and not as stockholders.
igurative conception takes the shape of a
In Schilling A Schneider Brewing Co. v.
logma, and is often applied rigorously, with>ut regard to its true purpose and meaning, Schneider, 110 Mo, 83, 19 S. W. 07, a corpon equity the relationship between the share- ration brought suit against certaiu stocklolders is recognized whenever this becomes holders to have shares which they held delecessary to the attainment of justice; a t clared to be the property of the corporation.
i w this relationship Is not recognized a t The court treated the remaining stockholders
11.' 1 Mor. Priv. Corp. 227. At the very as the real parties in interest, and expressly
utset of the discussion, then, it must be | referred to them as such, and held that, as
ssumed that, in a suit of this nature, the their predecessors in interest could not have
orporation and the individual plaintiffs can- complained of the use of moneys of the corot be separated. It follows that, if the In- poration in acquiring the shares, the stockividual plaintiffs are not entitled to relief, holders in whose interest the suit was brought
s counsel admits, the corporation is not, could not do so in their own name or in that
nd the judgment dismissing the bill might of the corporation.
The only decision which has been cited to
ery properly be affirmed without further
the contrary is Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald &
Iscussion."
Mai lory Construction Co., 41 Neb. 374, 429,
In Parsons v. Hayes, 14 Abb. N. C. 419,
59 N. W. 838. There it was held that a suit
le court says: "Again, considering t h a t for mismanagement was maintainable in
le fundamental position Is that Catlow be- equity as to a transaction in which four-fifths
tme, In fact, shareholder to the amount of of the stockholders participated and the re1 the capital stock, the following was the mainder acquiesced. There had been no
Nation between the parties: The corpora- change in the stockholders. Suit was brought
on w a s the holder of the legal title of the by one who had acquiesced to recover for the
•operty of the corporation, subject to cor- benefit of the corporation. It was said that
d a t e uses. Excepting this legal title fbr the action was for the benefit of the corpo•rporate uses, the shareholders were the ration, which was a distinct person, and was
trtles interested in the property, In fact, not affected by the circumstance that the
vnlng all of It, excepting the legal title, stockholder himself was in no position to
hich, a s against them, could be used for complain. But a rehearing was granted, If
rporate purposes. The trustees were the we may judge from the motion and brief of
atutory corporation.
The shareholders counsel, on this very ground; and upon reere members or a part of the corporation, hearing this branch of the case was decided
tie corporation held legal title for the pe- upon an entirely different point, namely, that
iniary benefit of the shareholders, having there had been no acquiescence on the part
> beneficial or pecuniary benefit In i t On of the complaining stockholder. Fitzgerald v.
e claims for the plaintiff, the thing pos- : Fitzgerald & Mallory Construction Co., 44
ssed is the right of the corporation to have Nel). 463, 62 N. W. 899. Hence, while there
! action against Its trustees for damages is no express retraction of the statement in
r their acts, which It is claimed were the former opinion, we are satisfied that the
•ongful to the corporation. This right, if court intended to recede from it, and that we
existed, was held by the same tenure and are not bound thereby. We reach this con: the same purposes that other property clusion the more readily because the proposi>uld be held. The corporation would have tion that acquiescence of all the stockholders
bare title to it for the beneficial use of does not preclude the right of the corpora-,
ireholders. It seems to be evident t h a t tion to relief, as advanced In the first opinion;
i corporation could not claim as damage Is contrary to the uniform and long-estabits Interests w h a t would be damage to lished course of decisions In all courts, and
i beneficial interest, when the owners of the understanding of all writers upon the sub> latter had consented to the so-called in- ject. 2 Cook, Corporations, fg 278, 279; 4
Thompson, Corporations, f 5269; 2 Beach,
7 "
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Private Corporations, S 887; 1 Morawetz, j of the taxpayers of the county; but, under
Corporations, §§ 262-264. The adjudications the present claim, the benefit would go to a
to the same effect as the statements of the private party, who bought with knowledge of
text-writers cited are legion.
the county's previous sale, and who admits
But It is said the defendant Barber, by rea- in his answer that he secured his own grant
son of his delinquencies, Is In no position to for a grossly Inadequate consideration beask that the court look behind the corpora- cause of the previous sale." In other words,
tion to the real and substantial parties hi the wrongdoing of the defendant will not
interest. The trial court took this view, say- blind a court to the fact that the plaintiff
ing: "I have come to the conclusion that, may have no standing in equity.
there being no equities in this case in favor
Counsel say that the court will not look
of Mr. Barber, it is not the duty of this court through the corporation to the real plaintiffs,
to look* behind the entity of the corporation." in order to preserve to Barber the fruits of
We do not think such a proposition can be his wrongdoing. If such were the only purmaintained. It is not the function of courts pose, we should agree. But the court will
of equity to administer punishment. When bear In mind the real parties in Interest, In
one person has wronged another in a matter order to prevent those parties from misuswithin its jurisdiction, equity will spare no ing equitable rules and remedies to obtain
effort to redress the person injured, and will relief to which they have no right, and re
not suffer the wrongdoer to escape restitu- cover back moneys which they paid out voltion to such person through any device or untarily upon full consideration, without any
technicality. But this is because of its de- deception, and to which they cau assert no
sire to right wrongs, not because of a desire legal claim whatever.
to punish all wrougdoers. If a wrongdoer
Turning, now, to those items which Indeserves to be punished, it does not follow volve withdrawal of moneys and assets of
that others are to be enriched a t his expense the company by Barber and conversion thereby a court of equity. A plaintiff must re- of to his own use, it must be evident that
cover on the strength of his own case, not the foregoing discussion does not apply thereon the weakness of the defendant's case. I t to. So far as its title to property and its
is his right, not the defendant's wrongdoing, right to its moneys and assets are concerned,
that is the basis of recovery; When it is dis- a clear distinction between the company and
closed that he has no standing in equity, the its stockholders is aiways drawn. As we
degree of wrongdoing of the defendant will have seen, even if Barber had owned all the
not avail him. This principle can hardly stock in the company, he would have had
need demonstration; but abundant illustra- no title to the corporate property, so fur as
tions are at hand. F o r instance, a creditor to be able to deal with it in ids own rather
cannot complain of a fraudulent conveyance than in the corporate name. But he was
by his debtor, unless he is injured thereby. only a majority stockholder. When he withBaldwin v. Burt, 43 Neb. 245, 61 N. W. 601. drew money or assets of the corporation, and
The conduct of the debtor may have been converted it to his own use, there was as
ever so fraudulent. But, if it appears that clear a conversion as if the transaction had
t h * creditor has not been prejudiced, he ac- taken place between natural persons. If he
quires no right merely from the evil intent concealed and covered up those transactions
or unconscientious acts of the debtor. An- by availing himself of the opportunities afother example may be seen in Roberts v. forded him as secretary and manager of the
Northern Pac. R. Co., 158 U. S. 1, 13, 15 Sup. company, and they were not discovered unC t 756, 39 L. Ed. 873. In t h a t case a county til a change in management resulted in an
had granted land to a railroad company with- investigation of the books, we see no reason
out authority, and the grant, under statutes why the company should not recover the
and decisions of the state, was of no effect. sums so misappropriated. We are therefore
Afterwards the county sold the same land to of opinion that, so far as relates to the
an individual. The court said: "Whatever $3,000 converted under pretense of payment
might be the result In a court of law of a con- to Reynolds and Lovett for services as lobbytest between these respective grantees of the ists, detailed in the twenty-third finding of
county, It may well be doubted whether a the district court, and the conversion of the
court of equity could be successfully appealed various collections, detailed in the twenty
to by a purchaser from the county of prop- eighth finding, the plaintiff should have Judgerty worth upward of $200,000 for a nominal ment. We think, likewise, that it ought to
consideration of less than $400. If the coun- recover the interest oti the mortgage loan
ty had found that It had been overreached In as found in the sixteenth finding. The trial
Its bargain with the railroad company, or had court held that this loan was made In good
learned that its grant of these lands was In- faith, was duly entered on the books of the
valid for want of power, and had come into a company, and properly secured and acquicourt of equity, offering to return or account esced in by the company and its officers.
for the consideration received, the condition But It further found that a large amount
of things would have been different from of interest ou the loan remained unpaid.
what it now is. In such a proceeding, the There is nothing in the record to justify any
rescission would have inured to the benefits I Inference,, much less a finding, that Barber
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was not to pay all the interest on this loan.
He had charge of the books and accounts | of the reduction; and the evidence Is clear
of the company, and the evidence shows I and convincing that he took the moneys
conclusively that he manipulated them in withdrawn in full satisfaction of his claim
many ways so as to conceal the true nature for salary, and had no thought of claiming
more until his right to withdraw the $2,200
of his dealings and the actual condition of
the transactions between himself and his em- was challenged after the new management
ployer. As to this item of interest, the case took charge. We think these circumstances
stands the same as any other between debtor are sumeient to show that the company relied on his voluntary action in reducing his
and creditor.
own salary, and took no express action thereThe same considerations apply to the mon- ou, because none was necessary, and that it
ey withdrawn on November 20, 1899. Un- i was understood by both parties that his salless the claim for back salary is a just and | ary was that which he had voluntarily fixed
valid one, this was simply a conversion of ! upon. In Shade v. Sisson Mill & Lumber
that amount of money of the company. It Co., 115 Cal. 357, 47 Pac. 135, the corporabecomes necessary, therefore, In this con- tion rendered statements monthly to an emnection, to pass upon the issues as to Bar- pJoy6, in which he was credited with a less
ber's claim for unpaid salary, since the com- salary per month than he should have repany has filed a cross-appeal from that por- ceived. It was held that the employe^, by
tion of the decree in which such claim Is acquiescence in these statements so rendered
allowed. Undoubtedly, as a general rule, him, was estopped to claim afterwards a
when parties have contracted for perform- salary in excess of that for which he was
ance of certain services for a definite period given credit. So long as Barber's reduction
a t a fixed salary, and the employment con- I of his own salary was carried out by himtinues beyond the period agreed upon, in the self for a long series of years, and even at
absence of any new contract, It will be pre- the time when he withdrew the $2,200 he
sumed that the employment continued under did not claim the right to withdraw any such
the same contract and upon the terms orig- sums as would be due to him if his present
inally fixed. Wallace • . Floyd, 20 Pa. 1&4, claims were allowed, we see no ground what72 Am. Dec. 620; Crane Bros. Mfg. Co. v. ever on which to sustain the judgment in his
Adams, 142 111. 125, 30 N. E. 1Q30. But this favor in this behalf. Hence we are of opinpresumption must yield to evidence showing ion that the company should recover the Item
a change of terms. Hale v. Sheeban, 41 Neb. of $3,000 converted on April 17, 1895, the
102, 59 N. W. 554; McCullough Iron Co. T. . item of $237.37 for collections unaccounted
Carpenter, 67 Md. 555, 11 Atl. 17(3; Common- for, the unpaid interest on the mortgage loan,
wealth Ins. Co. v. Crane, 6 Mete. (Mass.) I amounting at the date of the decree in the
64. It may be conceded that It would take lower court to $1,510, and the item of $2,200
two to make the new agreement, and that withdrawn on November 20, 1899.
a mere Intention on the part of Barber to
It is therefore recommended that the deaccept a less sum, or even an express statement by him that he would accept the less cree of the district court be reversed, and
mm, would not of itself bind him so to the cause remanded, with directions to enter
lo. Richard Thompson Co. v. Brook (Com. a new decree in favor of the plaintiff and
PI.) 14 N. Y. Supp. 370. In t h a t case cer- against the defendant Barber for the several
ain employe* of a corporation agreed among sums last above stated and interest thereon
hemselves to accept a reduction of salary, j at the rate by law provided. We further
[•he corporation was not a party to the recommend that each party pay bis own
greement, and it w a s never communicated | costs In this c o u r t
o or acted on by the corporation or Its
irectors. Such a case is very different
BARNES and OLDHAM, CO.. concur.
rom the one a t bar. Here, while there
fas no action by the corporation expressPER CURIAM. For the reasons stnted Jn
7, the court has found that from the time the foregoing opinion, the judgment of the
arber as general manager reduced his own district court Is reversed, and the cause is
llary, along with the salaries of other remanded, with directions to enter a new
nploy6s, to the time he ceased to be an judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against
fleer of the company, he drew his salary the defendant Barber In accordance with
om time to time substantially on the basis I said opinion. It Is further ordered that each
party pay his own costs In this c o u r t
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poini upon which the evidence is in irreconP A R K E R •.• STATE.
I cilable conflict. The credibility of the wit
nesses and the probative value of their testi(Supreme Court of Nebraska. Feb. 17, 1903.) mony were matters which it was the peculiar
CRIMINAL LAW—CREDIBILITY OP W I T N E S S function of the jury to determine, and we
CONFLICTING EVIDENCE—REVIEW—MISCONsee no reason for interfering with their deDUCT OF COUNSEL—SHOOTING WITH INTENT
termination or to seriously doubt its corTO KILL.
1. The credibility of witnesses and the proba- rectness.
tive value of their testimony are matters which
The alleged misconduct of the prosecuting
it U th« peculiar function of the jury to deter- attorney consisted of an appeal for convicmine.
tion
in which the duty of the j u r y to the
2. A verdict based upon substantially conflicting evidence will not be set aside by this court. state, to society in general, and particularly
3. An appeal for conviction, based altogether to the people of Boyd county, was pointed out
upon the evidence, however fervent it may be,
It
is not an abuse of the privilege of advocacy. in forcible and impressive language.
4. Ordinarily a party who did not promptly seems probable from alfidavits filed by some
object to an argument alleged as misconduct of the jurors that counsel based his claim for
will b« held to nave waived his right to com- conviction altogether upon the < v lence, and
plain.
5. But where the misconduct of counsel is so t h a t he did not at all exceed the limits of
flagrant and of such a character that neither legitimate discussion. Rut, in any view of
a complete retraction nor any admonition or re- the matter, it is certain that he committed
buke from the court can entirely destroy its
sinister influence, a new trial should be award- no such serious fault as to make it the duty
ed, regardless of the want of an objection and of the court to set aside the verdict. No
exception. Chicago, B. & Q. It. Co. v. Kellogg, objection was interposed by counsel for de76 N. W. 462, 55 tfeb. 748.
fendant at the time the remarks were made,
6. A person who has been found guilty of
shooting with intent to kill cannot found a and they were therefore neither approved
valid claim to judicial lenioncy upon his in- j nor condemned by the trial court. Tills be
ferior marksmanship.
| ing so, the following extract from the opin(Syllabus by the Court.)
ion in Chicago, B. & Q. H. Co. v. Kellogg. r>.r>
Error to district court, Boyd county; Har- Neb. 748, 70 N. W. 462. Is pertinent: "Jn
this case there was no formal objection,
rington, Judge.
Waltcv* W . P a r k e r w a s found guilty of I and consequently no ruling, or contumacious
shooting with intent to kill, and brings er- refusal to rule, which we are authorized to
review. Had the court, in response to a
ror. Affirmed
proper objection, vigorously condemned the
W. Q. Searo and W. T Wills, for plaintiff remarks of counsel, we think they would
In error. F r a n k N. Prout, Atty. Gen., Nor- have left no prejudicial impression on the
rls Brown, Dep Atty. Gen., and William B. minds of the Jury. By prompt action the tie
Rose, Asst. Atty. Gen , for the State.
fendant's counsel might have obtained an effective antidote for the poison iu Shafer's
SULLIVAN, O. J. Section 16 of the Crim- speech; but be failed to act, and is thereinal Code is a s follows: "If any person shall fore not in an attitude to have his commaliciously shoot, stab cut, or shoot at any plaint now considered. We do not, howevother person, with intent to kill, wound, or er, wish to be understood as holding that a
maim such person, every person so offending rebuke from the court, or even a complete
shall be imprisoned In the penitentiary not retraction by the offending counsel, is in ail
more than twenty years nor less than one cases of this kind a sovereign remedy. If
year." Upon an Information charging a vio- the transgression be flagrant--if the offensive
lation of this section the defendant, Parker, remark has stricken deep, and is of such a
was tried, found guilty, and sentenced to im- character that neither rebuke nor retracprisonment In the penitentiary for a term of tion can entirely destroy Its sinister infiuem-e
ten years.
—a new trial should be promptly awarded,
The grounds upon which he claims a re- regardless of the want of an objection and
versal of the judgment are (1) that the evi- exception."
dence is insufficient to sustain the verdict,
In our opinion, the sentence imposed is
(2) misconduct of the county attorney in ad- not excessive. If the defendant's aim had
dressing the jury, and (3) t h a t the sentence not been faulty, he might have been senis excessive.
tenced to hang. A claim to leniency, based
The defendant quarreled with his father- on inferior marksmanship, is not a very merin-law, Peter Hansen, and intentionally shot itorious or persuasive claim. The district
him, at a livery stable In the village of Spen- court had a large discretionary power, and
cer, in Boyd county. Thia is conceded, but we cannot regard a sentence imposing half
whether the shooting w a s malicious, or done the maximum penalty as an abuse of disa s a measure of necessary self-defense, is a cretion.
1 1 . I N Criminal Law, vol. 14. Crat. Die | 1T1I. I The judgment Is affirmed.
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